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This work explores the development of crypto-currencies – a subset of virtual currencies. 
It aims to provide a legal analysis of the key issues, namely investor protection (or lack 
thereof) and the use and classification of crypto-currencies. The work analyses domestic 
and European legislation to explore the protections currently afforded and classification of 
crypto-currencies under the current legislative framework. In the latter section of the work 
focus will shift to consideration of the extension of the current legislative framework or 
consider if the sui generis nature of crypto-currencies suggests bespoke regulation is 
required.  
 
The work aims to provide a starting point to assist further research in considering the exact 
mechanics of appropriate regulation.   





“Bitcoin is a remarkable cryptographic achievement and the ability to create something 
that is not duplicable in the digital world has enormous value”1 Eric Schmidt 
 
(iii) Introduction 
Endorsement by technology heavyweights, such as Eric Schmidt, has the potential to 
influence discussion and consequently the popularity and growth of virtual currencies. As a 
result, virtual currencies2 are increasingly debated in public fora as familiarity with the concept 
grows. Inextricably linked to increased discussion is the greater use of virtual currencies for 
everyday purchases3 alongside further investment4 and development of the virtual currencies. 
Influential bodies such as the UK Digital Currency Association [UKDCA]5 recently estimated 
there are more than 500 different virtual currencies in operation6 and the European Banking 
Authority [EBA]7 predicts this number will continue to rise.8 This work will focus on crypto-
currencies, a sub-set of virtual currencies, which use cryptography in their structure rather 
                                                          
1 CEO of Google as quoted in Jonathan Millet, Google Chairman Eric Schimidt: Bitcoin Architecture an Amazing 
Achievement, 16 March 2014, < http://www.newsbtc.com/2014/03/16/google-chairman-eric-schmidt-bitcoin-
architecture-amazing-advancement/> accessed 4 July 2015.  
2 E.g. Bitcoin (as discussed further in Chapter 1 (crypto-currencies)).  
3 The number of bitcoin transactions has experienced a steady increase from creation in 2009 until May 2015, 
where there were approximately 110,000 transactions per day on a rolling average basis on the entire global 
bitcoin network <http://blockchain.info/charts/n-transactions> accessed 11 July 2015. The number of 
transactions experienced a considerable spike in November 2013 following a hearing in Senate (United States 
of America) which stressed legitimate uses of bitcoin as detailed in Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee Congressional Hearing on Virtual Currencies, 18 November 2013 
<http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/media/majority-media/key-senate-committee-holds-first-congressional-
hearing-on-virtual-currencies> (Senate, USA, 18 November 2013) accessed 11 July 2015 and discussed in BBC 
Author, “Legitimate” Bitcoin’s value soars after Senate Hearing (BBC, London, 19 November 2013) <h 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-24986264 > accessed 11 July 2015. However, this figure may be 
compared to the number of Faster Payments Scheme Transactions in November 2014 there were 
approximately 89 million transactions monthly (approximately 2,966,666 per day) in the UK alone 
<http://www.paymentscouncil.org.uk/files/payments_council/publications_2014/free_industry_statistics_201
4/monthly_clearing_statistics_nov_2014.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. 
4 Coindesk Author, State of Bitcoin Q1 2015: Record Investment Buoys Ecosystem, (Coindesk, USA, 10 April 
2015) < http://www.coindesk.com/state-of-bitcoin-q1-2015-record-investment-buoys-ecosystem/> accessed 
11 July 2015. 
5 United Kingdom Digital Currency Association [UKDCA] is a non-profit organisation established to forward the 
opportunities associated with digital currencies. The organisation responded to the Government’s call for 
information on digital currencies and will be referred to throughout this thesis. Further information about the 
organisation is available at <https://www.ukdca.org/> accessed 11 July 2015.  
6 United Kingdom Digital Currency Association, The UK Digital Currency Association’s response to HM 
Treasury’s Digital Currencies: Call for Information, (UKDCA, London, 3 December 2014) < 
http://www.ukdca.org/downloads/UKDCA_HMT_Digital_Currencies_031214.pdf> p16, accessed 11 July 2015. 
7 European Banking Authority [EBA] is an independent EU Authority working to ensure effective and consistent 
prudential regulation and supervision. Further information is available <http://www.eba.europa.eu/> accessed 
4 July 2015.  
8 European Banking Authority, Opinion on Virtual Currencies (4 July 2014) 
<http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-2014-
08+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf> p10, accessed 11 July 2015. 





than an ancillary means of security. Patently, crypto-currencies are gaining in popularity. 
However, as a result of the relative novelty of crypto-currencies, commentaries provide a high 
level analysis of crypto-currencies and specific issues in isolation with few attempts to date to 
compile into a comprehensive work. Owing to the continuing evolution of crypto-currencies 
there is a lack of in-depth legal and regulatory review9 of the key risks. Detailed legal review 
forms the basis for regulation and as such the absence explains the inadequacy of the current 
regulatory framework. The Financial Action Task Force [FATF] noted that “the rapid 
development, increasing functionality, growing adoption and global nature…make national 
action…a priority.”10 There are now green shoots of regulatory interest;11 the UK Government 
published responses to a consultation on virtual currencies in March 2015,12 FATF released 
updated guidance on crypto-currencies in June 2015 and European Securities and Markets 
Authority [ESMA] published a call for evidence on investments using virtual currency or 
distributed ledger technology in early 2015.13 However the pace of development and time lag 
to introduce a regulatory framework means that, at present, there remains little or no protection 
for investors and users of crypto-currencies.  
 
This thesis aims to provide an in-depth legal analysis of the rapid development and key risks 
associated with crypto-currencies under the current regulatory framework. Owing to the noted 
breadth of discussion on crypto-currencies there are a number of avenues this analysis could 
take. The thesis has been deliberately selective. As such, an analysis of the “back office” 
aspects of the Blockchain and reward creation will not be undertaken due to the difficulty in a 
peer to peer system of determining the governing law when each peer, wherever located 
globally, is equally important in validating transactions.  In such a system it is impossible to 
                                                          
9 A conference on crypto-currencies was held on 12th June 2015 at the University of Birmingham with subject 
matter legal experts from across the world providing information. This shows there is appetite for legal debate 
on the topic. Further information and videos available at: 
<https://controllingcryptocurrencies.wordpress.com/programme/> accessed 11 July 2015. 
10 FATF Guidance, Guidance for a risk-based approach to virtual currencies, June 2015 <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-RBA-Virtual-Currencies.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. 
11 HM Treasury undertook a review of crypto-currencies publishing a call for information late in 2014. The 
author has been involved in providing feedback to the Call for Information which officially closed on 3 
December 2014. The HM Treasury response published in March 2015 is explored further in the following 
chapters. The FATF initiative have also published two guidance papers, discussed further in Chapter 5 
(Regulation) at 5.4.3 (Money Laundering). 
12 The UK’s National Crime Agency is now leading a multi-agency response to evaluating and responding to the 
threat posed by the criminal use of virtual currencies. The initial scope of virtual currencies is noted in: 
National Crime Agency, National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime 2015, 23 June 2015, < 
http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/publications/560-national-strategic-assessment-of-serious-and-
organised-crime-2015/file> accessed 11 July 2015.  
13 European Securities and Markets Authority, Call for evidence: investment using virtual currency or 
distributed ledger technology, 22 April 2015 (closed 21 July 2015) 
<http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2015-
532_call_for_evidence_on_virtual_currency_investment.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015.  





ascertain the legal system governing the relationships arising from transactions recorded in 
the Blockchain. The thesis will instead focus on the interactions between crypto-currencies 
and consumers through the medium of exchanges.  
 
Firstly, the thesis will draw on the regulatory objective of consumer protection and identify the 
legal risks faced by consumers when engaging in crypto-currency transactions. This will 
examine the entire crypto-currency framework and the platforms for conversion to and from 
fiat currencies14 rather than crypto-currencies in isolation. Secondly, as part of the analysis, 
the thesis will consider the nature and use of crypto-currencies by considering what crypto-
currencies are and trace their development and interaction with gateways to the regulated 
financial system. In order to do so the study will analyse application of money and payment 
terminology to the use of crypto-currencies. This will identify the properties of crypto-
currencies - whether crypto-currencies are money and a mode of payment in the traditional 
sense or rather crypto-currencies should be aligned to commodities with crypto-currency 
transactions being akin to commodity exchange. The thesis will also consider if crypto-
currencies are a unique product consisting of an amalgam of money and commodities.  
 
The conclusions reached in the initial chapters will form the basis for analysis in the following 
chapters to consider the protections available to consumers with an analysis of private 
international law provisions to determine the connecting factors, applicable legal system and 
regulatory environment. Recommendations will then be offered as to the most appropriate 
legal mechanisms to protect consumers and whether crypto-currencies, with their 
decentralised nature, can be assimilated into existing, established legal frameworks governing 
financial products and markets or whether they are sui generis in nature – a hybrid of 
commodities and money – which therefore require the development of sui generis legal 
concepts to fit with their innovative structures and operation. 
 
The intention is to state the current law as at 1st August 2015 but where possible account has 
been taken of subsequent developments.  
  
                                                          
14 Often deemed “real” money or “real” currency. Further information in the Glossary. 







51% Attack The largest potential threat to crypto-currencies. Where one person or group 
controls 51% of the mining power they can effectively control the production of 
new blocks and blur true ownership on the Blockchain.  
Altcoin 
 
Decentralised crypto-currency composed of a unique string of numbers and letters 
that constitutes units of currency. Altcoins developed from the principles of bitcoin, 
building different algorithms and based on different founding principles regarding 
creation and rewards. The specific principles are technologically specific and 
analysis of the terms of the founding protocols are outwith the scope of this thesis. 
The most popular altcoins include Ripple, Litecoin and Dogecoin. 
Bitcoin 
 
The most popular decentralised crypto-currency. It is composed of a unique string 
of numbers and letters that constitute units of currency and are used by the 
crypto-currency network in exchange for goods and services. The founding 
principles are contained in the bitcoin protocol available at 
<https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf>. The principles identify the rules surrounding 
creation and understanding of the algorithmic processes. This will be discussed in 
some detail in Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies) however, further in-depth technical 
analysis should be sought for the specifics regarding creation, for example by 
reviewing the protocol.   
Blockchain or 
Ledger 
The sequential public proof of work ledger system detailing all transactions which 
have ever taken place on a specific crypto-currency network. The blockchain is 
constantly expanding as new transactions and completed “blocks” are added with 
a new set of recordings. The technology underlying the Blockchain means there is 
no one central authority in control of Blockchain and all users can rely on the 
information contained therein. The key threat to the Blockchain is a 51% attack.  
Block rewards The rewards to miners for the proof of work i.e. the reward for proving / solving the 
transaction before other miners.  Rewards are the creation of new bitcoins for the 
proof of work. Rewards diminish over time in accordance with the Blockchain 
protocol. 
Crypto-currency Maths based, decentralised convertible virtual currencies. Crypto-currencies use 
the principles of cryptography in structure and are detailed in the founding 
protocols of the relevant crypto-currency. Examples include Bitcoins and Altcoins. 
In contrast with fiat currencies, crypto-currencies are not universally accepted in 
any country of issue.  







A digital representation of either virtual currencies or fiat currencies. For the 
purposes of this thesis the term virtual currencies will be used in place of digital 
currencies. 
E-money Digital representation of fiat currency used to electronically transfer value 
denominated in fiat currency. 
Exchange(s) A platform established to exchange virtual currencies for fiat currencies, funds or 
other forms of virtual currencies. Exchanges also offer online hosted wallets to 
store and deposit virtual currencies and effect transfers to other users. Examples 
include MtGox and Bitstamp.net. (discussed further in Chapter 1 (Crypto-
currencies) at 1.4 (Case Studies). 
FX A widely used global decentralised market for the trading of fiat currencies. Also 
known as foreign exchange market, forex or currency market.  
Fiat currencies Often deemed “real” money or “real” currency. Fiat currency in the UK is sterling, 
being the coin and paper money designated as legal tender. Fiat currencies are 
universally accepted as a means of exchange in the issuing country. 
Hash Rate The hash rate is the measuring unit of the processing power of the crypto-
currency network. Mathematical operations are undertaken for security purposes 
at a hash rate per second, per hour etc. For example 5 Th/s means 5 trillion 
calculations a second. 
LIBOR The London Inter-Bank Offered Rate. This is set daily as the interest rate 
benchmark for a broad range of financial transactions. It was formerly 
administered by the British Bankers Association [BBA] and the setting of LIBOR is 
now a regulated activity in the UK supervised by the Financial Conduct Authority. 
It is now administered by NYSE Euronext Rates Administration Limited.   
Miners Those operating the computers running the software to solve the crypto-currency 
algorithms. Originally this could be run on home PCs but miners increasingly pool 
to utilise supercomputers specially optimised to perform this function. 
Mining Where an entity that participates in virtual currencies runs software to solve 
complex algorithms and validate transactions in a virtual currency system. Such 
validation is noted in blocks in the Blockchain.  
Nonce A nonce is a random piece of data which is added to the block in order to create a 
unique string of numbers. For example, in the most popular crypto-currency 
Bitcoin, the nonce is an incremental number that is added to the block for every 
computation. Each newly solved block will have a new nonce added.  
Online or hosted 
wallets 
The facility used to store, hold or transfer virtual currencies. Online or hosted 
wallets can be stored centrally on a crypto-currency exchange or by downloading 





the application to a user's tablet / laptop / computer / smart phone. Online or 
hosted wallet are each attributed a code e.g. 
1QCerSNwoZysfHQ5KeuBZMLBsLZEQU4DxY 
Proof of Work Miners compete to produce proof of work through a process of trial and error to 
validate crypto-currency transactions. Proofs of work are tied to the data of each 
block and are required for the blocks to be accepted. Each block contains the 
hash of the preceding block, thus each block has a chain of blocks that together 
contain a large amount of work. The hash of the new block is smaller than the 
difficulty target and serves to prove that this work has been done. Smaller target 
numbers reduce the range of accepted nonces thereby increasing the average 
time required to find a nonce and why increased computable effort is required. For 
example, at the end of October 2014 miners had to try 154.6 quintillion values at 
average to find the nonce – the number used only once. 
Transaction The transfer of crypto-currencies from one user to another. Instructions are issued 
to an exchange as agent of the Online or Hosted Wallet user and is given effect 
by recording on the Blockchain. The transaction is attributed a transaction number 
and it is this number which  is noted on the Blockchain e.g. 
51f76a29516a69e9adeb937d77f59ec6ac3a2ad6df0dfb906cec9fc1716e171a 
User An individual or company using exchanges and crypto-currencies for the sale and 
purchase of goods and services.  
Virtual 
currencies 
Digital representation of value that can be digitally traded. Also known as digital 
currency; digital cash; electronic currencies; crypto-currencies and 
cryptocurrencies. 
 






AML Anti-Money Laundering 
BBA British Banking Authority 
CDD Customer Due Diligence 
COBS Conduct of Business Sourcebook 
COLL Collective Investment Schemes Block of the FCA Sourcebook 
CHAPS Clearing Houses Automated Payment System 
DISP Dispute Resolution: Complaints Block of FCA Sourcebook 
EBA European Banking Authority 
ESMA European Securities and Markets Authority 
FATF The Financial Action Task Force 
FCA Financial Conduct Authority 
FIT Fit and Proper Person test for Approved Persons Block of FCA Sourcebook 
FOS Financial Ombudsman Service 
FSA Financial Services Authority 
FSCS Financial Services Compensation Scheme 
FSMA Financial Services Markets Act 2000 
FX Foreign Exchange Trading  
PERG The Perimeter Guidance Manual of FCA Sourcebook 
POCA Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
HMT HM Treasury 
OTC Over the Counter Operations 
MAR Market Conduct Block of FCA Sourcebook  
PRIN High Level Principles for Business Block of FCA Sourcebook 
SYSC Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls Block of FCA 
Sourcebook 
UKDCA United Kingdom Digital Currency Association 
 
  





Chapter 1: Crypto-Currencies  
1.1: The concept 
For the purposes of this thesis virtual currencies can be defined as a representation of value 
that can be digitally traded as a means of exchange.15 This thesis will focus on analysing a 
subset of virtual currencies - mathematically based crypto-currencies, the generic term used 
to describe virtual currencies which incorporate the principles of cryptography in their structure 
rather than using cryptography to enhance security of the virtual currency.16 Used as a 
representation of value, crypto-currencies can be distinguished from e-money17 or internet 
based payment mechanisms18 which are digital representations of fiat currencies used to 
purchase goods and services. E-money and internet based payment mechanisms are 
governed by European Directives transposed into national legislation.19 To analyse the 
adequacy or otherwise of the current European and national legislative framework in 
governing the use of crypto-currencies as money, payment and deposits this section will 
examine what crypto-currencies are, the operation of crypto-currencies and identify and 
analyse the inherent problems associated with both crypto-currencies and exchanges.20 
Owing to the already noted lack of published legal analysis this chapter proposes to identify 
appropriate case studies to elucidate present use of crypto-currencies and exchanges and 
contextualise the abstract principles. The objective is to provide a high level overview of 
crypto-currencies and the infrastructure established to exploit this computer science 
breakthrough rather than an abstract analysis of crypto-currencies in isolation.  
Firstly, crypto-currencies can be categorised into the two most prevalent types: 
                                                          
15 See remainder of this Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies) and glossary of terms for further information regarding 
the operation of crypto-currencies. 
16 Topical news stories suggest crypto-currencies are a relatively new invention, however they were proposed 
as early in 1982 in a paper by David Chaum, Blind Signatures for untraceable signatures, 1982 / 1983 
<http://sceweb.sce.uhcl.edu/yang/teaching/csci5234WebSecurityFall2011/Chaum-blind-signatures.PDF> 
accessed 11 July 2015. The paper outlined an anonymous e-cash scheme using cryptography for payments. 
Although a number of other systems were proposed in the intervening period, the concept of crypto-
currencies garnered interest following the self-published introductory paper by Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008 
regarding the establishment of bitcoin. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, 31 
October 2008 <http://www.cryptovest.co.uk/resources/Bitcoin%20paper%20Original.pdf> accessed 11 July 
2015. Bitcoin is the most popular crypto-currency and is discussed further in this chapter.  
17 As defined in the glossary and further examined in Chapter 5 (Regulation) e-money is a digital representation 
of fiat currency, for example, adding funds to a paypal account to transfer and pay electronically by fiat 
currencies.  
18 As further examined in Chapter 3 (Payment) and Chapter 4 (Consumer Protections) at 4.8 (E-Commerce).  
19 As examined further in Chapter 5 (Regulation) at 5.6 (Electronic Money).  
20 Exchanges are platforms established to exchange crypto-currencies for fiat currencies, funds or other forms 
of virtual currencies. Examples are discussed further in Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies) at 1.4 (Case Studies).  





1. Convertible (or open) crypto-currencies which are exchangeable for fiat currencies. 
Fiat currencies can be converted to a crypto-currency, which is then retained or 
exchanged for goods or services and re-exchanged for fiat currencies at the current 
“exchange rate.” Examples include Bitcoin,21 Litecoin, Ripple, Darkcoin and 
Dogecoin.22 
 
2. Non-convertible (or closed) crypto-currency schemes for use only in the virtual 
communities in which they are developed.23 Non-convertible crypto-currencies (also 
known as unidirectional crypto-currencies) are noted for sake of completeness. They 
cannot be used as a means of universal exchange, having a value only within the game 
or virtual world in which they can traded. As a result they do not satisfy the legal criteria 
to constitute currency or money.  Accordingly unidirectional crypto-currencies will not 
be considered further in this thesis. 
 
This categorisation captures the types of crypto-currencies at the time of writing but that may 
expand as technology advances.  
1.2: Operation 
Crypto-currencies are “a digital representation of value that is neither issued by a central bank 
or a public authority….”24 That quality of crypto-currencies is at once a strength and weakness. 
The crypto-currency system is supervised by the computer networks of a series of distrustful, 
yet interested parties, which monitor and protect the open source network in exchange for 
opportunities to accrue further units of crypto-currency i.e. a decentralised peer-to-peer 
                                                          
21 For the purposes of this thesis, the common naming convention will be used i.e. “Bitcoin” (capitalised) refers 
to the software and network infrastructure used to create the crypto-currency while “bitcoin” or “bitcoins” 
(lowercase) refers to the individual units of account which are purchased and transferred on the Bitcoin 
network.  
22 Analysis of the structure, use and popularity of these crypto-currencies will be detailed in the case studies 
later in this chapter. 
23 These crypto-currency schemes, which have often been in place for a number of years, are not intended to 
be used outwith the particular virtual community for which they are purchased. Thus, there is no link to the 
real economy and they cannot be used in exchange for tangible goods and services. E.g. World of Warcraft 
Goods <https://eu.battle.net/shop/en/product/game/wow> accessed 11 July 2015; or the digital currency 
“Linden Dollars” (L$) utilised in the popular virtual world Second Life. There are a number of articles analysing 
Linden Dollars, for a general overview see Robert Bond, Business trends in virtual worlds and social networks – 
an overview of the legal and regulatory issues relating to intellectual property and money transactions 2009 
Ent. L.R 2009, 20(4), 121 – 128. 
24 European Banking Authority, Opinion on Virtual Currencies (2014) 
<http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-2014-
08+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf> at p5, accessed 11 July 2015. 





monitoring system with no official25 oversight as commonly provided by a central bank or other 
regulator.  
In a crypto-currency network, a user wishing to make payment issues instructions to an 
exchange26 holding the user’s online wallet or undertakes the transfer directly from the online 
wallet stored on their laptop or tablet. Exchanges primarily serve three functions: (i) to serve 
as a method of exchange from fiat currencies to crypto-currencies and back; (ii) as a platform 
for users to store crypto-currencies in an online wallet; and (iii) as a platform to transfer27 
crypto-currencies.  
In relation to the transfer of crypto-currencies from one user to another information is 
disseminated across the network where miners compete to verify ownership of the crypto-
currency through piecing together a set of mathematical algorithms or blocks to confirm 
ownership. This is a process of trial and error to find a nonce,28 such trial and error work is 
also known as proof of work. Ascertainment of the nonce and proofs of work are tied to the 
data of each transaction and are required for the blocks to be accepted by the Blockchain. 
The Blockchain is the sequential public proof of work ledger system detailing all transactions 
which have ever taken place on the specific crypto-currency network.  In return for verification 
of ownership, miners are awarded “block fees” or “block-rewards” i.e. newly created crypto-
currency units and/or paid fees by the parties to the transaction for assisting in effecting the 
transfer or transaction from one user to another. Each crypto-currency has its own verification 
requirements with different levels of computable effort required to solve the mathematical 
algorithms.29 Public and private keys corresponding to the sending address alongside the time 
and date of the transactions and the hash of the preceding block are detailed with every 
processed transaction and recorded in a continuously updated Blockchain. Approximately six 
times per hour a group of accepted transactions, a block, is added to the Blockchain. The 
apparently random assortment of characters are unique and required to demonstrate 
authenticity and ensure no double spending. The Bitcoin network protects against double 
                                                          
25 This can be differentiated from all fiat currencies which are subject to regulation, official oversight and 
monitoring. The governing regulation for fiat currencies will be examined in Chapter 5 (Regulation) with 
consideration of adaptability or extension for governance of crypto-currencies in Chapter 6 (Recommendations 
& Conclusions).  
26Some exchanges have been subject to negative publicity which is discussed further in this Chapter at 1.4 
(Case Studies).  
27 Note this is different to exchanging crypto-currencies to fiat currencies. This is the transfer of crypto-
currencies to another user in the form of crypto-currencies.  
28 A nonce is a random piece of data which is added to the block to create a unique string of numbers. Each 
newly created crypto-currency will have a nonce added. Further information is detailed in the glossary of 
terms in the preliminaries.   
29 For example, Bitcoin and Litecoins use different hashtag algorithms. The algorithms used by Litecoin result in 
faster confirmation times compared with Bitcoin. All altcoins (discussed below) are variations of the bitcoin 
network principles. 





spending i.e. where there is an attempt to use bitcoin credit more than once, by comparing 
each transaction against the previous “blocks” added to the Blockchain. It protects against 
double spending by not giving effect to the second transaction. The adding of verified 
transactions to the Blockchain as proof of work30 confirms the transaction31 to the rest of the 
network.32 Confirmation of the transaction occurs once it has been published to the Bitcoin 
network on the public ledger. Debate occurs as to the stage at which confirmation of the 
authenticity becomes certain and unchallengeable – this is commonly accepted to be once a 
block is 6 blocks deep i.e. it has gone through further transactions and been repeated in 
subsequent blocks a further 6 times. Crypto-currencies are acquired by the recipient as a 
secondary or derivative form of acquisition of ownership from another user. In contrast mining 
operations and block rewards as the original mode of acquisition of ownership. Ultimately, 
when crypto-currencies reach maximum issuance these methods of transfer will be the only 
means of exchanging crypto-currencies.  
In the early stages, mining was akin to an unprecedented, certainly in digital times, arms race, 
with miners competing to solve the computational algorithms, developed by the crypto-
currency protocols. Miners33 economically benefited from early investment in the technology 
required to crack the mathematical problems firstly by receiving the reward of bitcoins and 
secondly by virtue of the rise in price of bitcoins. However, owing to the founding principles of 
crypto-currencies34 the block fees payable (or new crypto-currencies awarded) for solving the 
algorithms continually diminish. In addition to block rewards miners may also levy transaction 
fees. In order to make transactions economically viable, miners’ transaction fees charged to 
users will require to increase to offset these reduced block rewards. Additionally, the costs 
associated with solving the algorithms are increasing owing to the advanced technology with 
                                                          
30 Edward Southhall and Mark Taylor, Bitcoins, CTLR 2013 19(6), 177 – 178 at 177;  and Nicolas Houy, It will 
cost you nothing to “kill” a proof-of-stake crypto-currency, January 2014, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2393940> 
accessed 11 July 2015.  
31 Nicolas Courtois and Lear Bahack, On subversive miner strategies and block withholding attack in bitcoin 
digital currency, 2 December 2014 <http://arxiv.org/pdf/1402.1718v5.pdf> accessed on 11 July 2015. 
32 For the purposes of this thesis a high level overview of how crypto-currencies are created and exchanged has 
been detailed.  There are many sources detailing the computer science involved in mining and exchange and 
should be considered if a fuller technological overview of crypto-currencies is sought. See Meni Rosenfeld, 
Analysis of Bitcoin Pooled Mining Reward Systems, 22 December 2011 <http://arxiv.org/pdf/1112.4980v1.pdf> 
accessed 11 July 2015; or Nicolas Courtois et al, The Unreasonable Fundamental Incertitudes Behind Bitcoin 
Mining, 10 April 2014 <http://arxiv.org/pdf/1310.7935v3.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. 
33 Individuals are commonly referred to as “miners” however, for the avoidance of doubt, the complex 
machinery and computational effort required to validate the transactions are actually mining (or solving) the 
mathematical problems to prove ownership. 
34 E.g. Bitcoin protocol available at <https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015; Ripple protocol 
available at <https://ripple.com/knowledge_categories/ripple-protocols/> accessed 11 July 2015. Additionally, 
see the case studies below regarding the implementation and use of crypto-currencies. 





which miners require to be equipped to compete and the computable effort required involving 
the consumption of prodigious quantities of electricity as well as competition from other miners.  
As noted previously, initially, individuals with specialist computational technology could 
profitably mine crypto-currencies (Figure 1), however the competitiveness35 of mining 
combined with the complex mathematical algorithms and technological requirements has 
resulted in individuals, initially key in the race, no longer profitably “mining.” Figure 2 pictorially 
represents the sophisticated technology36 businesses now dedicate to mining crypto-
currencies. The limited number of users and companies which have the required technology 
to “crack” the algorithms questions the de-centralised nature and founding principles of crypto-
currencies. This increases the possibility of a pool of miners expanding to constitute 51% or 
more of the overall mining industry. By holding the majority a dominant pool can dictate the 
answers to the entire industry with results for its own interest but the “wrong” answers for the 
crypto-currency industry – a so called 51% attack. As well as vault facilities for allegedly 
safekeeping the crypto-currency assets of customers,37 a number of larger exchanges now 
offer services, including online wallets, transmission of crypto-currency funds and conversion 
of fiat currencies to crypto-currencies. The crypto-currency eco-system is becoming 
increasingly reliant on such presently unregulated yet trusted service providers. This reliance 
was recently demonstrated when a security breach at one of the largest and well-known 
exchanges, bitstamp.net in January 201538 resulted in pricing uncertainty across the entire 
                                                          
35 The competitiveness refers to the competition between miners working to solve the algorithms to confirm 
the transaction. Solving the problems is rewarded with block rewards of crypto-currencies.  
36 Mining pools refers to the collective effort of organisations to crack the algorithms and split the associated 
costs. This is more profitable than continuing on an individual basis.  
37 The vault may be a “hot” vault held on a computer connected to the network or it may be “cold storage” 
solution where the private keys are converted typically to paper format and the paper is then stored securely 
and can be scanned back to digital format. 
38 As discussed later in this chapter and in the forthcoming chapters bitstamp.net suffered a significant security 
breach on 5 January 2015 and temporarily suspended services until 9pm on 9 January 2015. Users were 
instead provided with the following message:  
An important message to our customers: January 6, 2015, 12:34am UTC 
We have temporarily suspended Bitstamp services. Bitstamp customers can rest assured that their bitcoins 
held with us prior to temporary suspension of services on January 5th (at 9am UTC) are completely safe and 
will be honored in full. On January 4th, some of Bitstamp’s operational wallets were compromised, resulting in 
a loss of less than 19,000 BTC. Upon learning of the breach, we immediately notified all customers that they 
should no longer make deposits to previously issued bitcoin deposit addresses. To repeat, customers should 
NOT make any deposits to previously issued bitcoin deposit addresses. As an additional security measure, we 
suspended our systems while we fully investigate the incident and actively engage with law enforcement 
officials. This breach represents a small fraction of Bitstamp’s total bitcoin reserves, the overwhelming 
majority of which are held in secure offline cold storage systems. We would like to reassure all Bitstamp 
customers that their balances held prior to our temporary suspension of services will not be affected and will 
be honored in full. We appreciate customers’ patience during this disruption of services. We are working to 
transfer a secure backup of the Bitstamp site onto a new safe environment and will be bringing this online in 
the coming days. Customers can stay informed via updates on our website, on Twitter (@Bitstamp) and 





crypto-currency ecosystem.39 The effects of the outage demonstrates the increasingly 
centralised nature of the crypto-currency infrastructure with a limited pool of “miners”40 and 
key players operating exchanges.  The centralisation of powers arguably provides an 





An entire infrastructure including exchanges,44 converters and expert advisers45 has 
blossomed with the growth of crypto-currencies. The speed of technological developments in 
this area has not been replicated by advancements in adequate regulation.46  
1.3: Inherent Problems  
The inherent problems associated with crypto-currencies and exchanges will now be 
considered. Critics of crypto-currencies commonly present these problems as the basis for the 
introduction of regulatory regimes.  
 
                                                          
through Bitstamp customer support at support@bitstamp.net. - Bitstamp Team <https://www.bitstamp.net/> 
accessed 6 January 2015. 
39 Pete Rizzo, Bitstamp’s ongoing outage echoes through bitcoin economy, (Coindesk, USA, 6 January 2015) 
<http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-ecosystem-feels-far-reaching-effects-bitstamp-outage/> accessed 11 July 
2015. 
40 Nicolas Courtois and Lear Bahack, On subversive miner strategies and block withholding attack in bitcoin 
digital currency, 2 December 2014 <http://arxiv.org/pdf/1402.1718v5.pdf> accessed on 11 July 2015. 
41 The appropriateness of current regulation will be analysed further in Chapter 5 (Regulation) and the gaps 
identified in Chapter 6 (Recommendations & Conclusions) along with recommendations for appropriate 
regulation of the crypto-currency eco-system.   
42 < http://i.imgur.com/wfBGbcq.jpg> accessed 4 July 2015. 
43 < http://cdn5.thinkcomputers.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/bitcoin-mining.jpg> accessed 4 July 2015. 
44 Examples detailed in the forthcoming case studies.  
45 The leader in this field is coindesk <http://www.coindesk.com/> accessed 4 July 2015, regularly producing 
facts, figures and analysis of crypto-currencies and exchanges. 
46 This will be discussed further in Chapters 5 (Regulation) and 6 (Recommendations & Conclusions).  






External factors contribute to the risks associated with owning crypto-currencies including 
embezzlement, fraud, technological or accessibility problems. If an individual user loses his / 
her online wallet details, suffers hardware malfunction or loses the private key for transfer of 
the crypto-currency it has the effect of removing the “money” from circulation. The crypto-
currency still remains on the Blockchain but, without the private key(s) to retrieve it, no transfer 
can be effected.47 Therefore technological problems can result in the irrecoverable loss of 
crypto-currencies. It appears many users continue to be unaware of this risk.48  
1.3.2: Theft and Insolvency 
A number of exchanges have recently been subjected to well publicised alleged hacking and 
attacks by criminals seeking to profit from inadequate security measures which might be 
required of exchanges if they became subject to regulation. Alternatively, it is conceivable that 
owing to the lack of regulation it is, or would be, relatively easy – particularly given the 
technological steps required to establish and trade - for an exchange to claim it has been 
subject to hacking and therefore had lost the crypto-currencies stored therein. Owing to the 
anonymity of the users of the platform, the exchange could actually have been involved in the 
“hacking” or “attack” or simply in misappropriation of the funds itself thereby profiting from the 
lack of regulatory scrutiny.  The “lost”49 crypto-currencies are then simply transferred to online 
wallets operated by the exchange on their own behalf. Recent examples of problems with 
exchanges include the alleged hack of the exchange Mintpal in July 2014 resulting in the loss 
of $2m of bitcoin.50 Another exchange, Moolah, became insolvent following an alleged bug in 
                                                          
47 For example the news story of an individual searching for a hard drive for the private key after realising the 
value of bitcoins, BBC Author, James Howells searches for hard drive with £4mworth of bitcoins stored, 
(London, 28 November 2013) < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-south-east-wales-25134289> accessed 
11 July 2015. 
48 Matthew Sparkes, The £625m lost forever – the phenomenon of disappearing bitcoins, (Telegraph, London, 
23 January 2015) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/11362827/The-625m-lost-forever-the-
phenomenon-of-disappearing-Bitcoins.html> accessed 11 July 2015. 
49 When referring to “lost crypto-currencies” the thesis refers to the transfer of the crypto-currencies out of 
the hosted wallets. Owing to the principles of crypto-currencies there is no ability to reverse transactions and 
the losses are the transferring of the crypto-currencies out of the user’s wallets, through a series of interested 
parties’ wallets beyond recovery. This is not akin to the burning of banknotes as ultimately someone will 
unjustifiably gain from the loss.  
50 Alex Hern, British serial entrepreneur missing as $1.4m bitcoin is apparently stolen (The Guardian, London, 
23 October 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/23/british-serial-entrepreneur-
missing-bitcoin-apparently-stolen?CMP=EMCNEWEML6619I2> accessed 11 July 2015. 





the software,51 while the once market leading exchange MtGox52 was forced to close following 
alleged hacking53 and loss of approximately 800,000 bitcoins.54 As more fully discussed below, 
there is suspicion regarding management involvement in the MtGox problems.55 In the wake 
of the MtGox closure Bitstamp expanded to become the market leading crypto-currency 
exchange, however Bitstamp itself suffered a security breach56 in January 201557 with the loss 
of approximately 19,000 bitcoin.58 Owing to the anonymity in the use of the exchanges the 
creditors could not recoup the stolen or lost bitcoins and those individuals holding funds with 
the exchanges have not been compensated either by the exchange59 or through regulatory 
protections. Europol has predicted that owing to the wider opportunity base for organised 
cybercrime it is expected that the size, complexity and reach of such crimes in relation to 
crypto-currencies will continue to increase.60 
If crypto-currencies and the supporting infrastructure were regulated, the individuals setting 
up these exchanges located in the UK would be subject to authorisation by the Financial 
Conduct Authority [FCA]61 or perhaps a new bespoke regulator. As will be examined in the 
                                                          
51 Alex Hern, British serial entrepreneur missing as $1.4m bitcoin is apparently stolen (The Guardian, London, 
23 October 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/23/british-serial-entrepreneur-
missing-bitcoin-apparently-stolen?CMP=EMCNEWEML6619I2> accessed 11 July 2015. 
52 Mt Gox (Magic for Gathering Online Exchange) started as a trading venue for fantasy games and developed 
into a market leading exchange of crypto-currencies. Recent press coverage suggests that the loss on the 
MtGox platform was due to internal system manipulation and not any external attack. The articles also suggest 
that MtGox manipulated the value of bitcoins purchasing through accounts when the value was low then 
disappearing. For further information, Jon Southurst, Missing Mt Gox Bitcoins Likely an Inside Job, Say 
Japanese Police, (Coindesk, USA, 1 January 2015) <http://www.coindesk.com/missing-mt-gox-bitcoins-inside-
job-japanese-police/> accessed 11 July 2015 and Yessi Bello Perez, Report: Mt Gox Data Provides More Clues to 
Trading Bot “Willy” (Coindesk, USA, 19 February 2015) < http://www.coindesk.com/report-mt-gox-data-
provides-more-clues-to-trading-bot-willy/> accessed 11 July 2015.  
53 Recent evidence suggests the events surrounding MtGox were orchestrated internally from the outset and 
that funds were misappropriated systematically by a person or persons who had management roles with the 
institution and trusted administrator privileges. Further information is available at 
<http://blog.wizsec.jp/2015/04/the-missing-mtgox-bitcoins.html?m=1> accessed 11 July 2015.  
54Alex Hern, MtGox: That missing £70m of bitcoin? Er, here it is (The Guardian, London, 21 March 2014) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/mar/21/mtgox-missing-70m-bitcoin> accessed 11 July 2015. 
55 Jessica Elgot, Ex-boss of MtGox bitcoin exchange arrested in Japan over lost $390m (The Guardian, London, 1 
August 2015) < http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/01/ex-boss-of-mtgox-bitcoin-exchange-
arrested-in-japan-over-lost-480m> accessed 8 August 2015.  
56 Stan Higgins, Details of $5 million Bitstamp Hack Revealed, (Coindesk, USA, 1 July 2015) 
<http://www.coindesk.com/unconfirmed-report-5-million-bitstamp-bitcoin-exchange/> accessed 4 July 2015. 
57 Stan Higgins, Bitstamp claims $5million lost in hot wallet attack, (Coindesk, USA, 5 January 2015) 
<http://www.coindesk.com/bitstamp-claims-roughly-19000-btc-lost-hot-wallet-hack/> accessed 11 July 2015. 
58 At the time of loss this valued at approximately $5million. 
59 Banks in the UK offer consumers protection against online fraud, which is outwith any regulatory 
requirement. Therefore it is not inconceivable to suggest that the exchanges may recompense users where 
funds are lost.  
60 European Police Office, The Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (iOCTA) 2014 p86 
<www.europol.europa.eu> accessed 11 July 2015. 
61 The Financial Conduct Authority provides protection to consumers by ensuring the financial services are run 
appropriately. Further information is available at <http://www.fca.org.uk/> accessed 11 July 2015.  





forthcoming chapters, regulation by the FCA is a potential governance approach. Taking the 
insolvency of the Moolah exchange as an example, the creator Alex Green revealed he was 
previously known as Ryan Kennedy, an individual known for a series of failed business 
ventures including Flirbre, web hosting services and Lemon,62 a Bitcoin mining firm. If 
exchanges and the sale and transfer of crypto-currencies were regulated, for example by the 
FCA, it appears unlikely an unauthorised individual with several aliases and a history of failed 
business ventures would have satisfied the “fit and proper” person test  to become a controller 
of an authorised business in terms of the FCA sourcebooks Fit and Proper Person test for 
Approved Persons Block of FCA Sourcebook [FIT]63 and Senior Management Arrangements, 
Systems and Controls Block of FCA Sourcebook [SYSC].64 The FCA test includes detailed 
requirements relating to a person’s honesty, integrity and reputation; competence and 
capability; and financial soundness. If authorisation of exchanges and the individuals who 
would be controllers of those businesses were introduced this would require the “fit and 
proper” person test to be met in order to gain authorisation to launch, own or control an 
exchange.65 This suggests that regulation of the infrastructure surrounding crypto-currencies 
should be at the interface between exchanges and customers. Expressing this in another way 
the interface might be seen as that between the fiat currency and crypto-currency. This might 
be implemented as an extension of existing regulatory structure as an alternative to regulation 
of crypto-currencies themselves. This proposition will be considered further in Chapters 5 
(Regulation) and 6 (Recommendations and Conclusions). 
1.3.3: Lack of Central Regulation 
As crypto-currencies are not legal tender in the UK,66 acceptance by the providers of goods 
and services is not guaranteed. The lack of central regulation also results in restrictions in the 
protection afforded to holders. For example, should the value of crypto-currencies fluctuate 
there is no central body with the power to assist in stabilisation of exchange rates.67 The Bank 
                                                          
62 Alex Hern, British serial entrepreneur missing as $1.4m bitcoin is apparently stolen, (The Guardian, London, 
23 October 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/23/british-serial-entrepreneur-
missing-bitcoin-apparently-stolen?CMP=EMCNEWEML6619I2> accessed 11 July 2015. 
63 Available at <http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/FIT/1/3> accessed 11 July 2015. 
64 Available at < https://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/SYSC> accessed 11 July 2015.  
65 By way of comparison, the FCA recently published a final notice issued to Paul Reynolds, a former director of 
Aspire Personal Finance Ltd prohibiting him from performing any function relating to regulated activities on 
the basis that he is not a fit and property person. This final notice emphasises the application of these 
principles in practice. FCA Final Notice 2015: Paul Reynolds, 20 May 2015 < http://www.fca.org.uk/your-
fca/documents/final-notices/2015/paul-reynolds> accessed 11 July 2015.  
66 Coinage Act 1971 c24 s2 provides a definition of legal tender. The Bank of England is the Central Bank of the 
United Kingdom and sole issuer of legal tender banknotes in England and Wales. Further information regarding 
legal tender and the issuance of local currencies is available at 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/banknotes/Pages/localcurrencies/default.aspx> accessed 11 July 2015. 
67 Price volatility and stabilisation of rates are discussed in Chapter 2 (Money) at 2.3.3 (Store of Value). 





of England’s68 intervention in assisting Northern Rock during the run on deposits in the 
beginning of the financial crisis in September 200769 would not be replicated if similar problems 
arose in relation to crypto-currencies. To protect investors and customers and maintain the 
integrity of the banking system in the UK the Government was forced to nationalise Northern 
Rock in February 2008.70 Thereafter Her Majesty’s Treasury [HMT] separated the assets of 
Northern Rock into a new retail bank for sale while passing the proportion of the mortgage 
assets which were perceived to be of lower quality and therefore of greater risk of default to a 
resolution vehicle, Northern Rock Asset Management. Northern Rock, the new retail bank, 
was subsequently sold to Virgin Money in 2011 for an expected loss of £469 million.71 The 
loss to taxpayers is however significantly greater and has been estimated at £2 billion.72 Had 
the Government not stepped in to “rescue” Northern Rock depositors, with funds of £26 billion, 
would have suffered significant losses directly which would not be automatically met by 
Government in full through the Financial Services Compensation Scheme [FSCS].73 Although 
they would have been covered under the sui generis guarantee issued by the Government in 
relation to depositors in Northern Rock.74 If a similar crisis occurred with crypto-currencies, 
either at an individual exchange level or, more crucially, as the result of systemic failure in the 
entire crypto-currency network, users would not be afforded the same, or any, protections. 
There is no lender of last resort for crypto-currencies and because of their decentralised nature 
there is no central regulatory authority. 
                                                          
68 The Bank of England Court Minutes detail the reasoning behind the intervention in Northern Rock stating 
that if Northern Rock were allowed to fail it would create serious economic damage and accordingly the Bank 
of England intervened – at page 54 of the minutes 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/archivedocs/codm/20072009/codm2007b.pdf> 
accessed 11 July 2015. The serious economic damage and potential for systemic failure will be discussed 
further in the Chapter 5 (Regulation). 
69 BBC Author, The rush at Northern Rock continues, (BBC, London, 15 September 2007). 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6996136.stm> accessed 11 July 2015. 
70 This necessitated the passage of emergency legislation, the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 c2, to 
provide a legal basis for so doing. See further Public Accounts Committee – Eighteenth Report, HM Treasury: 
The creation and sale of Northern Rock plc, 5 November 2012 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmpubacc/552/55202.htm> at “Summary” 
accessed 11 July 2015. 
71Commons Select Committee, Committee publishes findings on the creation and sale of Northern Rock plc, 16 
November 2012 <http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/public-
accounts-committee/news/creation-and-sale-of-northern-rock-plc/> accessed 11 July 2015. 
72 Public Accounts Committee – Eighteenth Report, HM Treasury: The creation and sale of Northern Rock plc, 5 
November 2012 <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmpubacc/552/55202.htm> 
at “conclusions” accessed 11 July 2015. 
73 As introduced by Part XV (the Financial Services Compensation Scheme) ss212 – 224F of Financial Services 
and Markets Act c.8. The limit at the time of the collapse of Northern Rock was 100% of the first £2,000 of 
deposits and 90% of the next £33,000.  
74 Statement by HM Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling  in BBC Author, Northern Rock deposits 
guaranteed, (BBC, London, 17 September 2007)  
 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6999615.stm> accessed 11 July 2015. 





Losses would be suffered by those who had invested with no recovery prospects. The 
extension of protection to investors and users through the FSCS in relation to compensation 
and the Financial Ombudsman Service [FOS]75 in relation to alternative dispute resolution 
would undoubtedly secure wider acceptance of crypto-currencies and are explored in the 
forthcoming chapters.76  
1.3.4: Prohibition 
Finally, it cannot be discounted that any regulations that might be introduced could 
theoretically effectively close down any or all exchanges or outlaw crypto-currencies when 
regulating the area.77 An analogy can be drawn with the recent FCA regulation surrounding 
the provision of payday loans. In November 2014, the FCA confirmed a significant alteration 
to the landscape for payday loan companies and a reduction in potential profit margins of 
lenders78 in an attempt to protect consumers. From 2 January 2015, payday loan providers 
have been obliged to comply with strict caps on interest levels and repayment amounts. This 
will affect the viability of the business models of most payday lenders with estimates that only 
the top three lenders in the UK, Wonga, Dollar and QuickQuid will be able to operate profitably 
from the 400 payday lenders currently in operation in the UK.79 Similarly, the imposition of a 
regulatory scheme and transaction fee caps in relation to crypto-currencies may operate to 
prevent any exchange trading profitably. The immediate impact of any regulation in the sphere 
of crypto-currencies would undoubtedly increase volatility of the already volatile crypto-
currencies and reduce the acceptance of crypto-currencies as a means of exchange. Both 
China80 and Russia81  recently banned the use of Bitcoin. Existing exchanges have been 
                                                          
75 As introduced by Part XVI (the Ombudsman Scheme) ss225 – 234B of Financial Services and Markets Act c.8. 
76 As discussed in Chapter 5(Regulation) at 5.5.2.1(Financial Services Compensation Scheme (“FSCS”)) and 
5.5.2.2 (Financial Ombudsman Service (“FOS”)). 
77 For example, new regulation in New York requires a BitLicence. Recent press has revealed bitcoin exchanges 
will not be applying for licences to operate in New York and are effectively removing themselves from the 
market. Pete Rizzo, Bitcoin Exchanges Kraken and Bitfinex cut services in New York, (Coindesk, USA, 9 August 
2015) < http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-exchanges-kraken-and-bitstamp-cut-services-in-new-york/> 
accessed 10 August 2015.  
78 Proposal included: an initial cost cap of 0.8% per day; fixed default fees capped at £15; total cost cap of 
100%. FCA Press Release, FCA confirms price cap rules for payday lenders, (FCA, London, 11 November 2014) 
<http://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-confirms-price-cap-rules-for-payday-lenders> accessed 11 July 2015. 
79 Marion Dakers, FCA price cap on payday lenders to “put an end to spiralling debt” (The Telegraph, London, 
11 November 2014) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/11222397/FCA-
price-cap-on-payday-lenders-to-put-an-end-to-spiralling-debt.html> accessed 11 July 2015. 
80 China banned its banks from handling bitcoin transactions in December 2013 stating that Bitcoins were a 
“virtual good” and had no legal status. BBC Author, China bans banks from handing Bitcoin Trade (BBC, 
London, 5 December 2013) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-25233224> accessed 24 May 2015. 
81 Russia banned accessed to websites referring to bitcoin on January 13 2015. Further information available at 
Marco Pineda, Russian Court Overturns Ban on Access to Bitcoin Websites, (USA, 16 May 2015) < 
https://bitcoinmagazine.com/20440/russian-court-overturns-ban-access-bitcoin-websites/> accessed 11 July 
2015. 





closed down by authorities with the resulting loss of all crypto-currencies held by them. This 
undoubtedly impacts on the potential for crypto-currencies to be considered as a store of value 
and is borne out by the significant fall in value of bitcoin which followed the recent ban in 
China.82  
1.3.5: Money Laundering83 
Owing to the pseudo anonymity84 associated with crypto-currencies the opportunities for 
exploitation for illegal activities are abundant. The design of many crypto-currencies and 
exchanges allows for user anonymity. It was estimated in 2012 that 20% of all bitcoins 
exchanged every day on the world’s largest bitcoin exchange were spent on Silk Road,85 a 
now defunct black market trading platform. Unless an exchange develops and invokes its own 
procedures for anti-money laundering the statutory regulations do not currently extend to 
exchanges.86 Thus, users can never be certain that the crypto-currencies purchased or 
exchanged do not represent criminal property.87 The global potential of crypto-currencies to 
transmit funds across nations also questions the anti-money laundering practices required of 
exchanges given the different practices in place regarding anti-money laundering. There is a 
lack of universal acceptance as to the practices to be invoked, particularly outwith the EU and 
countries in the Financial Action Task Force [FATF]88 initiative. The introduction of effective 
anti-money laundering regulations would reduce the opportunities for criminals to trade with 
crypto-currencies and provide reassurance for legitimate users of crypto-currencies as a 
medium of exchange.  
                                                          
82 Following China’s ban, the value of the bitcoin decreased by 50%, as detailed in Joseph Cook, Bitcoins: 
Technological Innovation or Emerging Threat?, 30J. Marshall J. Info. Tech. & Privacy L. 535 – 570 (2014) at 561. 
83 As further discussed in Chapter 5 (Regulation) at 5.4.1 (Money Laundering). 
84 The transfer of crypto-currencies appear anonymous, however, such transfers are inherently traceable. 
Although the identity of the hosted wallets may appear anonymous e.g. Mr Smith, it can be uncovered through 
identification of IP addresses and access location which are recorded in the Blockchain. Such methods are not 
straightforward and as demonstrated in the ongoing legal actions against the founders of exchanges the IP 
addresses are not always ascertainable and cannot necessarily be linked to the specific user – hence use of the 
term pseudo-anonymous.   
85 Edward Southhall and Mark Taylor, Bitcoins, CTLR 2013 19(6), 177 – 178 at 178. 
86 Refer to exchange terms and conditions in Appendix 2 (Terms and Conditions).   
87 Proceeds of Crime Act s340 (Definition of Criminal Property). That is property which is or represents the 
proceeds of crime. The Proceeds of Crime Act will be examined in further detail in Chapter 5 (Regulation) at 
5.4.2 (Proceeds of Crime).  
88 Financial Action Task Force which is discussed in detail in the forthcoming chapters, specifically in Chapter 5 
(Regulation) at 5.4.1 (Money Laundering). FATF have now produced guidance in relation to crypto-currencies, 
FATF Guidance, Guidance for a risk-based approach to virtual currencies, June 2015 <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-RBA-Virtual-Currencies.pdf> accessed 27 June 2015. 
  





The following section aims to consider how crypto-currencies are used and how exchanges 
operate to understand whether extension of the current legislative framework is appropriate to 
govern crypto-currencies and exchanges. Development and use of crypto-currencies is still in 
its early stages. This enables weaknesses in the system to be exploited by individuals and 
companies seeking to financially profit both legally and illegally from the lack of regulation. 
Additionally, the lack of anti-money laundering compliance offers opportunities to transfer and 
disguise the proceeds of crime. Chapters 4 (Consumer Protection) and 5 (Regulation) will then 
examine the current regulatory framework to determine if the inherent problems can be 
regulated by legislation.  
1.4: Case Studies 
Given the novelty of crypto-currencies there is an absence of primary legal sources in the form 
of case reports and legislation. There is however a variety of comments from press and other 
resources relating to events and key players in the crypto-currency arena. Despite Bitcoin 
having been established for six years, academic interest appears to have only recently been 
awakened with little established literature. As a result it has been necessary, in order to 
develop the analysis, to engage with other topical sources such as news coverage and blogs 
on the topic of crypto-currencies which lack detailed legal analysis and to extrapolate legal 
arguments from those sources. 
The following examples relating to crypto-currencies and exchanges provides substance to 
the abstract arguments above, emphasising current exploitation and the resulting consumer 
detriment while illustrating some of the inherent problems in practice. The selected examples 
provide information on widely used crypto-currencies alongside exchanges. Owing to the 
number of crypto-currencies which have received varying degrees of adoption, this section 
has been deliberately selective but nonetheless offers adequate analysis of the most 
commonly encountered crypto-currencies. By considering the uses to which crypto-currencies 
have, to date, been put, analysis of the current regulatory gaps in the protections available will 
be provided.  
1.4.1: Case Study A: Bitcoin (crypto-currency) 
Satoshi Nakamoto’s89 introductory paper on Bitcoin,90 considered by many as the first practical 
crypto-currency,91 describes it is as a purely peer-to-peer version of electronic money allowing 
online payments and exchanges directly between parties without the need to go through a 
                                                          
89 This is the pseudonym for the creator of Bitcoin. It is uncertain if this is an individual or a group of creators. 
90 Discussed at note 10 above. 
91 Although as noted above, the concept of crypto-currencies is not new having been introduced, albeit under 
a different name, by David Chaum in 1982. 





central bank or financial institution.92 As there is no oversight by a central authority, 
precautionary measures are taken to ensure security in transactions.93 This paper received 
much interest and Bitcoins were launched on 3 January 2009 as a frontierless convertible 
crypto-currency.   
Nakamoto noted that the payment mechanism requires to be trusted by individuals and 
declared that “we need a way for the payee to know that the previous owners did not sign any 
earlier transactions [i.e. double spend]. For our purposes, the earliest transaction is the one 
that counts, so we don’t care about later attempts to double spend……transactions must be 
publicly announced…..”94 Nakamoto discounted the popular solution of introducing a trusted 
central authority preferring a publicly announced system of transaction history, known as the 
ledger or Blockchain.  
The paper continued to contrast the public nature of the transaction history with traditional 
banking, thus “the traditional banking model achieves a level of privacy by limiting access to 
information to the parties involved and trusted third party. The necessity to announce all 
transactions publicly precludes this method, but privacy can still be maintained by breaking 
the flow of information in another place: by keeping public keys anonymous. The public can 
see that someone is sending an amount to someone else, but without information linking the 
transaction to anyone. This is similar to the level of information released by stock exchanges, 
where the time and size of individual trades, the “tape”, is made public, but without telling who 
the parties were.”95 The bitcoins are composed of a unique combination of letters, numbers 
and symbols, often referred to as a digital signature. However anonymity is maintained by not 
associating the digital signatures with a name but with an account also consisting of numbers 
and letters.96 Anonymity is further preserved through the use of a private key required to 
transfer crypto-currencies.  
Bitcoins are created through the process known as mining. The block rewards or bitcoins 
released as rewards for solving the algorithmic problems halves every four years – from 2009 
                                                          
92Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System <https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 
24 May 2015. 
93 Joseph Cook, Bitcoins: Technological Innovation or Emerging Threat?, 30J. Marshall J. Info. Tech. & Privacy L. 
535 – 570 (2014) at 538. 
94 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System <https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> accessed 
11 July 2015. 
95 Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System <https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdfF> 
accessed 11 July 2015. 
96 Further information regarding the transaction is detailed in the glossary. 





to 2012 the reward was 50 bitcoin, but since 2013 this has reduced to 25 bitcoin.97 Owing to 
the algorithmic structure and protocol of bitcoins, the maximum number of bitcoins will be 
achieved when the block reward is reduced to zero and no new coins can be created98 - 
currently estimated to be 2040. Despite this finite nature of bitcoin, they can be broken into 
smaller denominations, called “Satoshis”99 with the ability to subdivide each bitcoin into 100 
million smaller units.100 Nonetheless the finite supply of bitcoins is one of the key components 
which may appeal to investors because their value can no longer be diluted through the issue 
of new units. However, many of those purchasing bitcoins are just that – investors seeking to 
profit from the volatility of the exchange rate of crypto-currencies, purchasing when low and 
selling when at optimum levels. The frequency with which individuals are using bitcoin as a 
means of exchange is limited.101 Figure 3 details the rolling seven day average at around 
100,000 transactions worldwide demonstrating a continuing level of acceptance amongst the 
crypto-currency community at a level considerably greater than other crypto-currencies, but 
these figures confirm the level of acceptance is not, at present, universal. 
Figure 3 
 
                                                          
97 Michal Polasik, Anna Piotrowska, Tomasz Wisniewski, Radoslaw Kotkowski, Lightfoot Geoff, Price 
Fluctuations and the Use of Bitcoin: An Empirical Inquiry (Poland and UK, 30 October 2014) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2516754>  accessed on 11 July 2015. 
98 Mark Taylor, Rachel Savary and Ben Regnard-Weinrabe, Virtual Currencies: the other side of the coin 
Practical Law Company Article (London, 23 October 2013). 
99 Named after the author of bitcoins. 
100 Joseph Cook, Bitcoins: Technological Innovation or Emerging Threat?, 30J. Marshall J. Info. Tech. & Privacy 
L. 535 – 570 (2014) at 539. 
101 See generally Chapter 2 (Money). 






The cryptography involved in producing crypto-currencies means that the majority of crypto-
currencies have a maximum issue, for example Bitcoin has a limit of 21 million coins,103 the 
second most popular crypto-currency Litecoin104 a limit of 84 million coins105 and Namecoin106 
a limit of 21 million coins. An exception is Dogecoin,107 which although, originally intended to 
create 100 billion Dogecoins, more recently announced that the Dogecoin network would 
produce an infinite number of Dogecoins. Dogecoin operates in a similar manner to Bitcoin 
and Litecoin using public and private keys to encode transfers. For investors however, the 
value of Dogecoins cannot increase as a result of the infinite supply and economics of supply 
and demand will dictate the price. In addition with the novelty of Dogecoins; it remains to be 
seen whether its use will become widespread.108 The limited nature of crypto-currencies has 
not yet proved problematic as many crypto-currencies are not expected to reach maximum 
issue until around 2040. However, the finite supply will ultimately either increase crypto-
currency values or result in the crypto-currencies becoming worthless. At present, as 
demonstrated by Figure 4 below, the value of bitcoin has been extremely volatile over the 
preceding 18 months.   
 
 
                                                          
102 Number of bitcoin transactions per day, taken on a 7 day rolling average <https://blockchain.info/charts/n-
transactions?showDataPoints=false&timespan=&show_header=true&daysAverageString=7&scale=0&address=
> accessed 11 July 2015. 
103 Typically Bitcoin which is the clear leader in the field handles an average of 110,000 transactions per day 
<https://bitinfocharts.com/comparison/transactions-btc-ltc-doge.html> accessed 16 May 2015. 
104 Announced in 2011 by its creator, former Google engineer Charles Lee, Litecoin has a coin limit of 84 
million. Litecoin is an open source, decentralised payment network also using a proof of work ledger. Again 
this is decoded by CPUs albeit unlike Bitcoin this can still be undertaken by consumer grade computers. 
Litecoin is the second largest crypto-currency after Bitcoin.  
105 Litecoin is presenting handling less than 3,000 transactions per day. 
<https://bitinfocharts.com/comparison/transactions-btc-ltc-doge.html> accessed 16 May 2015. 
106 Announced in 2011 Namecoin is based on the code of Bitcoin and uses the same proof-of-work algorithms. 
Further information is available at <http://namecoin.info/> accessed 11 July 2015. 
107 Launched on 8 December 2013, Dogecoin, created by Billy Markus and Jackson Palmer, aims to distance 
itself from Bitcoin and its association with Silk Road (discussed in detail later in this chapter). Dogecoin deals 
with large numbers of coin that are less in value. Further information regarding Dogecoin is available at 
<http://dogecoin.com/> accessed 11 July 2015. 
108 Jackson Palmer, creator of Dogecoin, recently announced his extended leave from the crypto-currency 
community owing to the “toxic environment” of the industry. This obviously questions the ongoing viability to 
dogecoin use and circulation. Further information is available in Sarah Jenn, Dogecoin Founder Leaves 
Cryptocurrency Community, Newsbtc, Bitcoin New Service (USA, 24 April 2015) 
<http://www.newsbtc.com/2015/04/24/dogecoin-founder-leaves-cryptocurrency-community/> accessed 11 
July 2015. From around 200,000 transactions a day in early 2014 Dogecoin is handling around 14,000 
transaction a day in May 2015. <https://bitinfocharts.com/comparison/transactions-btc-ltc-doge.html> 
accessed 16 May 2015. 








At this stage it is difficult to predict how the value will be perceived in a further 25 years or 
whether discussion surrounding crypto-currencies will have ceased entirely. It is not 
improbable that by 2040 crypto-currencies will be considered a fad akin to the tulip mania in 
17th century Holland.110 Tulip mania was the first recorded speculative bubble, where over the 
course of four years in Holland the price of tulip bulbs increased 200 times to the equivalent 
value of a luxury house.111 The fad passed and in one month the price dropped to almost 
nothing.112 The volatility of crypto-currencies, particularly following the bitstamp.net outage is 
in some ways comparable to the bubble bursting or fad passing and crypto-currencies 
becoming worthless.   
1.4.2: Case Study B: Altcoins (crypto-currency) 
Following the success of Bitcoin a number of other crypto-currencies have been developed, 
collectively known as Altcoins. Some are noted above. The majority are modelled on the 
                                                          
109 Blockchain Information <https://blockchain.info/charts/market-
price?showDataPoints=false&timespan=&show_header=true&daysAverageString=7&scale=0&address=> 
accessed 11 July 2015. 
110 Neil Seitz et al, The U.S. subprime mortgage crisis: what have we learned? Comp. Law. 2010, 31(11) 355 - 
361 at 357. 
111 Earl Thompson, The tulipmania: Fact or artefact? Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2006 at p1. 
112 Earl Thompson, The tulipmania: Fact or artefact? Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2006 at p4. 





principles of Bitcoin with minor changes to the algorithms, Blockchains and supply. The most 
popular are detailed in the charts in Appendix 1A and 1B.113 
These alternative virtual and crypto-currencies are not as widely accepted as bitcoins114 and 
although use and awareness is increasing, circulation is not (yet) as extensive as bitcoin.115 
With an estimated 500 virtual currencies available it is difficult to predict continued use and 
which will be favoured by the public. However, it is evident that Governments cannot ignore 
the increasing number and popularity of crypto-currencies and regulation is required to protect 
investors, depositors and users from the illegality which has been associated with crypto-
currencies hitherto.116 The following examples are included to illustrate the types of criminal 
conduct with which crypto-currencies have become associated.  
1.4.3: Case Study C: Liberty Reserve (crypto-currency & exchange) 
Established in 2006, Liberty Reserve was a predecessor to Bitcoin describing itself as the 
internet’s “oldest, safest and most popular payment processors….serving millions all around 
a world.”117 However the aforementioned lack of regulatory oversight meant use of Liberty 
Reserve became inextricably linked with money transmission by criminals. Criminals regularly 
laundered the proceeds of crime e.g. credit card fraud, identity fraud, investment fraud and 
computer hacking seamlessly and anonymously through Liberty Reserve. Transactions were 
conducted in Liberty Dollars which were convertible to fiat currencies thereby enabling the 
conversion to “clean money.” It is estimated that 55 million separate financial transactions 
illegally laundered over six billion dollars through the Liberty Reserve platform.118  
Liberty Reserve required users to register accounts with only basic identifying information, 
which in terms of normal money laundering checks could not be considered sufficient 
                                                          
113 Information in Appendix 1A is reproduced from coinmarketcap. Information correct at 20 December 2014 
<http://coinmarketcap.com/> accessed 20 December 2014. Information reproduced in Appendix 1B is also 
reproduced from Marketcap and is correct at 17 May 2015. This shows the liquidity of the crypto-currency 
market and the changes in popularity over the period of 6 months.   
114 Bitcoins maintains an approximate 90% share of the total market capitalisation of all crypto-currencies in 
circulation. As detailed in United Kingdom Digital Currency Association, The UK Digital Currency Association’s 
response to HM Treasury’s Digital Currencies: Call for Information, 3 December 2014. 
115 Samuel Gibbs, Nine Bitcoin alternatives for future currency investments, (The Guardian, London 28 
November 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/28/bitcoin-alternatives-future-
currency-investments> accessed 11 July 2015. 
116 Further discussion regarding the initial steps taken by Governments are discussed in Chapter 6 
(Recommendations & Conclusions). 
117 As cited in BBC Author, Liberty Reserve digital money service forced offline (BBC, London, 27 May 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22680297> accessed 11 July 2015.   
118 Erik Barnett, Virtual Currencies: Safe for Business and Consumers or just for Criminals? 13th European 
Security Conference & Exhibition (The Hague, 2 April 2014) 
<http://photos.state.gov/libraries/useu/231771/PDFs/2014_Erik_Barnett_crypto-currencies_remarks.pdf> 
accessed 11 July 2015.  





validation of identities. Latterly, during investigations by authorities evidence revealed users 
registering under blatantly false names, including “Russia hackers”; “Hacker Account” and 
“Joe Bogus.”119 Additionally the utilisation of independent exchanges to transfer funds resulted 
in Liberty Reserve further avoiding collating any information to identify users. This effectively 
led to no party having any oversight of the users, transactions or conversion to fiat currencies, 
enabling criminals to anonymously launder criminal funds.  
After extensive investigations the US Department of Justice charged Liberty Reserve and 
seven of its principals120 with operating an unregistered money transmitter business121 and 
money laundering which facilitated the movement of more than $6 billion in illicit proceeds.122 
The US Department of Justice seized the website in May 2013123 at which time Liberty 
Reserve had more than a million worldwide users.124 While the US has had criminal provisions 
which were utilised in relation to so called wire fraud125 since the 1930s there has been an 
                                                          
119 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Report, Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT 
Risks, June 2014 < http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/virtual-currency-key-definitions-
and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. 
120 BBC Author, FBI arrests Silk Road drugs site suspect, (BBC, London, 2 October 2013) < 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-24373759> accessed 11 July 2015. 
121 USA Federal Criminal Code, 18 U.S. Code § 1343 - Fraud by wire, radio, or television. 
122 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Report, Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT 
Risks, June 2014 < http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/virtual-currency-key-definitions-
and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. 
123 As cited in BBC Author, Liberty Reserve digital money service forced offline (BBC, London, 27 May 2013) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-22680297> accessed 11 July 2015. 
 
 
124 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Report, Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT 
Risks, June 2014 < http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/virtual-currency-key-definitions-
and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. 
125 USA Federal Criminal Code states at 18 U.S. Code § 1343 - Fraud by wire, radio, or television, “Whoever, 
having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by 
means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, 
signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both. If the violation occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit 
authorized, transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with, a presidentially 
declared major disaster or emergency (as those terms are defined in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford 
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42U.S.C. 5122)), or affects a financial institution, such person 
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.” 





absence of similar provisions within the EU until recently.  The Payment Services Directive126 
does not contain criminal sanctions nor does its transposition into the domestic law of the 
UK.127 Thus, if Liberty Reserve had been founded and operated in the UK no criminal actions 
would lie against the principals for operating the payment systems per se but128 actions might 
have proceeded under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002129 [POCA]. 
The lack of money laundering controls enabled the principals of Liberty Reserve to operate an 
exchange which conducted no client due diligence checks, maintained no coherent records 
and had no reporting obligations. Potentially, Liberty Reserve could be used for illegal 
purposes, yet owing to the novelty of Liberty Reserve the US Department of Justice took seven 
years to apply relevant regulations to charge the principals and effectively shut down the 
exchange.130 It is not inconceivable that further illegal platforms will be developed in Europe 
and the USA operating outwith the sphere of regulation and on the margins of proceeds of 
crime provisions. 
 
1.4.4: Case Study D: Silk Road (crypto-currency exchange) 
Launched in February 2011 Silk Road operated a hidden online marketplace, hosted on The 
Onion Router [TOR]131, for trading in illegal goods such as drugs, pornography, weapons and 
other unlawful goods and services. The anonymity offered by TOR132 enabled criminals to 
exchange illegal goods and services on the marketplace anonymously. With reportedly, just 
under a million registered users and an estimated $213.9m in sales and $13.2m in 
                                                          
126 2007/64/EC on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 
2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC and implementation into the UK through the 
Payment Services Regulations 2009 SI 2009/209. 
127 Discussed further in Chapter 3 (Payment) at 3.7 (Payment Regulation).  
128 However, as discussed in the forthcoming chapters extension of existing regulation may be suitable to 
protect consumers and impose criminal sanctions.  
129  Discussed further in Chapter 5 (Regulation) at 5.4.2 (Proceeds of Crime). 
130 Two of its principals Arthur Budovsky and Vladimir Kats had previously run a US based company GoldAge 
and had been convicted by US authorities in early 2007 of running an illegal wire fraud operation. See further 
David Boddiger; L. Arias (May 25, 2013). Millions of dollars in limbo after shuttering of digital currency site 
Liberty Reserve. Tico Times<http://www.ticotimes.net/2013/05/24/millions-of-dollars-in-limbo-after-
shuttering-of-digital-currency-site-liberty-reserve.> accessed 11 July 2015. 
131 TOR is free software enabling use of the internet anonymously so activities, IP address and location cannot 
be detected by government agencies or corporations. For the purposes of this thesis acknowledgement of the 
inherent anonymity of TOR is sufficient. See further Roger Dingledine et al TOR: The Second Generation Onion 
Router. US Naval Research Laboratory (2004) < http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA465464> accessed 11 July 2015. Further academic 
papers can be consulted if further information regarding the technicalities of TOR is required.   
132 The Onion Router freely available software for enabling online anonymity. It provides inscription including 
in relation to the IP address. 





commissions on Silk Road before law enforcement agencies shut it down,133 the marketplace 
was a major platform for illicit purchases and sales facilitated by crypto-currency transfers. 
Although a platform with the estimated monthly trading worldwide of Silk Road infers a major 
means of exchange for crypto-currencies, in comparison the number of payments under the 
Faster Payments Scheme in the UK alone, this an insignificant proportion of financial 
transactions.134 
FATF produced a comprehensive report on the operation of Silk Road, effectively operating 
as a Bitcoin bank where “….every Silk Road user had at least one Silk Road Bitcoin address 
…. To make a purchase a user obtained bitcoins (typically through a Bitcoin exchanger) and 
sent them to a Bitcoin address associated with his or her Silk Road account to fund the 
account. When a purchase was made, Silk Road transferred the user’s bitcoins to an escrow 
account it maintained, pending completion of the transaction, and then transferred the user’s 
/ buyer’s bitcoins from the escrow account to the vendor’s Silk Road Bitcoin address.”135 
After extensive investigations136 the US Department of Justice closed Silk Road and arrested 
the alleged owner and operator, who went under the alias of Dread Pirate Roberts.137 The 
principal of Silk Road has recently been found guilty of wire fraud and is subject to a life 
sentence for the money laundering and criminal activities associated with Silk Road.138 The 
US Justice Department also seized approximately 173,991 bitcoins worth more than $33.6 
million at the time of seizure.139 At the time of seizure the quantity of bitcoin owned by Dread 
                                                          
133 Nicky Woolf, Silk Road’s Dread Pirate Roberts convicted of running online drug market, (Guardian, USA, 5 
February 2015) < http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/04/silk-road-ross-ulbricht-convicted-
drug-charges?CMP=EMCNEWEML6619I2> accessed 11 July 2015. 
134 See footnote above. 
135 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Report Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT 
Risks, June 2014 < http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/virtual-currency-key-definitions-
and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. 
136 It has been discovered that undercover officers investigating Silk Road participated in trading on Silk Road, 
further information is detailed in Joe Miller, Silk Road agents charged with stealing seized Bitcoin, (BBC, 
London, 30 March 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-32124251> accessed 24 May 2015. 
137 Kate Vinton, Ross Ulbrichts lawyer condemns dark web threats against silk road trial judge (USA, 24 October 
2014) <http://www.forbes.com/sites/katevinton/2014/10/24/ross-ulbrichts-lawyer-condemns-dark-web-
threats-against-silk-road-trial-judge/> accessed 11 July 2015.  
138 Ross Ulbricht, the creator of Silk Road was convicted of all seven charges on 4 February 2015. Further 
information regarding the charges is available at BBC Author, Ross Ulbricht: Silk Road creator convicted on drugs 
charges, (BBC, London, 5 February 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-31134938> accessed 
11 July 2015; Stan Higgins, Ross Ulbricht Found Guilty of Operating Silk Road Dark Market, (Coindesk, USA, 4 
February 2015) <http://www.coindesk.com/ross-ulbricht-found-guilty-operating-silk-road-dark-market/>  
accessed 11 July 2015. 
139 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Report, Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT 
Risks, June 2014 <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/virtual-currency-key-definitions-
and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf > accessed 11 July 2015. 





Pirate Roberts, in commission alone, constituted 5% of all the bitcoin in circulation.140 
Opponents of crypto-currencies reference the closure of Silk Road as evidence of illegal use 
of crypto-currencies and the delays in law enforcement bodies conducting investigations. The 
introduction of regulation could minimise the potential for the use of crypto-currencies for illegal 
purposes.  
1.4.5: Case Study E: Silk Road 2.0 (Exchange) 
In November 2014, an international raid across 16 European countries and the USA, was 
undertaken to shut down Silk Road 2.0 and 400 other websites believed to be trading illegal 
items.141 The sites were operated on the TOR network in a similar vein to the original Silk 
Road in order to provide anonymity to users. Large numbers of bitcoins were seized and with 
the operation still ongoing further websites are expected to be shut down as the investigation 
progresses.142 Again the lack of adequate regulation or any regulation in many jurisdictions 
enables criminals to utilise crypto-currencies and exchanges for illegal and illicit purposes.  
1.4.6: Case Study F: Ripple (crypto-currency) 
As noted, the majority of altcoins are developed using the principles of Bitcoins with minor 
adaptations. Recent developments have focused on an alternative implementation of the 
Blockchain proposing a federated digital currency accessed via a known and trusted 
“gateway.” This removes the decentralised nature apparent in bitcoin and other crypto-
currencies.143  
The protocol144 provides the technology for real-time cross-border payments and settlement 
including in its currency. This hybrid model is increasing in popularity generally attributed to 
the centralised, federated nature of the crypto-currency. However, this innovation resulted in 
Ripple recently being fined by the US Federal Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
[FinCEN] for breaching banking laws. FinCEN claims violations of the Bank Secrecy Act as a 
result of failures to register as a money services business and implement appropriate anti-
money laundering procedures.145 Ripple contend they did not wilfully participate in criminal 
                                                          
140 Joseph Cook, Bitcoins: Technological Innovation or Emerging Threat?, 30J. Marshall J. Info. Tech. & Privacy 
L. 535 - 570 (2014) p558. 
141 Jane Wakefield, Huge raid to shut down 400-plus dark net sites (BBC, London, 7 November 2014) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-29950946> accessed 11 July 2015.  
142 BBC Author, US police arrest Silk Road 2.0 suspect in Seattle, (BBC, London, 21 January 2015) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-30913709> accessed 11 July 2015. 
143 <https://ripple.com/knowledge_categories/ripple-protocols/> accessed 11 July 2015. 
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145 Stan Higgins, FinCEN fines Ripples labs for Bank Secrecy Act Violations, (Coindesk, USA, 5 May 2015) 
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activities but owing to the innovative practices of the service registration in these areas was 
overlooked.146  
1.5: Conclusions  
The foregoing examples indicate that crypto-currencies can become associated with 
organised crime147 but also suggests that crypto-currencies are not at present replacing nor 
actively competing with fiat currencies in relation to the volume of transactions. Although 
crypto-currencies, particularly bitcoin, have experienced a significant rise in popularity there is 
a continuing reluctance for individuals and retailers to adopt the use of crypto-currencies. 
Without appropriate regulation organised criminals will continue to utilise platforms and 
exchanges for laundering the proceeds of crime. If exchanges and platforms continue to be 
utilised in such a fashion without appropriate investor protection crypto-currencies are unlikely 
to gain worldwide acceptance. Regulation of exchanges is patently required for more users to 
trust and invest in crypto-currencies.  
  
                                                          
146 Stan Higgins, FinCEN fines Ripples labs for Bank Secrecy Act Violations, (Coindesk, USA, 5 May 2015) 
<http://www.coindesk.com/fincen-fines-ripple-labs-700000-bank-secrecy-act/> accessed 11 July 2015. 
147 Organised crime can be defined as serious crime planned, coordinated and conducted by people working 
together on a continuing basis. Their motivation is often, but not always, financial gain. National Crime Agency 
available at <http://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/crime-threats/organised-crime-groups> accessed on 11 
July 2015. 





Chapter 2: Money  
2.1: Functions 
This chapter will examine the functions of money in contemporary society from both legal and 
economic perspectives. These functions will then be explored in relation to crypto-currencies 
with a view to establishing whether crypto-currencies can or should be classed as money. The 
danger of adopting a definitional approach without consideration of practical application is that 
where a disruptive product appears that product may fail to satisfy a definitional approach and 
yet perform the substantive function of the product with which the disrupter is intended to 
compete. As already examined,148 crypto-currencies are increasingly exchanged for fiat 
currencies, deposited with exchanges and used as a method of payment for goods and 
services. Such usage suggests equivalent use to “money” and fiat currency. The European 
Banking Authority [EBA] recently acknowledged that crypto-currencies “….could potentially 
fulfil one or more of the functions of money.”149 However, given the lack of governance by a 
central authority these functions are limited to the community who believe and trust in the 
specific networks. 
To analyse the appropriateness, or otherwise, of classifying crypto-currencies as money and 
the resultant impact on the regulatory framework an examination of the constituent functions 
of “money” is required. This will enable consideration of the accuracy of the EBA’s statement 
that crypto-currencies are at present not money but could nonetheless fulfil some monetary 
functions. This chapter will consider public perception and thereafter assess the legal and 
economic components of money to analyse their existence in crypto-currencies. Thereafter 
Chapter 3 (Payment) will consider the use of crypto-currencies as a method of payment for 
goods and services before examining the current regulatory framework and the ability to adapt 
this framework to govern the use of crypto-currencies in Chapter 5 (Regulation). 
2.1.1: Public Perception 
While economic and legal perspectives are fundamental for appraising the components of 
money, it is also important to consider public perceptions and how money is used in 
contemporary society. This will enable consideration of whether the properties of money can 
also be applied to crypto-currencies.  
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The widely acknowledged characteristics of money include (i) having money to buy goods e.g. 
food, clothes, property, cars; (ii) being in a position to exchange money for services e.g. 
transport and entertainment; (iii) money as the method of return for undertaking work; (iv) or 
simply having savings or “money in the bank.” This final component is a common 
misconception.  Owing to the importance of this presumption and alignment with the deposit 
services of exchanges this proposition requires clarification.  
2.1.1.1: Foley v Hill 
The relationship between the bank, customer and savings is long established in English law 
as a result of the decision in Foley v Hill.150 Once money is paid into or transferred to a bank 
the depositor no longer owns or has possession of the cash/notes/coins. Traditional, tangible 
money is a corporeal moveable where possession provides ownership. This is transferred by 
the handing over of notes or coins (traditio). Contemporary usage151 has extended the popular 
conception of money to payment and transfer electronically through direct debits, Bankers 
Automated Clearing System [BACS] payments, Clearing Houses Automated Payment System 
[CHAPS] and Faster Payments,152 without the requirement of physical possession of money. 
Thus, possession of a corporeal moveable is no longer required to prove ownership nor 
necessary to transfer funds or money. In Foley, Lord Lyndhurst held that, “…money, when 
paid into a bank, ceases altogether to be the money of the principal; it is then the money of 
the banker, who is bound to return an equivalent by paying a similar sum to that deposited 
with him when he is asked for it.”153 The individual’s ownership rights are extinguished upon 
traditio of the money to the bank and a personal right comes into being where the individual 
can require the bank to account for the equivalent value on demand.154 The individual thus 
becomes a creditor155 of the bank and holds a personal right156 to be repaid the amount in 
                                                          
150 (1848) II House of Lords Cases (Clark’s) 28. This case develops the earlier decision in Carr v Carr (1811) 1 
Mer 541. 
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paragraph of this chapter.  
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account upon demand. This contractual right to be repaid will only be discharged by the bank 
through payment to the individual upon presentation of a passbook or its equivalent157 and in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of the account.158 Should the bank become insolvent 
the customer becomes an unsecured creditor.159 Transfer of ownership of money to the bank 
accordingly differs from the public perception of continuing to own money in the bank account.  
2.1.1.2 Royal Bank of Scotland v Skinner 
Scots law reflects the rule established in Foley. Lord MacKay examined the relationship 
between bank, customer and savings in Royal Bank of Scotland v Skinner160 holding that 
“…..after some fluctuation of opinion, it is now well settled that the relationship of customer 
and banker is…..a simple relation – it may be one sided, or it may be two-sided – of creditor 
– debtor. The banker is not, in the general case, the custodian of the money. When money is 
paid in, despite the popular belief, it is simply consumed by the banker, who gives an obligation 
of an equivalent amount.”161 This long standing position has more recently been reaffirmed in 
North Lanarkshire Council v Crossan.162  
2.2: Deposit 
As examined,163 exchanges primarily serve three functions: (a) as a platform for exchanging 
fiat currencies to crypto-currencies and vice versa – a similar function to that undertaken by a 
bureaux du change;164 (b) as a store of crypto-currencies and therefore of value for individuals 
with an online wallet with the relevant exchange; and (c) as a platform for transferring crypto-
currencies for payment. This section will assess exchanges and whether the use of “online 
wallets” or “online vaults” is akin to a banking relationship between bank and customer of 
accepting deposits, or the exchange is acting as custodian of the crypto-currencies deposited 
or if the relationship should be equiparated with a civilian concept of depositum. The following 
chapters will continue to analyse specific exchange terms and conditions and the protections 
afforded to consumers through indigenous UK legislation and European measures.  
 
 
                                                          
157 Or nowadays, a bank card or an over the counter transaction at the bank.  
158 Lorne Crerar, The Law of Banking in Scotland, (2nd Edition, Totel Publishing 2007) at p202. 
159 Lorne Crerar, The Law of Banking in Scotland, (2nd Edition, Totel Publishing 2007) at p190. 
160 1931 SLT 382. 
161 1931 SLT 382 at 384. 
162 2007 S.L.T. (Sh Ct) 169 although the Sheriff Principal countenanced earmarking of funds in suitable cases. 
163 In Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies) at 1.2 (Operation). 
164 See later regarding regulation of bureax de change under customer due diligence requirements of Money 
Laundering. 






It is possible that the decisions in Royal Bank of Scotland v Skinner165 and Foley v Hill166 might, 
by extension, be applied to crypto-currencies.167 Thus, an individual will no longer own the 
crypto-currencies deposited with the exchange but have a contractual relationship conferring 
a personal right with the relevant exchange for repayment upon demand. However, the 
relationship between the individual and exchange is unclear and requires further analysis.  
The acceptance of deposits in “hosted wallets” or “online vaults”168 by exchanges169 may 
amount to the exchange acting as a custodian of the crypto-currencies and constitute the 
civilian contract of depositum. Further consideration of this proposition is required. Justinian 
states “the obligation incurred by a person with whom a thing is deposited for custody is real, 
and he can be sued by the action of the deposit; he too being responsible for the restoration 
of the identical thing deposited, though only where it is lost through some positive act of 
commission on his part: for carelessness, that is to say, inattention and negligence he is not 
liable.”170 This suggests that individuals depositing sums with exchanges would have a 
common law claim against the exchange for repayment where the sums were lost through 
some positive action by the exchange. However, as examined171 the majority of losses 
suffered by exchanges are as a result of alleged third party theft or technological faults and 
are not through a positive act of negligence or otherwise by the exchange.172 Gauis also 
opined that an individual would not be liable where funds are misappropriated through 
fraudulent acts, even if such loss through theft is the result of negligence or carelessness by 
the individual, “……but as he with whom property is deposited for safe keeping is only 
responsible where he has committed fraud in like manner, if the property should be stolen 
from him, for the reason that he is not required to make restitution by the action of deposit he 
is not, on that account, interested in its being preserved; hence he cannot bring the action of 
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Protection). 
170 The Institutes of Justinian, 2.XIV.3. 
171 See Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies) at 1.4 (Case Studies). 
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theft, but this action will lie in favour of the owner.”173 Finally, Justinian confirms that “as a 
depositary is not answerable for safe keeping of the thing deposited, but only for fraud, and, if 
it is stolen, is not compellable to make restitution by action of deposit, he has no interest if it 
is lost, and therefore the action of theft is maintainable only by the depositor.”174Applying the 
Roman jurists it can be concluded that under the civilian contract an individual would have a 
claim for loss only where such loss is the result of a positive action by the exchange. This is 
not sufficiently broad to cover the alleged hacks encountered by exchanges and affords limited 
protection to consumers. The following section will consider whether exchanges are acting in 
the capacity of a custodian, holding funds for the underlying consumer, only to be returned.  
2.2.2: Custodianship 
The application of the principles of custodianship require the same item deposited to be 
returned. The question may be posed whether crypto-currencies are subject to these rules or 
whether they are fungible. Crypto-currencies do not have a serial number that can be traced 
through the Blockchain to ensure the same crypto-currencies are paid out as were paid in. 
Therefore crypto-currencies are not unique and are inherently fungible. Thus, there is no 
obligation on the exchange to pay out the same crypto-currency unit, such as a bitcoin, as 
paid into the hosted wallet. As crypto-currencies are fungible, the obligation placed upon the 
exchange is to return the value of the crypto-currency rather than a specific unit of a crypto-
currency.175 The individual thus has a personal right to bring an action for payment by the 
exchange rather than a right to demand delivery from the exchange as custodian. This 
confirms that exchanges are not acting in a custodial relationship with the consumer. 
Accordingly the contract with an exchange is not one of depositum. This is explored further in 
the next paragraph. 
The real contract of depositum requires traditio, the physical handing over of a corporeal 
moveable. As crypto-currencies involve incorporeal moveables the concept of depositum 
would require a considerable conceptual expansion in order to be applicable. However, the 
absence of a corporeal moveable is not an end to the possibility of retaining a real right in the 
hands of the consumer. An examination of other real rights may provide a useful analogy. In 
property transactions relating to immoveable property, the property was physically passed to 
a new owner with the ceremonial passing of soil and in later practice the recording of the event 
in the attending notary’s protocol book and subsequently by the public act of recording that 
instrument in the sasine register, then by direct recording of the transfer itself in that register 
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and latterly in the land register.176 The recording of the deed in the sasine register or the land 
register was the equivalent to traditio. Similarly, in relation to incorporeal rights they may be 
transferred by assignation which is a private transaction between the parties plus intimation to 
the third party which is  the equivalent of the public act, and to traditio and the physical handing 
over of property.177 Taking this proposition and applying to the use of exchanges - an individual 
deposits funds in a hosted wallet which is transferred by the exchange to the equivalent, at 
the current exchange rate, of crypto-currency. The purchase of the crypto-currency is by the 
exchange on behalf of the individual depositing funds in hosted wallets. Such a purchase 
transaction is recorded on the Blockchain, but owing to the fundamental principles178 of the 
Blockchain the transaction is not ascribed to an identifiable individual and remains 
anonymous, other than reference to the transaction having occurred. As noted above crypto-
currencies are fungible, so the purchase to the individual’s “online account” need not be the 
same crypto-currencies but can come from a communal fund of crypto-currencies. The 
oxymoron of the “anonymity of the public announcement” transferring ownership results in the 
transfer neither constituting a clear assignation nor public intimation of the transfer of crypto-
currencies from one user to another. Therefore the “depositing” of funds into hosted wallets is 
not comparable to the depositum real right as there is no identifiable assignation nor intimation 
of the transfer to the individual’s hosted wallet or online account. The exchanges are holding 
funds on behalf of individuals, which may be considered a fiduciary relationship – the case law 
regarding implied and contractual trusts arising from such relationships and its application to 
the governance of crypto-currencies will be assessed in the following paragraphs. 
2.2.3: Implied Trust179  
In Devron Potatoes v Gordon & Innes Limited180 the Outer House of the Court of Session 
considered the situation of an implied trust in relation to a bank holding funds which were 
apparently earmarked or labelled to identify the interests of third parties in Scotland. A 
cooperative of potato growers, brought an action for payment against their former marketing 
agents and their receivers following on from the marketing agents’ insolvency. The cooperative 
of potato growers also raised an action against the agents’ bank. The marketing agents had 
established a general “growers’ account” in their name with their bank solely for deposits held 
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on behalf of the pursuers and other potato growers. This might have been thought sufficient 
to earmark the funds as segregated from the agents’ own funds. However, on receivership of 
the marketing agent the court held the monies were not held separately from the marketing 
agents’ general funds and were available to be set off against debts due by the agents to the 
bank. This demonstrates the reluctance of the courts to imply obligations of trust even where 
the original parties had created the arrangement to offer comfort to the growers that the funds 
were in fact segregated. This can be applied to the situation where an exchange holds funds 
on behalf of the individuals, aware that the funds are the individual’s and not the exchange’s. 
Upon failure of the exchange, it appears the funds of the individuals will not be separated from 
the exchange but considered part of the exchange’s funds and liable to set-off against the 
exchange’s own obligations. While Devron Potatoes is an Outer House case a further example 
from the Inner House can be found in Style Financial Services Limited v Bank of Scotland (No 
2)181 concerning the holding of payments by a third party. Individuals were provided with 
finance and could repay directly to the finance party or Goldberg (“G”), an associated 
company, in cash or cheque. The finance company and G had agreed that G would credit 
those sums to the finance company on an ongoing basis. G suffered financial problems and 
the money held for the finance company was applied by the bank to discharge the debt, even 
though the bank was aware the funds were being held for the finance company. The court 
held that the written agreements between G and the finance company did not create an 
express trust over the funds collected by G and no trust was created, and in the circumstances 
no express declaration of trust was otherwise created. The relationship between G and the 
finance company was that of debtor and creditor. It is likely that the courts will apply this 
principle to funds held in exchanges, the result would be a loss to the underlying individuals. 
Therefore the individuals would not be entitled to recover funds under implied trust, and 
certainly the contractual documentation182 does not amount to the creation of a legal trust, as 
the exchange is not acting as an agent on behalf of the individuals who have deposited sums 
with the exchange.  This aligns with the debtor-creditor relationship discussed above in Foley. 
In contrast the decision in Bank of Scotland v A Ltd183 suggests that in England banks may in 
certain circumstances find themselves being successfully found to hold funds for the benefit 
of third parties and not their customer as a result of the operation of equitable principles. This 
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may explain in part the reluctance of banks to offer services to exchanges184 along with 
difficulties of confirming the source of funds - a requisite of money laundering regulations.185  
As the depositing of crypto-currencies with exchanges is neither a custodial relationship, the 
depositum civilian contract nor an implied trust, then should the exchange experience financial 
problems individuals will only have a personal right against the exchanges for loss of crypto-
currencies deposited therein, ranking after any secured lenders, unless the terms and 
conditions of the exchange can be considered constituting an express trust. As was seen with 
banks in 2008, this renders those using exchanges peculiarly vulnerable to their failure. 
2.2.4: Express Trust 
Even if there is no room to imply a trust from the relationship of an exchange with its customers 
that does not preclude the creation of an express trust through the terms and conditions of the 
contract between an exchange and its customers. Having undertaken a review of the terms 
and conditions of a number of exchanges,186 no contractual trust for accepting deposit of the 
funds is created.187 This question of the creation of an express trust as a term of a contract in 
Scots law was considered in Clark Taylor v Quality Site Development (Edinburgh) Ltd.188 Lord 
President Emslie clearly detailed the requirements for a trust – including the requirement for 
appropriation of property to trust purposes. Effectively, the real right in the property required 
to be transferred and qualified by the trust purposes. The Lord President also distinguished 
an obligation to create a trust in the future (a personal obligation) from the actual creation of 
the trust by investing the trustee with a real right in actual property and not future property. 
Thus, segregation from the trustee’s own funds by the appropriation to the trust purposes with 
suitable labelling is required in Scots law. It is evident from the terms and conditions examined 
that neither party envisages the creation of an express trust and therefore no further 
consideration of this proposition is required.  
In English law in contrast, a trust exists as a result of the acceptance of both legal and 
equitable estates existing in the same property at once. Furthermore trust assets need not be 
labelled in the title to the assets. If they become mixed, for example in an online wallet then 
the doctrine of tracing will be of application The ability to trace the mixed assets was 
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considered by Fox LJ in Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson189 who stated that “equity …. will follow 
money into a mixed fund.” This can be considered applicable in light of deposits into online 
wallets where a fiduciary relationship exists. This could therefore give rise to the equitable 
right in property under English law.  
2.3: Economists’ Perspectives 
The economists’ perspective of money and its usage requires explored to assess whether 
crypto-currencies are being used as a traditional form of money.  
Firstly, modern economists, such as Hicks, generally follow Adam Smith’s analysis190 and 
define money through the functions it performs:191 
(i)  medium of exchange; 
(ii)  measure of value or a standard for contractual obligations;  
(iii)  store of value or wealth; and  
(iv)  unit of account.  
Adam Smith,192 the founding father of modern economics, analysed the development and 
application of money in accordance with these four functions. This influential work is still 
considered the cornerstone of modern economics and many modern economists still rely on 
Adam Smith’s analysis and conclusions. Latterly, John Maynard Keynes built upon Smith’s 
philosophies and the key elements of the use of money. This section is reliant on the works of 
these key economists in assisting in the explanation of the progression and application of 
economic theory in society. However, it must be made clear that owing to the plethora of 
information produced by economists this section aims to consider each function in some, but 
by no means minute, detail as the majority of the economic analysis is outwith the scope of 
this thesis.  
Thus, Eastwell, Milgate and Newman propose “money is still best defined in the classical 
tradition to refer to any object generally accepted and used as a medium of exchange.” 193 
Anything constitutes money which is acceptable as a medium of exchanges. Lawyers discount 
this definition as too expansive instead confining the definition of money to the context in which 
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it is used. These differing opinions will be key in assessing whether crypto-currencies 
constitute money and will directly impact on the applicable legislation.194 
2.3.1: Medium of Exchange 
At a basic level, economists propose that money must be a common medium of exchange,195 
i.e. something held because individuals plan to trade or swap it for another item. Smith196 
viewed money as an essential part of moving from a subsistence economy, or autarky, to an 
exchange economy. In a subsistence economy, everyone consumed only what they produce. 
As Smith explains197 it is more efficient and economic for people to specialise in producing 
greater amounts of one good than they need themselves and trading or exchanging for other 
items. This development depicts progression of society into an exchange society with 
individuals actively exchanging goods with one another.198  
It is worthwhile devoting particular attention to Smith’s analysis199 in order to develop a working 
hypothesis of the development from the basic exchange economy and into increasingly 
expansive trading. In the UK, cattle began to be used as a common factor in ascertaining the 
value of exchange for goods i.e. one cow equated to 10 bags of grain. The crudest 
interpretation considers cattle as an early form of commodity money, being the measure of 
value and common factor in exchange – a characteristic not dissimilar to crypto-currencies. 
Smith200 provides some further examples of commodity money.201 Use of cattle can be viewed 
as an early stage of exchange of commodity money i.e. when non-financial assets serve some 
of the functions of money. Use of commodities, which in themselves hold value, provide a 
level of confidence that they can be exchanged for other goods in the future. As society 
developed the barter economy and cattle exchanges were no longer practicable and people 
began to utilise other methods of exchange. Commodities such as gold and silver retained 
their value, were not perishable and there was a limited quantity available which, if not quite 
finite, was not readily added to. Thus, gold and silver began to be considered as more 
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appropriate common trading mechanisms.202 The development continued and led to the 
institution of coins, of which the stamp covering entirely both sides of the piece, was to 
demonstrate the weight and fineness of the metal and was used as a means of exchange in 
society. Initially, the lack of checks on the quality of the metal resulted in issues of trust in 
coins until universal acceptance was achieved. Latterly, the central development of coins and 
notes addressed this lack of trust. Nowadays the use of coins and notes as a means of 
exchange has resulted in the transfer of an item representing a nominal value – the value of 
the notes and coins is depicted on the items and is representative of the amount rather than 
constituting the amount. The universality of money and common trust result in universal 
acceptance of money as a means of exchange. The lack of these elements in crypto-
currencies is immediately key in determining whether crypto-currencies ought to be 
considered as money. At best, crypto-currencies may have presently attained the status of a 
type of commodity money within, what remains at the time of writing, a restricted community 
of acceptance. 
As the number of worldwide retailers accepting crypto-currencies as a means of exchange 
increases, application of the above analysis as to whether the use of crypto-currencies as a 
medium of exchange constitute money must be considered. One of the leading analysts of 
crypto-currencies, Blockchain,203 estimate that there were approximately 110,000 transactions 
per day on the bitcoin network in May 2015204 and Coindesk estimate that approximately 
100,000 merchants accepted crypto-currencies in 2014.205 The number of bitcoin transactions 
has experienced a steady increase from creation in 2009 until November 2014. Wikipedia206 
and Mozilla207 accept donations in bitcoin, Microsoft208 accept payment by bitcoin while Google 
can calculate crypto-currency to fiat currency conversion rates.209 While acceptance is 
becoming increasingly mainstream this does not give a clear indication as to how widely the 
facility is actually used by customers to purchase goods and services. To assess usage as a 
means of exchange the activity of hosted wallets requires analysis. Coindesk estimated that 
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there were over 5 million wallets trading crypto-currencies in June 2014.210 In undertaking the 
analysis Coindesk acknowledged that many individuals may have double wallets, or no longer 
use “empty” wallets. The number of duplications or wallets no longer in use has not been 
quantified, but the 5 million wallets can be considered a significant over-estimate. Bank of 
England Reports also analysed wallet activity concluding that “so far in 2014, there have been, 
on average, fewer than 0.02 transactions per day for wallets held with “My Wallet” (roughly 
one transaction per day for every 65 wallets).211 It is suggested that these statistics 
demonstrate that individuals may have dabbled in crypto-currencies but are no longer actively 
participating in the use as a means of exchange for goods, services or other crypto-currencies 
and confirming both Coindesk’s statement that there may be double or empty wallets and the 
earlier conclusions that individuals are purchasing crypto-currencies for long term speculative 
investment purposes.  
While these figures demonstrate that the popularity of crypto-currencies is increasing they also 
confirm that as yet the transaction numbers fall far short of fiat currencies. This suggests 
crypto-currencies require a significantly higher adoption rate amongst the public at large to 
gain the universal trust required to be accepted worldwide as a means of exchange. The 
existence of the other components traditionally associated with money will now be examined 
to continue with the consideration of what crypto-currencies should be classified.   
2.3.2: Measures of Value or as a Standard for Contractual Obligations 
Smith212 discussed the rate at which goods or units may be exchanged for another and how 
the value of exchange can be ascertained. In the abstract, Smith distinguished between the 
"usefulness" of the goods to be acquired and the "cost incurred" in creating the goods i.e. by 
deducting or taking into account the costs incurred in production a value in use can be 
ascertained. Secondly, Smith continued by explaining the means by which we value a total 
stock of goods created by an individual and used in exchange for others i.e. the “value in 
exchange.” This value in exchange is dependent on a multitude of factors including availability 
of products (demand and supply) and the production costs alongside competitors’ prices.  
Smith explained that the items which have the greatest value in use frequently have little or 
no value in exchange; and those with the greatest value in exchange often little value in use. 
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To elucidate this proposition Smith213 considered the examples of water and diamonds – 
nothing is more useful (and necessary) than water, but it will purchase scarce anything, 
whereas diamonds with limited value in use can be exchanged for a plethora of items.214 
Skinner considered the commonality is that both hold some value because they represent, 
albeit on distinctly different levels, a source of satisfaction to the individual.215  Based on the 
foregoing analysis the function of usefulness is key to the definition of “value” of goods, yet 
usefulness could not be pinned on ascertaining a value of the goods.  
Smith216 introduced a further strand to his analysis stating that the rate at which an individual 
will exchange one good for another must be affected not only by the usefulness and scarcity 
of the goods to be acquired, but also by the “toil and trouble” involved in creating the goods 
exchanged. Smith's analysis217 suggests that the real value of goods to be exchanged is 
expressed in terms of the amount of labour used to create those goods, in connection with the 
scarcity and usefulness of the goods. In modern society, labour is intrinsically linked to 
production costs and cannot be easily distinguished.  
Applying these factors to crypto-currencies and the ability to measure the value in crypto-
currencies is not an easy task. As discussed in the foregoing paragraph the “toil and trouble” 
in creating crypto-currencies is considerable and should in theory increase the value in 
exchange. However, balanced against the source of satisfaction to individuals and the uses 
of crypto-currencies this is difficult to quantify. Arguably crypto-currencies can only be 
considered a measure of value to those who trust and believe in the network. Crypto-
currencies may be considered equivalent, by the limited community that are happy to 
recognise them, to diamonds in the above example; diamonds have limited value in use but 
can be exchanged for a plethora of items. Similarly, crypto-currencies have limited value in 
use but can be exchanged for a number of goods and services – as already discussed the 
limited means of exchange means crypto-currencies cannot yet be exchanged for a wide 
range of items. The intrinsic link between value in exchange and store of value will be 
examined further below.  
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2.3.3: Store of Value 
The third function of money is as a store of value i.e. money can be saved, retrieved and 
exchanged at a later time for a reasonably predictable value or predictable usefulness. 
Economic theory asserts that in a free market economy market price represents the interaction 
between supply and demand. Price is set to equate the quantity being supplied and that being 
demanded. The law of price dictates that where the same product is being offered for sale at 
multiple locations the cost differential should not be greater than representing shipping, taxes, 
distribution and other affiliated costs. Thus, the price of commodities should always remain in 
a price differential with only slight variations amongst retailers representing variations in 
shipping or distribution and the seller’s desired profit margin.218 Application of the price theory 
in accordance with the store of value will be applied to crypto-currencies in the following 
paragraphs.  
Economists regularly debate the importance of the store of value function. Keynes219 
suggested that this function is no longer key as individuals wishing to receive returns for their 
finances are better placed investing in other products and services. However, modern 
economists, including Tobin, conclude that "the crucial property of 'money' in this role is being 
a store of value”220 thereby reasserting its importance in the definition by function. Store of 
value has also been confirmed by Friedman221 as an element of complete certainty as it is vital 
that an individual has the ability to store wealth, thus "…money as such can take the form of 
any durable asset capable of performing the store-of-value function. Largely through this 
function money influences the cyclical behaviour of consumption, savings, investment and 
employment."222 Predictability is key as many items increase or decrease in value and cannot 
be considered an asset with a reliable store of value.  
In modern society money can fluctuate in value owing to a number of factors. For example, in 
the aftermath of the First World War in Germany the value of Weimar republic marks became 
a poor store of value owing to hyperinflation and foreign currency was used by some Germans 
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to purchase goods owing to their more predictable value. 223  A further example is the 
fluctuation in the value of the pound in the weeks preceding the Scottish independence 
referendum, with the pound hitting 10 month lows owing to the uncertainty of the outcome.224 
However, these incidents are unusual and the consistency and store of value in money by and 
large remains. 
It appears that the degree of circulation with many crypto-currencies, including the most 
popular crypto-currency, bitcoin remains low.225 The Blockchain figures226 suggest that 
individuals could be retaining crypto-currencies as the store of value qualities are more valued 
than use as a means of exchange. An alternative interpretation may be that the lack of 
universal acceptance places limitations on use and therefore reduces the opportunities for 
consumer use. If retaining, individuals should be confident that crypto-currencies can be used 
for future supply and demand and certain about value retention. Yet, crypto-currencies are 
recognised for their volatility, exposing holders to losses and conversely significant gains as a 
result of fluctuations in exchange rates against fiat currency.227 For example, the value of the 
most popular crypto-currency, Bitcoin, experienced a crash in value over New Year 2014 / 
2015.228 Academics suggest that holders of crypto-currencies are, to some extent, betting that 
future supply and demand will remain and crypto-currencies will be used as an increasingly 
common method of exchange.229 Perhaps unsurprisingly given the lack of official oversight, 
the Bank of England warns that crypto-currencies appear to be poor short–term stores of value 
given the unpredictability in exchange against fiat currencies.230 This was affirmed in a recent 
presentation at The World Bank – Global Forum of Law, Justice and Development231 where 
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the European Central Bank’s Iddo de Jong232 proposed that crypto-currencies do not meet the 
characteristics of money and cannot be considered a store of value. Notwithstanding the 
conclusions of these influential bodies further opinions regarding the store of value capabilities 
must be analysed.  
The number of google searches for “bitcoin” peaked in line with a peak in value of bitcoins.233 
If value is so closely linked to publicity then crypto-currencies may be considered a novelty.  
Comparison with Tulipmania in 17th Century Netherlands should be made as “…former US 
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, Nout Wellinck, a former President of the Dutch 
Central Bank, and Nobel Laureate economist Robert Shiller maintain that virtual currency is a 
passing fad or bubble, akin to Tulipmania in 17th Century Netherlands.”234 Tulipmania resulted 
in the contract price for tulips in early February 1637 reaching a level approximately 20 times 
higher than the price in November 1636 as a result of the use of futures contracts.235 Thomson 
referred to a graph (reproduced in Appendix 3: Price Fluctuations) which is not dissimilar to 
the price fluctuations in the most common crypto-currency, bitcoins, also graphically 
represented in Appendix 3: Price Fluctuations. Such opinions question the long term viability 
of crypto-currencies and whether they can be considered a sustainable store of value. In 
addition the novelty of crypto-currencies means there is no evidence assessing the medium 
to long term store of value properties.  
Finally, the application of price theory to crypto-currencies is not without difficulty. Each 
exchange acts as an Over The Counter [OTC] marketplace, which means there is no 
established market where traders directly trade the commodity and the price differential is not 
within a designated range; each exchange makes its own market, deciding on price and 
markup. As noted in the following chapters, actions by regulators in relation to the unregulated 
LIBOR market proceeded under a breach of the High Level Principles for Business [PRIN] 
block in the FCA handbook, in the absence of regulation specific to that market. At present 
neither crypto-currencies nor those operating OTC markets in the exchange of fiat currencies 
to and from crypto-currencies are regulated. So no action by the FCA based on the High Level 
Principles for Business would be applicable to those involved in such unregulated activities.  
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Evaluation as a store of value and price theory is dependent on the evolution and sustainability 
of crypto-currencies in the medium to long term, future demand and supply, continued 
acceptance balanced against the finite nature of many crypto-currencies and the increasing 
alternative crypto-currencies available on the market. These factors will be considered in the 
following chapters.  
2.3.4: Unit of Account 
Keynes explained that money of account, that in which debts and prices and general 
purchasing power are expressed, is another key concept of the theory of money and a basis 
for further economic propositions.236 He continued by noting that money itself, namely that by 
delivery of which debt, contracts and price contracts are discharged,237 and in the shape of 
which a store of general purchasing power is held, derives its character from its relationship 
to the money of account, since the debts and prices must have been expressed in terms of 
the latter. Thus, money can only exist in relation to a money to account and is the thing which 
answers the description to money to account.238 Thus, wheat, apples and t-shirts cannot be 
added together to calculate the gross national product of the country as they are all different 
commodities and have no common factor. However using money as the unit of account to 
calculate the value of these products creates a common factor and method of calculation 
which can be used to calculate the gross national product of a country. Although the nominal 
value of property, stocks, shares or bonds can increase or decrease the nominal value of a 
pound, euro or dollar remains the same, at least within the national state of the currency. The 
constancy of the nominal value of money is a consequence of the fact that money is itself a 
unit of account which defines the nominal value of any currency.  
There is little evidence of any crypto-currency being used as a unit of account. Only a small 
number of transactions at present occur where the parties negotiate and agree a price in 
bitcoin.239 By and large prices are non-negotiable exchange rates240 and retailers regularly 
update the prices in accordance with fluctuation in exchange rates. Therefore it is clear that 
crypto-currencies do not meet this key economic function of money.  
The foregoing economic analysis questions the use of crypto-currencies as money. Crypto-
currencies meet the key objective of being used and accepted as a means of exchange. 
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However, the universality of such exchange, particularly in comparison with Faster Payments 
Schemes and cash such as Pounds Sterling usage, is still restricted to the network of users 
who trust the principles of the crypto-currency network. Lack of universal acceptance is key in 
the consideration of crypto-currencies as “money” and arguably the foregoing analysis 
suggests that crypto-currencies cannot be “money” for these purposes. Additionally, the ability 
of crypto-currencies to retain value is questionable. As noted, the volatility of crypto-currency 
value is at best a highly speculative investment and the absence of this important 
characteristic of stability implies that crypto-currencies cannot be considered money. The 
following section will examine the additional legal requirements in order for crypto-currencies 
to be considered as money.  
2.4: Legal 
The use of “money” features heavily in commercial contracts, the sale of land, property and 
goods, services and other legal obligations. Yet lawyers have struggled to provide a single all-
embracing definition of money which can be applied across a range of legal scenarios. 
Scholars and courts alike argue the meaning of the term varies depending upon the context 
in which it is used and suggest that attempting to provide a definitive, universal and thereby 
restrictive definition of money may produce undesired effects. Goode asserted that “much of 
the debate on what constitutes money in law is rather sterile and has few implications for the 
rights of parties to commercial transactions, where payment by bank transfer is the almost 
universal method of settlement.”241 Proctor admits that in the context of commercial and 
financial transactions, the notion of payment242 is of more practical importance243 than a 
definition of money explaining that "the lawyer’s preoccupation with private and commercial 
rights and the performance of financial obligations tends to diminish the importance of ‘money’ 
as an independent legal concept, because the notion of payment usually plays a greater role 
in those cases in which a dispute does arise.”244 This preoccupation with the legal 
consequences of payment mechanisms has produced an abundance of case law on the 
concept of payment, its occurrence and implications245 yet the courts have, on very few 
occasions, examined in any meaningful way the concept of money.246 This lack of guidance 
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proves problematic in this thesis where consideration of the definition and application of 
crypto-currencies requires an understanding of the term “money” and the regulatory 
framework underpinning it.  
Owing to the importance of the term “money” in the analysis of crypto-currencies it is important 
to analyse the limited available case law and legal opinions before undertaking an analysis of 
payment in Chapter 3. Mann the leading scholar in this area247 agrees that "it therefore seems 
appropriate for the lawyer to seek a definition of money, given the frequent use which is made 
both of the term itself and its many derivatives, including debt, damages, payment, price, 
capital, interest, tax, pecuniary legacy, and doubtless many others."248 
Such analysis ought to commence with the well-used quote by Mann "the quality of money is 
to be attributed to all chattels that are: issued under the authority of the law in force within a 
State of issue; under the terms of that State's law, denominated by reference to a unit of force 
within a State of issue; under the terms of that State's law, denominated by reference to a unit 
of account; and under the terms of that law, to serve as a universal means of exchange in the 
State of issue."249 
The definition embodies four sections, not dissimilar to the economists’ analysis above:  
(i) Money is a chattel.250 
(ii) Money is issued by the state. 
(iii) Money is a unit of account. 
(iv) Money is used as a means of exchange. 
Interpretation of these elements has varied since Mann proposed this definition owing to 
technological advancements such as the increasing use of bank transfers and electronic 
payments and the reduction in circulation of coins and notes. In the UK, notes and coins251 
now represent less than 5% of the whole money supply252 with the remaining 95% of money 
supply consisting of bank account ledgers records of which are held on computer hard drives  
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as well as commercial instruments and contracts.253 This movement from the traditional sphere 
of banking cannot be overlooked in considering the definition and application of money. 
Perhaps the reduction in notes and coins in the whole money supply is reflective of the 
requirement for modernisation of the legal thought in relation to how money should be 
conceptualised. 
2.4.1: Money is a chattel 
"The quality of money is to be attributed to all chattels...."254 
As detailed above, over the centuries a diversity of items have served the function of money 
as a tangible corporeal moveable capable of exchange, ranging from cattle, salt, tobacco, gold 
and silver to everyday use of coins and bank notes. Coins and bank notes are both considered 
as chattels in possession or personal property i.e. physical personal property in possession 
where possession itself is the badge of ownership and which can be used as a means of 
payment or exchange. The use of chattels as a means of exchange emphasises that elements 
cannot be considered in isolation as there is inevitably cross over. 
Bank notes are regularly used as payment or means of exchange. Bank notes are additionally, 
in English law, a chose in action meaning they are personal rights over property which can be 
claimed or enforced only by action, and not simply by taking possession. Thus, on bank notes 
the wording “I promise to pay the bearer on demand the sum of XX pounds,” constitutes a 
promise to pay upon presentation to the Bank of England. This wording dates from when Bank 
of England notes represented deposits of gold, at which time a member of the public could 
exchange a Bank of England banknote for gold to the same value.255 Bank notes are also 
deemed a negotiable instrument,256 however in practice the bank note is used as a chattel and 
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owing to the fungible nature is exchanged for other coins and notes constituting legal tender257 
and its status as a negotiable instrument is of little practical significance. 
Proctor258 suggests that the existence of a physical chattel issued by or under the authority of 
the State is no longer a required feature in the definition of money259 as creditors frequently 
accept cheques, bank transfers, credit cards, and any other forms of reasonable commercial 
settlement of debts which are not issued under the authority of the State. As considered, notes 
and coins now represent less than 5% of the whole money supply in the UK.260 The use of 
these chattels through private entities has developed in response to technological and societal 
developments.  It is acknowledged that there has been a divergence from the traditional chattel 
and it may no longer be an obvious chattel in the purest sense of the word i.e. a physical 
chattel which is held and ownership transferred but rather it can be an obligation. Thus, a 
chattel now includes incorporeal moveable property, rather than being restricted to corporeal 
moveable property. This obligation would include forms of credit and debit, amounting to 
personal obligations rather than a proprietary claim to the tangible moveable and therefore 
extend the definition of money to bank transfers and other forms of commercial settlement of 
debts. This acceptance is reflective of the development of a money society where use of 
physical chattels or corporeal moveables is no longer a requisite to the definition of money.  
2.4.2: Money is issued by the State 
The second aspect of Mann's definition is that money must be issued, authorised and 
monitored by the State in order to qualify as money. This aspect of Mann's definition aligns 
with the State Theory proposed by Knapp,261 who opined that only chattels or money issued 
by the State under its legal authority can be deemed money; and that the value to be attributed 
is determined by law as opposed to the value of the work in the process of production. Given 
the complex nature of the State Theory this thesis does not propose to analyse the State 
Theory. However it is acknowledged that Knapp's analysis divided opinion and received both 
considerable criticism and strong support.262 The key conclusion from the State Theory that 
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the issuance and governance of money circulation by the State will be relied upon in this 
section.  
At present in the UK, the State retains and exercises sovereignty over money matters.263 The 
Bank of England has a monopoly of note-issuing power264 and the issue of coinage265 is the 
exclusive prerogative of the Crown, exercised through the Mint.266 Banknotes issued by the 
authorised banks in Scotland267 and Northern Ireland268 are also legal currency and can be 
accepted throughout the United Kingdom, having been authorised and approved by 
Parliament.269  
For clarity, gift vouchers issued by retailers are not money – as is often confirmed on such 
vouchers which state that the vouchers have no monetary value. This is in part because they 
are not issued by the State and cannot constitute money and also commercially a retailer does 
not want to offer a refund on a purchased gift voucher. Furthermore, gift vouchers often require 
to be redeemed failing which they expire. This demonstrates that they have a very limited role 
as a store of value and recent examples of retailers suffering insolvency questions the store 
of value properties.270 The absence of store of value in the use and circulation of crypto-
currencies is clearly important, although advocates of such instruments cite this as an 
advantage of being disjointed from state control. Crypto-currencies are a decentralised peer 
to peer system with no official oversight or regulation by a central bank or other regulator. 
Additionally there is no governing body monitoring the circulation and use of crypto-currencies, 
and as noted above, this affects the universal acceptance of crypto-currencies as a means of 
exchange and results in volatility in value. As crypto-currencies do not confine themselves to 
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London, 21 January 2013) < http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-21118711> accessed 11 July 2015. 





a single nation state or currency block such as the euro, it would be complex if not impossible 
to assign responsibility for such an instrument to any particular state. 
Concerns regarding the future increased use and circulation of crypto-currencies have been 
raised given the current lack of appropriate regulation.271 However, as noted, the use of crypto-
currencies is still restricted to those who believe and trust in the system and the number of 
crypto-currency transactions is minor in comparison with fiat currencies. As will be examined 
in Chapter 5 (Regulation), both national and European governments are considering whether 
central issuance and regulation of exchanges and crypto-currencies is the preferred route of 
protection for investors or rather if they should continue to evolve naturally.  
2.4.3: Unit of Account 
Money or notes must have a nominal value i.e. it must show on the face of it the value for 
which is effective in law to discharge an obligation. This unit of account enables a standard of 
value against which the value of commodities can be measured. However, the physical coins 
that an individual holds are a fungible token of the actual amount. One pound can be 
representative of another pound with both being interchangeable with one another. 
Additionally, under the applicable laws of the country a pound is a pound and that is the value 
ascribed thereto, however, if the coin was not legislatively deemed a pound the value of the 
metal would not be so high and would not be changeable for such an amount. In R v 
Thompson272 it was held that “money was only considered to have a value because it was just 
like any other goods. But nowadays such a conception has been universally abandoned: 
goods which have become a currency are no longer like any other goods.”273 
The foregoing analysis provides a detailed explanation as to why crypto-currencies do not 
constitute a unit of account.  On the basis of the conclusions reached, it is clear that crypto-
currencies should not be considered a unit of account equivalent to the properties of unit of 
account in relation to fiat currencies.  
2.4.4: Medium of Exchange 
Economists consider this to be the key element of money. The best known judicial definition 
was provided in Moss v Hancock.274 Quoting Walker, Darling J stated money is: “that which 
passes freely from hand to hand throughout the community in final discharge of debts and full 
payment for commodities, being accepted equally without reference to the character or credit 
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of the person who offers it and without the intention of the person who receives it to consume 
it or apply it to any other use than in turn to tender it to others in discharge of debts or payment 
for commodities.” This interpretation confirms money as a medium of commerce or exchange 
which is universally accepted without question as to its viability nor usability. Darling J judicially 
aligned the legal interpretation of money as a medium of exchange with the economists’ 
perspective of money making clear that money cannot be an object of exchange but rather a 
medium of exchange.  
The present use of crypto-currencies does not square with the tests established in Moss. 
Crypto-currencies are not universally accepted as a means of exchange for goods and 
services owing to the lack of universal trust by the public at large. Demand and acceptance is 
restricted to the network who trust in the technology and viability of crypto-currencies. As noted 
in the analysis above, the transaction rate remains low when compared to established 
methods of payment. The restricted number of transactions does not demonstrate universal 
acceptance and consequently, crypto-currencies cannot be considered as an item which, to 
quote Darling J, “passes freely from hand to hand throughout the community.” Therefore the 
use of crypto-currencies may be likened to a commodity exchange rather than as a means of 
exchange.   
2.4.5: Store of Value 
This concept is discussed in detail in R v Thompson275 specifically “……Gold and especially 
“monetary gold” is used as an insurance against devaluation. Consequently, even though 
transactions in gold or silver coins which are legal tender take the form of “commercial” 
transactions, they may be regarded as a form of investment, or if you prefer, of putting assets 
away.”276 
Money cannot lose its character, unless legislation formally demonetises the previous 
currency. In modern times although the value of money will fluctuate on the given exchange 
rate with other currencies, it maintains a relatively constant store of value. One reason for this 
is because it is backed / supported by a central bank. In economic terms, money does not lose 
its value277 because it has not been spent; an individual in possession of money is not legally 
obliged to spend the money and retaining it will secure the value.  
For the reasons explored above, crypto-currencies cannot be considered a reliable store of 
value and therefore fail to fulfil this legal requirement of money. Additionally,278 it is possible 
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that legislation may outlaw the use of crypto-currencies as a means of exchange or prevent 
those holding crypto-currencies on behalf of others from dealing in it at their instruction through 
the failure to secure a licence to trade if that were to be introduced. Therefore the ability of 
crypto-currencies to be considered as a reliable store of value is, at best, uncertain.   
2.5: Conclusions 
It is abundantly clear from the above analysis that crypto-currencies cannot be considered 
equivalent to “money.” The key requirement absent in crypto-currencies is the lack of sufficient 
acceptance of crypto-currencies to constitute a universal means of exchange. As noted, 
acceptance is restricted to the network of individuals and businesses that trust and believe in 
the properties of crypto-currencies. Use is therefore restricted to retailers who are prepared to 
accept crypto-currencies in receipt of goods and services and as yet, crypto-currencies are 
not widely accepted by retailers. It is acknowledged that use continues to increase. However, 
owing to the relative novelty of crypto-currencies there is no evidence of sustained use, 
circulation or acceptance by the public. Additionally, as noted, the volatility in value of crypto-
currencies means they cannot be considered a reliable store of value. Again, the inability of 
crypto-currencies to meet this requirement means they cannot be construed as money.  
These conclusions therefore confirm that the use of currency in their name is misleading and 
crypto-currencies are not, and should not, be considered money for the purposes of use nor 
investment. 
If crypto-currencies cannot be considered money, a closer assessment of the uses of crypto-
currencies must be undertaken. The following chapter will look at the mechanics of payment 
and consider if the use of crypto-currencies in exchange for goods and services is equivalent 
to payment or whether, if such exchanges amount to merely commodity exchanges or some 
similar concept. 
  





Chapter 3: Payment 
3.1: Requirements 
While exchanges may offer to hold crypto-currencies for customers without offering payment 
services – the vault or safekeeping function - crypto-currencies are increasingly used as a 
form of payment in exchange for goods and services.279 A working definition of payment is 
therefore required to determine whether the use of crypto-currencies in exchange for the 
goods and services does constitute payment in a legal sense or whether the contract in which 
it is accepted should be characterised differently such as barter or mutual exchange rather 
than one of sale and purchase. Owing to the importance of the definition of payment, 
particularly electronic payment, in ascertaining whether contractual obligations have been 
discharged a body of case law has developed analysing payment mechanics, obligations, 
timing and assumptions. This chapter will examine payment case law relevant to crypto-
currencies to enable consideration if payment by crypto-currencies actually constitutes 
payment in the traditional sense, or if such uses of crypto-currencies are equivalent to 
commodity exchange for services.  In Skatteverket v David Hedqvis280 Kokott AG has offered 
the view that bitcoin is for the purposes of VAT neither goods nor services but a payment 
mechanism and therefore not liable to VAT. However the CJEU is bound by the finding of the 
referring Swedish court that bitcoin is a pure form of payment.281 For the reasons explored 
below in this chapter that finding from the referring court must be seriously questioned. 
Scots282 and English law283 both require there to be consensus in idem284 for legally 
enforceable contractual obligations to arise. Both legal systems adopt a model of offer and 
acceptance as an analytical tool to determine whether contractual relations have been formed. 
In relation to essential content both systems have similar requirements but English law 
traditionally requires a further essential element which is absent in Scotland - consideration. 
Such consideration can be token and does not require to be monetary. It is highly unlikely that 
any commercial organisation would be willing to engage in a contract for the provision of goods 
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or services without payment or other consideration and therefore payment is also of 
significance in Scots law. What constitutes payment will now be considered.  
3.2: What is payment? 
The starting point in any contract will be to interpret the provisions of the contract itself. This 
is equally true in relation to what constitutes payment. The accepted principle is that ordinary 
words should be given their ordinary meaning. In the case of ambiguity, the English courts 
conclude that words should be interpreted in their commercial setting285 with the application of 
business common sense.286 Consideration of business common sense in contract 
interpretation is still appropriate despite the recent emphasis by the Supreme Court on 
application of the natural meaning of wording.287  This can be contrasted with the application 
of general rules of contract interpretation by the Scots courts where contractual interpretation 
is restricted to the necessary interpretation of the ordinary meaning of the words.288 
Accordingly in the first instance payment will be interpreted as provided for in the contract 
itself. Where the contract is silent or ambiguous in relation to payment then resort must be had 
to a definitional approach. 
Goode,289 a leading academic, proposed the following working definition of payment 
“….payment in the legal sense means a gift or loan of money or any act offered and accepted 
in performance of a money obligation. Money must therefore feature in some way, either 
                                                          
285 Lord Mustill held in Charter Reinsurance v Fagan [1997] AC. 313 that the ordinary meaning of words should 
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289 Proctor (ed), Goode on Payment Obligations in Commercial and Financial Transactions, (2nd Edition) 
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because payment is in physical money or because the obligation to be discharged by the act 
of payment is a money obligation…...” 290 
Goode’s definition is more expansive than Scots law requirements for contracts but, as noted, 
the inclusion of monetary payment is inevitable. Goode’s definition is adopted for the purpose 
of this thesis. It can be broken down into several sections:  
(a) A gift or loan of money or any act 
(b) Offered and accepted 
(c) In performance of a money obligation 
Taking each in turn, a gift or loan of money or any act of payment must be made by the debtor. 
A gift can be easily defined as the donation of a corporeal or incorporeal to another party for 
no return. The following paragraph will consider payment made by the debtor. 
As already discussed,291 payment into a bank account extinguishes one obligation and creates 
a new obligation, or chose in action, against the bank for repayment of an equivalent sum. 
Ownership is not retained and it is not equivalent to the transfer of funds into the bank, 
regardless of the terminology regularly used in society. This rule is applicable irrespective of 
the type of transfer occurring e.g. electronic transfer292 or physical transfer of the cash or coins 
to the bank. The process of electronic transfer was discussed in the Libyan Bank case293 
where the transfer of funds from one account of the Libyan Bank at Bankers Trust to the Libyan 
Bank was undertaken.294 It is clear that monies which are paid into an account are not 
transferred nor is there an assignation of existing rights. Rather the right is extinguished and 
a new right created. If individuals are using crypto-currencies for payment then the funds are 
not transferring but new rights are created. As already identified, crypto-currencies are fungible 
and the amounts paid in to online wallets do not necessarily need to be repaid with the identical 
crypto-currency unit. Thus, the concept of payment can constitute the extinguishing of one 
individual’s rights, creation of a new right when the money is transferred through a third party 
which is then extinguished and a new right created when the funds are repaid.  These rules 
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have been applied in relation to theft and associated criminal offences in a number of English 
cases discussed below.295  
Goode’s second requirement is that the money must be offered by the debtor or by a third 
party having actual or apparent authority to make it on his behalf as a pro tanto discharge of 
the debtor’s obligation to the creditor. An unauthorised payment by an independent third party 
is not accepted as a discharge of the debtor’s obligation except where the debtor either ratifies 
expressly by nominating the third party as authorised to act on his behalf or by expressly 
accepting the benefit of the payment. Thus, the action must have the intended purpose of 
being applied against outstanding debts due to a creditor.   
The above can be considered an offer of money or obligation in return for performance. Offer 
and acceptance of electronic funds transfer is not as easily ascertained as offer and 
acceptance of corporeal moveable property. Electronic fund transfer can be initiated by either 
the debtor’s bank or creditor’s bank – raising the question as to what constitutes the offer and 
conversely the acceptance. Such offer and acceptance was considered in the Scottish case 
of HMV Fields Properties v Bracken Self Selection Fabrics.296 If an electronic fund transfer is 
initiated by the debtor’s bank the funds are “pushed” to the creditors’ bank by some form of 
credit transfer. Therefore it is clear that the funds are being offered by the debtor’s bank, 
following instructions from the debtor, and accepted by the creditors’ bank constituting 
acceptance of the funds. If, on the other hand, a funds transfer is initiated by the creditor’s 
bank, the funds are effectively “pulled” from the debtor’s bank accounts, for example by the 
presentment of a cheque for payment from that account or by the creditor initiating a direct 
debit on the basis of a previously granted authority by the debtor. Payment by cheque is an 
example of an offer by the debtor and acceptance by the creditor through payment into 
account. Although the transaction is initiated by the creditor’s bank “pulling” the funds, such 
action is based upon the offer by the debtor through presentation of the cheque. As Geva297 
explained “…A payment mechanism can be broadly described as any machinery facilitating 
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the transmission of money in the payment of a debt, which enables the debtor to avoid the 
transportation of money and its physical delivery to the creditor in the discharge of the debt.”298 
Applying this to crypto-currencies, an individual must be involved in pushing the funds to the 
creditor’s accounts through use of the private key. As yet, it is not possible to arrange for direct 
debits or payment by cheque with crypto-currencies. Therefore only “pushing” the funds is 
currently available as means of transferring crypto-currencies. Payment by means of “pulling” 
the funds requires conversion to fiat currencies to effect such transfers. Therefore, fiat 
currencies still enjoy a monopoly in transactions of this nature with the requirement for further 
technological advances in the Blockchain protocol required before transactions “pulling” funds 
are possible.   
Storage in an online wallet is equivalent to the offer by the debtor and acceptance by the 
creditor. However, the mechanics of such offer and acceptance are different from the 
traditional sense of payment as third parties are involved in assisting the transfer to the 
relevant parties.  
3.3: Monetary Obligation 
The final component of Goode’s definition is in performance of a monetary obligation. 
Consideration of whether the dishonest appropriation of funds constitutes theft produces 
guidance as to the classification of crypto-currencies and use of performance of a monetary 
obligation. This section will explore the case law and consider application of the principles to 
the use of crypto-currencies.  
3.3.1: R v Preddy 
In the English House of Lords case R v Preddy,299 , Preddy had engaged in mortgage fraud. 
His mortgage application contained false statements which induced the building society to 
approve a mortgage. The Building Society instructed their bankers to transfer funds to 
Preddy’s solicitors’ client bank account. Preddy was unjustifiably enriched by these actions 
through the fraudulent scheme, to the detriment and reduction in the patrimony of the lender. 
The question for the court was whether this unjustified enrichment constituted a payment and 
theft of the Building Society’s funds300 or if another right had been breached. The Court 
held…”when the bank account of the defendant…is credited, he does not obtain the lending 
institution’s chose in action. On the contrary that chose in action is extinguished or reduced 
pro tanto, and a chose in action is brought into existence representing a debt in an equivalent 
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sum owed by a different bank to the defendant.”301 Obtaining funds through the transfer did 
not involve property belonging to another person transferring but rather property being newly 
created or varied. Therefore Preddy’s actions could not be considered to be theft within the 
meaning of section 15(1) of the Theft Act 1968.302 This accords with the principles established 
in Foley303 and Skinner.304 
3.3.2: Holmes v Governor of Brixton Prison305 
Following Preddy, the court in Holmes considered the new section 15A of the Theft Act which 
had been enacted following the Preddy decision, concluding that payment was not complete 
until any condition placed upon payment was removed. Holmes credited his personal account, 
deceitfully, while working at a large financial organisation. Such deception took place in the 
course of the payment transaction and therefore fell within the remit of the new section 15A of 
the Theft Act.  
More recently R v Waya306 considered307 the offence of obtaining an electronic money transfer 
by deceit. These cases demonstrate the extension of the Theft Act and interpretation in 
relation to electronic transfers. Waya’s conviction for obtaining “a money transfer by deception” 
can be equiparated with “wire fraud” in America.308 In America, the principals of Silk Road 
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have been found guilty of wire fraud and imprisoned for the money laundering and criminal 
activities associated with Silk Road.309 This correlation between wire fraud and obtaining a 
money transfer by deception is obviously key given the nature of exchanges and the actions 
of participants in these schemes.  
3.3.3:  Aectra Refining and Manufacturing Inc v Exmar NV 
Aectra Refining and Manufacturing Inc v Exmar NV310 considered the use of CHAPS311 and 
when payment on the system occurs. On the proper construction of the transfer form used in 
the CHAPS, a remitting bank was authorised to debit a customer’s account when the form had 
correctly identified the beneficiary’s receiving bank, sort code and account number: the 
standard CHAPS practice did not require correspondence between those identifiers and the 
beneficiary’s name.312 A customer who had named the beneficiary correctly but entered an 
incorrect sort code and account number on the CHAPS form could not recover the completed 
payment from the remitting bank. The receiving bank, in accordance with banking practice, 
did not check the name on the account and relied on the sort code and account number. 
Account names were not checked as it would impact on the ability to transfer funds within the 
guaranteed 1.5 hours.313 As crypto-currencies are still relatively novel there is no common 
practice or rules governing the checks undertaken by exchanges holding funds in online 
wallets and thereafter transferring such funds. However, given the requirement of the public 
Blockchain it appears the likelihood of incorrectly completing the information required is slight 
and individuals are required to correctly complete the information before any transfer can 
occur. The actions of miners, checking the authenticity of the transactions is not dissimilar to 
the checks required for CHAPS transactions. This is an area where regulation could be 
introduced to assist in the interpretation of when payments made become effective.  
3.4: Delivery? 
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Finally, whilst payment often involves the performance of a monetary obligation, it does not 
require the delivery of physical money. Thus, owing to the increased usage of online accounts, 
the electronic transfers are undertaken behind the scenes and the individual does not 
physically touch nor transfer corporeal moveable money. Additionally, money need not 
transfer hands where the items are setoff against existing debts or used to offset a rolling 
customer record.314 These payments can all be conducted electronically. 
Parties can effect a change in their relative wealth by agreeing to such change in their relative 
positions through third parties. Both have debt relationships with their respective third parties, 
and the payment mechanism is used to increase the debt a third party owes the payee and 
reduce the debt a third party owes the payer. 315 The values of these choses in action are 
altered to achieve the movement in buying power or wealth. The relationship in Scotland 
corresponds with the English examples albeit different terminology is applicable. The payee 
with a personal right or obligation has a right in action against the debtor or his representatives. 
The personal right is a real right in the law of obligations, and the payee may oblige the debtor 
to fulfil that obligation.316 The payer, in making a non-cash payment, sets in train a course of 
events at the end of which its monetary rights are worth less, and the payee’s monetary rights 
are worth more. Provided that the payee is willing to treat this as a valid payment, it is good 
consideration for the purchase or effective discharge of existing debt.317 
Modern payment systems do not generally involve an assignment of underlying rights. Instead 
they result in the increase and decrease in institutional liabilities owed to the payer and payee. 
No property is transferred through this process. The payer and payee both hold intangible 
property, both before and after the transaction. Neither acquires nor disposes of these chattels 
during the transfer (as least not from or to each other). Lord Millett stated in Foskett v 
McKeown318 that no money or property passes through the payment system. Instead, the 
system is “simply a series of debits and credits that are causally and transactionally linked.”319 
These debits and credits are recorded in ledgers not dissimilar to the Blockchain ledger of 
crypto-currency transactions, albeit the Blockchain is public. The differing aspect is the 
anonymity of the traditional payments in comparison with the publicly announced public 
Blockchain ledger.  
                                                          
314 These transactions are not restricted to electronic funds transfers.  
315 Rhys Bollen, Continuing confusion over what a payment is, CSLR 2005 1(1), p31 – 38. 
316 Prof. H MacQueen et al (eds), Gloag and Henderson’s The Law of Scotland (13th Edition, W.Green 2012) at 
1.05 on p4. 
317 Rhys Bollen, Continuing confusion over what a payment is, CSLR 2005 1(1), p31 – 32. 
318 [2001] 1 AC 102. 
319 [2001] 1 AC 102 at 128. 





3.5: Application to the operation of crypto-currencies 
As will be discussed, the delivery and acceptance of funds in crypto-currency transactions 
operate differently. A question arises regarding the risk to the merchant and consumer when 
paying by crypto-currencies. However, this risk is being addressed with the development of 
new Blockchain technology with multi signature and escrow systems320 to ensure that delivery 
and acceptance are assured before the merchant receives the funds. One of the core benefits 
for merchants accepting payment by crypto-currency is the reduced transaction cost – 
currently merchants receiving credit card payments must pay up to 3% of the value of each 
transaction to traditional payment service providers to undertake the transaction. These fees 
have not gone unnoticed by exchanges and payment processors with Coinbase and Bitpay 
offering to process bitcoin payments for 0% fee and charge.321 However as noted322 at present 
miners will still receive block rewards for solving the algorithms which are simply created by 
the system and may themselves add transaction fees and the exchanges will remunerate 
themselves through the exchange rates which the offer to and from fiat currencies.   
3.6: Right to payment? 
In Tresender-Griffin v Co-operative Insurance Society Limited323 Denning LJ stated that 
sterling is a constant unit of value in the eye of the law against which everything is 
measured.324 This works within the context of a single legal system but completely ignores 
exchange rate risk where another currency is the unit of account of either party. This can be 
distinguished from crypto-currencies which are not universally accepted and are restricted to 
those users who trust and accept the worldwide use. Therefore this opinion is of importance 
when considering the potential for crypto-currencies to be used as a universal means of 
exchange or payment for goods and services. As Goode states, “the parties are not entitled 
or obliged to demand and receive payment according to the real value of the money of account 
at due payment date compared with its value at contract date, they are merely concerned with 
the nominal value specified in the contract.”325 Nonetheless, Denning’s description is one of 
                                                          
320 Escrow is English terminology which at present, has no equivalent provisions in Scotland. This can be a 
bond, deed or other document held in the hands of a third party until a condition is lifted. A practical example 
would be holding funds in escrow until the signed contract is received.   
321 United Kingdom Digital Currency Association, The UK Digital Currency Association’s response to HM 
Treasury’s Digital Currencies: Call for Information, 3 December 2014. 
322 In Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies) at 1.2 (Operation).  
323 [1956] 2 QB 127. 
324 “…..a man who stipulates for a pound must take a pound when payment is made, whatever the pound is 
worth at that time. Sterling is the constant unit of value by which in the eye of law every else is measured. 
Prices of commodities may go up or down, other currencies may go up or down, but sterling remains the 
same.” [1956] 2 QB 127 at 144. 
325 R.M. Goode, Payment Obligations in Commercial and Financial Transactions, (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 
1983) at p33. 





considerable importance in analysing crypto-currencies as payment mechanisms. If a contract 
stipulates payment be made in a specific crypto-currency then the payee must uphold this 
obligation. In a recent American example the parties chose bitcoin as consideration for 
performance and the court subsequently held payment was to be made in bitcoin.326 As 
discussed, bitcoin is not a currency because it is not money nor currency, at best bitcoin can 
be seen as commodity money or a funds transmission vehicle. While courts have power to 
make awards in foreign currency in appropriate circumstances bitcoin does not attract this 
status for the simple reason that it is not a currency. Thus an order for payment is therefore 
for implement i.e. an order ad factum praestandum to deliver bitcoin to the value of XX to the 
pursuer.327 Failure to deliver that obligation permits going back to court for payment in fiat 
currency.  However, as has been detailed in the preceding chapter on Money, contracting on 
the basis of payment by crypto-currency can be either a risky, and potentially costly 






3.7: Payment Regulation 
                                                          
326 Stan Higgins, Judge Rules in Peer-to-Peer Bitcoin Lending Lawsuit, (Coindesk, USA, 18 June 2015) < 
http://www.coindesk.com/judge-rules-in-peer-to-peer-bitcoin-lending-lawsuit/> accessed 11 July 2015  
327 The relevant rules in Scotland are in the Court of Session Rules Court of Session Rules Chapter 7 (Decrees 
for payment in foreign currency) 7.5. (1) Where an application is made under rule 7.1 for an extract of a decree 
for payment in a foreign currency, the applicant shall lodge with the note to the Extractor a certified statement 
of the rate of exchange prevailing at- (a) the date of the decree sought to be extracted, (b) the date on which 
the note to the Extractor is lodged, or (c) a date within three days before the date on which the note to the 
Extractor is lodged, and the sterling equivalent of the principal sum, interest and expenses decerned for. (2) 
The certified statement required under paragraph (1) shall be by an official in the Bank of England or an 
institution authorised under the Banking Act 1987 (a). The equivalent rules in the Sheriff Court is contained in 
Act of Sederunt (Sheriff Court Ordinary Cause Rules) 1993 No.1956 (s223) SCHEDULE 1: 30.3.(1) Where decree 
has been granted for payment of a sum of money in a foreign currency or the sterling equivalent, a party 
requesting extract of the decree shall do so by minute endorsed on or annexed to the initial writ stating the 
rate of exchange prevailing on the date of the decree sought to be extracted or the date, or within 3 days 
before the date, on which the extract is ordered, and the sterling equivalent at that rate for the principal sum 
and interest decerned for; (2) A certificate in Form G18, from the Bank of England or a bank which is an 
institution authorised under the Banking Act 1987 certifying the rate of exchange and the sterling equivalent 
shall be lodged with the minute requesting extract of the decree; (3) The extract decree issued by the sheriff 
clerk shall mention any certificate referred to in paragraph (2). 





The Internal Market and Services Directorate of the European Commission explain that the 
“crucial” Payment Services Directive328 (“PSD”) was intended to provide a coherent legal 
framework for cross-border payments329 in the European Economic Area (EEA). 
The PSD brought within the sphere of regulation other payment service providers not already 
regulated as banks or clearing houses. The latter are organisations which offer back office 
services allowing banks to communicate with each other in relation to effecting the mechanics 
of payments.330 Application is limited “to payment service providers whose main activity 
consists in the provision of payment services to payment service users.”331 The extension to 
payment service providers requires further analysis to assess (i) what constitutes a payment 
service provider; (ii) whether exchange providers can be deemed payment services providers 
and are included under the PSD; (iii) or if not, whether extension of the PSD to exchange 
providers is plausible. Finally, this section will examine the protections guaranteed by the 
establishment of the new Payment Services Regulator and the proposal for updating the PSD 
by means of a second Payment Services Directive.332 
The PSD was transposed into domestic law in the UK through the Payment Services 
Regulations 2009333 (“PSR”). As noted, the PSD extended the right to undertake regulated 
payment services to the new entity, payment service provider which refers to the services of 
payment institutions. The PSD regulates a previously unregulated sector of “payment 
institutions” (e.g. money remitters, retailers, and phone companies) to enable the provision of 
payment services alongside banks. Broadly, the PSR applies where the services are provided 
from an establishment maintained by a payment service provider in the UK (a bank, Electronic 
Money Institution or Payment Institution) and the payment is made within the EEA and 
crucially, carried out in the euro or currency of the state in which the transaction is conducted 
i.e. in the UK sterling would be applicable. Clearly, transactions for payment of goods and 
services undertaken by exchanges and online wallets are not be undertaken in fiat currencies 
but in crypto-currencies. Therefore application of the PSD in its current guise to exchanges 
                                                          
328 2007/64/EC on payment services in the internal market amending Directives 97/7/EC, 2002/65/EC, 
2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 97/5/EC. 
329 Charlie McCreevy, Internal Market and Services Commissioner, Press Release 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-1914_en.htm?locale=en> accessed 11 July 2015. 
330 Cheque Clearing is dealt the Cheque and Clearing Company see < http://www.chequeandcredit.co.uk/ > 
accessed on 11 July 2015; BACS payments and Faster Payments are handled by Bacs Payment Schemes Ltd see 
< http://www.bacs.co.uk/Bacs/Corporate/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 11 July 2015; CHAPS payments are 
handled by CHAPSCo < http://www.chapsco.co.uk/> accessed on 11 July 2015. Operation of a clearing house is 
a regulated activity under part XVIII of FSMA. 
331 Payment Services Directive 2007/64/EC at Recital 6. Available online at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007L0064&from=EN> accessed 11 July 2015. 
332 Those in the industry have expressed concerns that it is too early to recast the PSD regime (as it has only 
been 4 years since the PSD was implemented in the UK in November 2009). 
333 SI 2009/209. 





and payment is at best questionable334 and the regulation is currently being ignored by 
exchanges. The lack of regulation permits those “mining” and owning exchanges to have 
significant powers in crypto-currency transactions. The United Kingdom Digital Currency 
Association [UKDCA]335 responded to the UK Government’s Call for Information336 with the 
recommendation that regulation of the infrastructure for conversion of crypto-currencies to and 
from fiat currencies should be regulated under the PSR. This regulation would monitor 
conversions into or from fiat currencies i.e. regulate the fiat element undertaken by exchanges. 
Classification of exchanges as payment institutions would suggest the primary purpose of 
exchanges would be to facilitate payment between consumers and retailers. The UKDCA 
acknowledge this would create a hybrid approach to regulation with further guidance required 
for monitoring other actions of exchanges337 and will be further considered in the forthcoming 
chapters.   
The PSD introduces the right for the payment service provider to specify the information 
required to execute a payment order correctly. This includes coherent unique identifier 
information. The PSD permits the payment service provider to act in a diligent and coherent 
manner and request a unique identifier from the payee. Where the unique identifier is found 
to be incoherent, the payment service provider should be permitted to refuse payment. This 
“unique identifier” is metadata associated with the payment to prevent fraud.338 There was 
discussion at EU level whether the unique identifiers should be introduced through the 
proposed second payment services directive or fourth anti-money laundering – clearly the 
former was the preferred method. This links the payment protection to consumers with the 
anti-money laundering measures discussed in the following sections.  
Meantime, it is useful to note that the PSD states that “…this Directive should lay down rules 
on the execution of payment transactions where the funds are electronic money, as defined 
in Article 1(3)(b) of Directive 200/46/EC. This Directive should, however, neither regulate 
issuance of electronic money nor amend the prudential regulation of electronic money 
institutions as provided for in Directive 2000/46/EC. Therefore payment institutions should not 
                                                          
334 The potential amendments and application to crypto-currencies will be considered further in Chapter 4 
(Consumer Protections) and Chapter 5 (Regulation).  
335 The UK Digital Currency Association, a non-profit organisation established by individuals and businesses 
who recognise the vision digital currencies ultimately represent. Further information available at 
<https://www.ukdca.org/> accessed 11 July 2015.   
336 Digital currencies: Call for Information, closed 3 December 2014 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/digital-currencies-call-for-information/digital-currencies-call-
for-information> accessed 11 July 2015. 
337 United Kingdom Digital Currency Association, The UK Digital Currency Association’s Response to HM 
Treasury’s Digital Currencies: Call for Information, 3 December 2014 at p2. 
338 Payment Services Directive 2007/64/EC at Recital 70 & 71. Available online at <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007L0064&from=EN> accessed 11 July 2015. 





be allowed to issue electronic money.”339 Analysis of the issuance of electronic money will be 
undertaken in the following chapters’ analysis of the E-money Directive.  
Finally, reference should be made to the newly established Payment Systems Regulator in 
the UK. Following the Treasury Report in July 2011340 outlining serious concerns about the 
governance of payment systems, the Government published the “Opening up UK Payments” 
consultation in March 2013341 with the aim of bringing payment systems under formal 
economic regulation. As a result, the Payment Systems Regulator (“the Regulator”), a 
subsidiary of the FCA342 was incorporated and became operational in April 2015343 operating 
as a competition focused regulator of payment systems.  
The Regulator has three objectives: to promote competition, promote innovation; and ensure 
that payment systems are developed and operated in the interests of service-users.344 The 
Regulator recently concluded a Consultation345 specifying the regulatory framework and 
policies that the Regulator proposed to adopt. Following the consultation346 the Regulator 
regulates the clearing houses, which were previously authorised under FSMA,347 operating 
the main interbank payment systems, namely BACS, CHAPS, Faster Payments Services 
(FPS), LINK, Cheque and Credit Clearing (C&CC) and Northern Ireland Cheque Clearing 
(NICC) and the two largest card payment systems in the UK, MasterCard and Visa. The 
                                                          
339 Payment Services Directive 2007/64/EC at Recital 9. Available online at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32007L0064&from=EN> accessed 11 July 2015. 
340 Treasury – Nineteenth Report, Independent Commission on Banking, 19 July 2011 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtreasy/1069/106902.htm> accessed 11 
July 2015. 
341 HM Treasury, Opening up UK payments 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/221903/consult_opening_
up_uk_payments.pdf> accessed 24 May 2015; and HM Treasury, Opening up UK payments: Response to 
Consultation, October 2013. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/249085/PU1563_Opening_u
p_UK_payments_Government_response.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. 
342 The Payment Systems Regulator was incorporated in April 2014 and became fully operational in April 2015.  
343 The Payment Systems Regulator launched on 1 April 2015. This new economic regulatory intends to 
develop a system which works well for the individuals that use them. Further information is available on the 
Payment Systems Regulator website <https://www.psr.org.uk/> accessed 24 May 2015.  
344 FCA Paper, A new regulatory framework for payment systems in the UK (PSO CP14/1), November 2014 < 
http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/psr/psr-cp14-1-cp-a-new-regulatory-framework-for-payment-
systems-in-the-uk.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. 
345 Consultation closed on 12 January 2015.  
346 HM Treasury, Designation of payment systems for regulation by the Payment Services Regulator, 14 
October 2014. < https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/designation-of-payment-systems-for-
regulation-by-the-payment-systems-regulator/designation-of-payment-systems-for-regulation-by-the-
payment-systems-regulator> accessed 11 July 2015. 
347 s288, FSMA 2001  





Regulator’s powers do not extend to exchanges nor to Western Union348 and similar money 
remittance services as these have not been designated by the Treasury.349 Should it be 
concluded that regulation is desired, a relatively straightforward option would be to extend the 
powers of the Regulator350 to cover exchanges. The legislative base of the draft second 
Payment Services Directive is Article 114 TFEU – the approximation of law of member states 
to facilitate the establishment and functioning of the EU. Therefore mutual cooperation is 
required rather than maximum harmonisation which permits the UK to choose to over 
implement and extend protections to consumers by the regulation of exchanges.     
3.8: Conclusions 
It is evident from the above analysis that electronic transfer of funds to effect payment does 
not actually transfer the funds but extinguishes one personal right or chose in action and 
creates a personal right to repayment. Applying this principle to exchanges, upon payment 
into the online wallet the individual extinguishes the right of ownership of the crypto-currency 
or whatever is deposited. Instead, the individual receives a personal right to repayment. This 
right will ensure repayment at the current value of crypto-currency. The above analysis 
confirms that exchanges are, at present, outwith the regulatory framework. Thus, if as has 
already occurred on a number of occasions, an exchange is subject to hacking or other attack 
then the services are not protection under the payment regulation. This will be discussed 







                                                          
348 The Western Union Company is a financial services and communications company enabling person-to-
person money transfer, money orders, business payments and commercial services worldwide via telegraph. 
Further information available at <http://www.westernunion.co.uk/gb/Home.page> accessed 11 July 2015. 
349 See <https://www.psr.org.uk/payment-systems/who-we-regulate> accessed on 15 July 2015. 
350 This will be examined in further detail in the forthcoming Chapter 6 (Recommendations & Conclusions). 





Chapter 4: Consumer Protections 
4.1: Overview 
The preceding chapters sought to analyse crypto-currency contracts in terms of existing, well 
understood contractual frameworks for banking relationships, for deposit and in relation to 
payments. It is recognised that the relationship with exchanges may be a business to business 
(“B2B”) contract or a business to consumer contract (“B2C”). This chapter will explore the 
contractual protections applicable to banking, deposit and payment transactions offered to 
consumers within the EU in general,351 their transposition into domestic UK law, alongside 
indigenous UK protections352 and application to crypto-currency transactions.  
4.2: Governing Law 
An examination of aspects of private international law is required in order to establish which 
legal regime will apply to any contract which is executed entirely in an online environment. 
The contractual governing law, whether explicit or implied, dictates the applicable law for 
interpretation of the contract, the respective obligations of both parties to the contract and the 
resolution of any disputes under the contract. Determination of the governing law is therefore 
important when exploring the rights and remedies available to parties. However, in relation to 
a crypto-currency contract it is a difficult concept to pin down due to its decentralised peer to 
peer nature. If the crypto-currency owes its existence to the Blockchain and that does not 
occupy a single geographic place on any server it is almost impossible to determine which 
legal system governs the creation or transfer of crypto-currencies. This creates possible legal 
anomalies and difficulties between creation and use. When new crypto-currencies, for 
example bitcoins, are created by rewarding the miners verifying transactions and adding them 
to the Blockchain they too only exist virtually through their representation in the Blockchain. 
However exchanges will have a physical location as will the consumers who interact with them. 
It is proposed to examine those relationships rather than trying to associate crypto-currencies 
themselves with a particular legal system. It is thus at the points of conversion to fiat currencies 
or in relation to payment instructions that those interactions can be ascribed using generally 
applicable existing rules of private international law. Having considered the answers provided 
                                                          
351 Owing to the scope of private international law, this section aims to outline the key principles in relation to 
crypto-currencies and the relationship between consumers and exchanges. However, this is by no means an in 
depth analysis and a further review of the case law on habitual residence and place of performance specifically 
is recommended. This section therefore aims to highlight some of the concerns and provide a high level 
overview of the private international law perspective.  
352 Indigenous UK protections will be touched upon in this chapter but explored further in the forthcoming 
chapter on regulation.  





by private international law in relation to the governing law, this chapter will consider the 
protections offered assuming that UK and/or EU law will apply 
4.3: Private International Law 
Should the parties reach a position where there are differences between them which they are 
unable to resolve, the courts may, in the absence of explicit agreement,353 be required to 
determine the governing law of the contract – in the absence of any contractual alternative 
dispute resolution provisions or which may be imposed by operation of law. As Tang explains 
this is not straightforward as “the internet is ‘a network of networks,’ which breaks down 
traditional borders between each country and creates a virtually borderless market.”354 This 
online borderless market, certainly in relation to crypto-currencies, is also largely anonymous. 
It is often unclear within the bitcoin ecosystem where parties are incorporated or have their 
real seat. The absence of mandatory anti-money laundering controls allows individuals to 
disguise their real identity even though the exchanges and consumers will have physical 
locations. The anonymity includes the absence of information relating to domicile or habitual 
residence – matters of key importance to private international law355 and to any court required 
to address resolution of any contractual disputes. These difficulties will be examined in the 
analysis of exchange terms and conditions in this chapter. 
4.4: Choice of law 
The primary rule determined under the Rome 1 Regulation356 is party autonomy in respect of 
choice of law. The parties are free to choose the governing law in terms of the contract.357 The 
Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) 358  which has been adopted by all fifty US states provides 
a similar rule.359 Where there has been no effective choice made by the parties at the time of 
entering into contractual relations then, within the EU, a crypto-currency Business to Business 
[B2B] contract will have the implied choice of law of the habitual residence of the service 
                                                          
353 The terms and conditions contained in Appendix 2 (Terms and Conditions) at Appendix 2C (ANXBTC) do not 
have an express governing law clause.  
354 Sophia Tang Zheng, Electronic Consumer Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009), 
at p12 – 13. 
355 Sophia Tang Zheng, Electronic Consumer Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2009), 
at p13. 
356 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law 
applicable to contractual obligations (Rome 1). 
357 Art 3(1). 
358Uniform Commercial Code § 1-301. The UCC applies to Bank Deposits (article 4), Funds Transfers (Article 4A) 
and Investment Securities (Article 8). For the purposes of this chapter it is assumed that Article 4A has the 
potential to apply to crypto-currency payment transactions.  
359 Reference to the UCC is to provide a comparator for the EU and the focus on this section will remain in the 
EU. 





provider.360 However where the contract is a Business to Consumer [B2C] one, that is a 
contract where one party is a natural person not acting within the scope of his trade or 
profession and the other party is acting in such a professional capacity then the applicable law 
will be that of the consumer’s habitual residence,361 if the professional party either pursues his 
activities in the country where the consumer has his habitual residence or directs his activities 
to that country.362 It is not clear what “directing activities” means. Having a website in English 
hosted outwith the EU and available within the EU may not be directing activities but clearly, 
if that were supported by other marketing materials which were directed to a particular member 
state through press or radio advertising that would presumably establish directing activities.363 
The Court of Justice of the European Union [CJEU] has considered the interpretation of 
“directing activities” concluding that the contract need not be concluded at distance to 
constitute directed activities.364 It appears that the question of directing activities is therefore 
one which falls to be determined by the facts in individual cases and that as yet, the 
jurisprudence available from the Court of Justice of the European Union is not sufficiently 
developed to provide an entirely predictable result in any given situation. A consumer would 
however be prohibited from relying on Rome 1 should he complete an order form misleading 
the trader to believe him to be habitually resident in a country in which the goods were legally 
directed to be sold.365 If the party autonomy rules are followed, Article 6 of Rome 1 Regulation 
provides that the rights of the consumer shall not be less than those which would have been 
                                                          
360 Art 4(1)(b). 
361 Under Rome 1 Regulation. 
362 Art 6(1). 
363 Further analysis of directing activities is noted in Peter Pammer v Reederei Karl Schlüter GmbH & Co. KG (C-
585/08) and Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v Oliver Heller (C-144/09). , where the Court stated  Recital 24 in the 
preamble to Regulation No 593/2008 is worded as follows: ‘With more specific reference to consumer 
contracts, … consistency with Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 requires both that there be a reference to the 
concept of directed activity as a condition for applying the consumer protection rule and that the concept be 
interpreted harmoniously in Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 and this Regulation, bearing in mind that a joint 
declaration by the Council and the Commission on Article 15 of Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 states that “for 
Article 15(1)(c) to be applicable it is not sufficient for an undertaking to target its activities at the Member State 
of the consumer’s residence, or at a number of Member States including that Member State; a contract must 
also be concluded within the framework of its activities”. The declaration also states that “the mere fact that 
an Internet site is accessible is not sufficient for Article 15 to be applicable, although a factor will be that this 
Internet site solicits the conclusion of distance contracts and that a contract has actually been concluded at a 
distance, by whatever means. In this respect, the language or currency which a website uses does not 
constitute a relevant factor.” 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30dd7a646deac3cf4a888e15828e8
a4c506a.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxuPbxf0?text=&docid=83437&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&o
cc=first&part=1&cid=44467> accessed 11 July 2015. 
364 Daniela Mühlleitner v Ahmad Yusufi and Wadat Yusufi Case 
C-190/11<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=126428&pageIndex=0&doclang=
EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=32533> accessed 11 July 2015. 
365 Peter Stone, EU Private International Law, (Edward Elgar Publishing, England, 2010) at p352. 





applicable had the express choice of law not been made.366 Thus, the protections offered to 
consumers by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations,367 Consumer Contracts 
(Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations368 and the Electronic 
Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations,369 which implement the corresponding EU 
instruments,370 could not be excluded. These will be explored later.  
The UCC adopts a slightly different approach to the protection of consumers: where there is 
an active choice of law it is ineffective unless it bears a reasonable relation to the law of the 
principal residence of the consumer.371 The EU rule provides stronger protection in that it 
requires equivalence rather than merely approximation. Furthermore it should be noted that 
the current protection available to EU citizens is stronger than that previously available under 
the Rome Convention 1980372 following recognition by the European Court373 that provisions 
should protect the party who is less experienced in economic and legal matters.374  
Where activities are located outwith the EU the courts will determine the appropriate governing 
law by considering a number of factors, including the place of performance375 or where the 
necessary actions are required to conclude the contract376 i.e. the subject matter of the 
dispute.377 Owing to the worldwide nature of e-commerce, particularly the services offered by 
exchanges, it is probable that determination of applicable law under this mechanism will be 
required.  A starting point might be the terms and conditions in order to determine where 
characteristic performance is due. The place of performance may be where the place of 
payment into the exchange’s “hosted wallet” is made or where the money is transferred out of 
the exchange. It should be noted that as a number of exchanges are located in Asia, applying 
the private international rules of place of performance may produce an unfavourable 
applicable law outcome for many individuals with money deposited with exchanges owing to 
the costs associated with commencing legal action in an unknown jurisdiction. 
                                                          
366 Art 6(2). 
367 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (SI1999/2083). 
368 Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013 (SI2013/3134) 
implemented the Directive on Consumer Rights (2011/83/EC) in the UK and replaced the Consumer Protection 
(Distance Selling) Regulations 2000 (SI2000/2334).  
369 The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (SI2002/2013). 
370  Unfair Consumer Contract Terms Directive 93/13/EEC; Consumer Rights Directive (2011/83/EC); Electronic 
Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC. 
371 § 1-301(e). 
372 Peter Stone, EU Private International Law, (Edward Elgar Publishing, England, 2010) p351. 
373 Shearson Lehman Hutton v TVB [1993] ECR I-139, at para 18 [1993] I.L.Pr.199 
374 Peter Stone, EU Private International Law, (Edward Elgar Publishing, England, 2010)  p123 
375 Brussels 1 Regulation, Art 5(1). 
376 Rome Convention, Art 5(2). 
377 Actor sequitur forum rei: the pursuer must have access to the court where the subject matter of the dispute 
is situated. 





4.5: Choice of court 
A brief examination of choice of court rules is required. From an analysis of several sets of 
exchange terms and conditions, many terms and conditions fail to clearly identify either the 
governing law or the jurisdiction of the courts.378 Where there is an express choice of court 
clause this will be given effect to.379 However, in the absence of express choice of court 
provisions private international law dictates the application of general rules dependent upon 
the locality of the contracting parties.380 Where both parties and the activities are located within 
the EU, the Brussels I Recast Regulation381 stipulates that persons domiciled in a member 
state shall be sued in the courts of that member state regardless of whether they are 
nationals382 of the member state.383 Where different member states have concurrent 
jurisdiction over the same dispute, the court first seized of the action will have jurisdiction to 
determine the case.384 The concept of domicile for the purposes of Brussels 1 Recast is an 
autonomous one which is more akin to ordinary or habitual residence rather than the common 
law concept of domicile within the United Kingdom.  Owing to the single market in the EU this 
clearly dictates a suitable mechanism for identifying the forum for disputes or the jurisdiction 
for governance of the terms and conditions in the absence of express agreement of the parties. 
Application of Brussels I Recast is therefore required in the absence of express choice of court 
provisions. However, as identified, the anonymity associated with crypto-currencies and 
exchanges may result in difficulties in ascertaining the domicile and habitual residence of the 
parties so the application of Brussels I Recast will not be entirely straightforward.385  
                                                          
378 For example see Appendix 2C (ANXBTC). 
379 Brussels 1 Regulation was recast by EU Regulation No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters 
and entered into force on 10 January 2015. Brussels 1 Recast at paragraph 22. 
380 See Appendix 2 (Terms and Conditions). The terms in Appendix 2C (ANXBTC) does not contain an express 
choice of court provision and therefore the rules considered in this section will be applicable.  
381 Brussels 1 Regulation, effective from 1 March 2002. Brussels 1 Regulation was recast by EU Regulation No. 
1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgements in civil and commercial matters and entered into force on 10 January 2015. 
382 Brussels 1 Regulation, Art 2(1) and 2(2). 
383 This is the general rule but there are specific rules in relation to contract in Art 7. In relation to a contract 
the place of performance determines which courts have jurisdiction. That raises all the questions of place of 
performance. Art 7 goes on to determine that in relation to service contracts is the place of performance of 
those services. However in relation to consumer contracts art 18 provides a consumer can bring an action 
either where the provider is domiciled or where he is domiciled and proceedings may only be brought against 
a consumer where he is domiciled. Given the nature of the services being provided by an exchange it is 
unlikely that they will sue the consumer because the consumer is not obliged to provide any ongoing 
performance. Rather it will be the consumer suing the exchange for failure to return funds to the consumer or 
implement payment instructions. Such proceedings accordingly can be raised in the place where the consumer 
is domiciled but ultimately that judgment would require to be enforced where the exchange is domiciled. 
384 E Crawford and J Carruthers, International Private Law: A Scots Perspective, (3rd Edition, W. Green, London, 
2010) at 155 
385 Peter Stone, EU Private International Law, (Edward Elgar Publishing, England, 2010) at p134 – 137. 





As noted above in relation to the choice of court, there are special jurisdictions in relation to a 
contract. A person domiciled in a member state may be sued in another member state in the 
courts for the place of performance of the obligation.386 That again raises the issue of whether 
repayment is due at the consumer’s end or at the exchange end. In relation to consumers they 
may bring proceedings in either the member state in which they are domiciled or that other 
member state where the other party undertakes business.387 However where a consumer is 
sued they may be sued only in the member state where they are domiciled.388 It is unlikely the 
consumer will be sued as performance of the obligations remains with the exchange and it is 
more likely that consumer may be forced to take action when their exchange fails to implement 
their obligations. 
4.6: Prorogation agreements 
The Brussels 1 Recast Regulation recognises party autonomy – the right of the contracting 
parties to make an effective choice of court in terms of the contract itself or a specific 
agreement at the time a dispute arises. However the Regulation expressly excludes 
application to agreements which instead refer matters to arbitration.389 The Brussels 1 Recast 
Regulation amended related actions (or lis pendens)390 provisions where there is a contractual 
exclusive jurisdiction clause. The amendments aimed to address the problems seen in the 
West Tankers391 litigation392 where the English courts issued an anti-suit injunction in support 
of arbitration proceedings in the UK which failed to stop the Italian courts becoming first seized 
in terms of the original Brussels 1 Regulation. The new provisions allow a member state court 
specified in an exclusive jurisdiction clause to proceed to determine a dispute even if 
proceedings have commenced first (in breach of contract) before another member state court. 
Therefore the other member state court is required to stay proceedings to allow the exclusive 
jurisdiction court to determine the issue.   
Arbitration in consumer contracts is uncommon; in the example terms and conditions of 
exchanges there is no such provision. However, there exists, within the UK financial services 
sector, broadly stated a statutory right on the part of the consumer to refer a dispute to the 




389 art 1(2)(d). 
390 A Anton et al, Private International Law, (3rd Edition, W.Green, Edinburgh, 2011) at 258. 
391 General Assicurazioni Generali SpA v West Tankers Inc [2009] 1 AC 1138; [2009] 3 WLR 696. 
392 Further proceedings in the case are reported at West Tankers Inc v Allianz SpA (formerly known as Riunione 
Adriatrica Sicurta) & Anor [2012] EWHC 454 (Comm); [2012] 1 C.L.C. 762. 





Financial Ombudsman Service [FOS].393 It is a form of alternative dispute resolution and is not 
a court proceeding nor is there any agreement to refer the matter to arbitration. It does 
determine the civil rights of the financial services provider394 but not the consumer unless the 
consumer accepts the findings. The process of exchange of written information and 
determination generally without an oral hearing has been held to be compliant with the 
provider’s right to a fair hearing in determination of its civil rights and obligations.395  The Court 
of Appeal has held in In Focus396 that where a consumer accepted a settlement through the 
FOS this amounted to res judicata when the consumer subsequently sought to sue the 
defendants for the balance of the claim which exceeded the FOS limits. Accordingly, the 
English courts apparently treat a FOS decision as the equivalent to the decision of a court or 
the outcome of an arbitration. In contrast in Scotland, Lord Woolman in the Outer House held 
that the taking of a case to the FOS was not arbitration which would have the effect of 
interrupting the running of prescription in relation to a claim made against the defenders.397 
Instituting court proceedings or the reference to arbitration of a dispute would have that effect. 
As a result it appears that the Scottish and English courts presently take differing views on the 
effects of FOS determining a case. It is suggested the existence of a statutory right for a 
consumer to have a claim determined by FOS is not arbitration nor should it be regarded as a 
court process and that In Focus is wrongly decided. Accordingly if some ombudsman-like ADR 
process were incorporated into exchange contracts as part of a scheme of regulation that right 
may potentially fall within the scope of Brussels 1 Recast, should it be construed as arbitration 
but not apparently where it is regarded as a form of alternative dispute resolution, albeit 
compulsory for one of the parties. The current position where the Scottish and English courts 
take differing views on the nature of such remedies merely illustrates the potential for 
confusion. 
The existence of such a right would not prevent proceedings being taken by an exchange to 
the detriment of a consumer in a country outwith the jurisdiction clause in the terms and 
conditions – as was seen in West Tankers. The amendments in Brussels 1 Recast allow the 
court which has jurisdiction in terms of the choice of court provisions to determine the issue 
and the court first seized must stay398 their proceedings and defer to the court of choice to 
                                                          
393 The Dispute Resolution: Complaints Block of FCA Sourcebook [DISP] provisions for referral to FOS 
<http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/handbook/DISP/INTRO/1> accessed 11 July 2015. These expand the 
statutory outline contained in Part XVI of Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. 
394 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 s228(5). 
395  Article 6 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Heather Moor and Edgecomb 
v UK 2011 ECtHR App 1550/09. 
396 Clark v In Focus Asset Management [2014] EWCA Civ 118; [2014] 1 WLR 2502. 
397 Clark v Argyle Consulting Limited 2011 SLT 180. 
398 Sist in Scotland. 





accept or reject the validity of that choice.  Such a route for alternative dispute resolution will 
be discussed later.399 
The foregoing examination of private international law aspects is necessary to consider at a 
preliminary step in order that it can be determined what the governing law is and which courts 
have jurisdiction in order that the appropriate substantive consumer protections imposed as a 
matter of law according to the governing law applicable through express choice of law or 
implied as discussed above into B2C contracts can be considered. In the following sections it 
will be assumed that the governing law is one of the legal systems of the UK. 
4.7: Unfair Terms 
The B2C nature of the contracts under consideration dictates that the terms and conditions 
and provision of services400 in relation to crypto-currencies, particularly bitcoin, result in those 
terms and conditions falling under the ambit of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977401 (“UCTA”) 
and Unfair Terms Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999402 (“UTCCR”). UCTA applies to 
contract terms or notices that seek to limit or exclude liability and certain types of liability can 
never be excluded in consumer contracts, such as liability for fraud, death or personal injury. 
The UTCCR403 introduced a definition of “unfair” in relation to consumer contracts which are 
expressed in a standard form (namely, a term which has not been individually negotiated) 
contrary to the requirement of good faith which causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ 
rights and obligations arising under the contract to the detriment of the consumer.404  This is 
often referred to as the fairness test. In Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank405 
it was concluded that the determinative elements of the test were the application of good faith 
and a significant imbalance between the parties. The former requires open and fair dealing by 
the business to the consumer. Accordingly terms should be expressed fully, clearly and legibly, 
with no contractual pitfalls or traps placed on the parties. This includes any attempts by the 
service provider to exclude or limit liability for fraud. Fraud liability can never be excluded in 
consumer contracts and attempts to do so will be unsuccessful. Additionally the seller or 
business should not take advantage of the lack of knowledge or experience of the consumer. 
                                                          
399 In Chapter 6 (Recommendations & Conclusions). 
400 As detailed in Chapter 2 (Money) at 2.5 (Conclusion) crypto-currencies cannot be considered money. 
401 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 c50. 
402 SI 1999/2083. 
403 This transposes into UK law the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 OJ 
L 95/29.   
404 Art 3(1) of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive and Regulation 5(2) of UTCCR. There is a “grey 
list” of terms which are prima facie unfair in the schedule to the Regulations. 
405 [2001] UKHL 52. This case considered application of the 1994 regulations which were subsequently replaced 
by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999. 





An examination of the terms and conditions of the three sample exchanges is required to 
assess the application of these principles in practice.406 The three selected terms and 
conditions represent three of the largest exchanges in operation and also permit analysis of 
exchanges located outwith the UK 
These examples appear to have been assembled from “off the shelf” terms and largely fail to 
detail the type of services provided or to tailor the obligations of either party to make reference 
to the provision of exchange services.407 The terms and conditions408 contain extensive 
limitation of liability provisions which fail to balance the risks to the consumers depositing the 
funds against those risks undertaken by the online exchange providing the service – the 
balance is firmly in favour of the exchanges.  For example, BTC.sx’s terms and conditions of 
use409 include a broad indemnity in favour of BTC.sx in respect of use of the website and as a 
consequence use of the services provided by BTC.  This is illogical considering the provision 
of services is by BTC.sx to the consumer. The same terms and conditions include an extensive 
limitation of liability clause, including a cap limited to the fees paid by the consumer in the 
foregoing 12 month period. As the fees paid by the consumer can be minor compared to the 
sums deposited this is highly restrictive for investors and demonstrates there is no effective 
recourse, should the exchange encounter problems or losses.410 Conversely the terms of 
bitstamp.net411 are more consumer friendly enabling the consumer to recoup sums from 
bitstamp.net. The limitation is capped at the greater of either the total amount held on 
account412 for the member (less commission) or 125% of the amount of the transactions that 
are subject to the claim. However, the terms do include an uncapped indemnity in favour of 
bitstamp.net and no reciprocal provisions in favour of the consumer. Finally, as demonstrated 
by the recent significant problems at bitstamp.net413  consumers should carefully consider the 
exchange which exchange in which to deposit their crypto-currency.414 
The inability to influence the terms of the contract, even if the consumer has had the 
opportunity to review them prior to entering into the contract means that the terms have not 
                                                          
406 The terms and conditions from the example exchanges are contained in Appendices 2A – 2C.  
407 <https://btc.sx/about/terms-privacy/> accessed 11 July 2015. 
408 <https://anxbtc.com> accessed 11 July 2015 and <www.bitstamp.net> accessed 11 July 2015. 
409 Appendix 2 (Terms and Conditions). 
410 As explored in detail in Chapter 1 (Crypto-Currencies) at 1.4 (Case Studies). 
411 Appendix 2 (Terms and Conditions). 
412 As defined in the terms and conditions. 
413 This is discussed Chapter 1 (Crypto-Currencies) at 1.2 (Operation). 
414 There is acknowledgment of the issues associated with hosted wallets in the bitcoin industry. Companies 
are now actively involved in creating more resilient technology to better protect users and create additional 
checks for depositing and withdrawal of funds from hosted wallets. For further information see Daniel Cawrey, 
Should Bitcoin Users Trust Hosted Wallets? (Coindesk, USA, 17 August 2014) 
<https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-users-trust-hosted-wallets/> accessed 11 July. 





been individually negotiated415 and will be considered accordingly in light of the UTCCR and 
UCTA. Additionally, the indemnities and limitations of liability would not be enforced in the EU 
as a result of the significant imbalance which they create. This is true either where the 
governing law is within a member state or where the business activities are directed towards 
the EU or any member state.  
4.8: E-commerce 
The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002416 transposed the E-Commerce 
Directive417 into UK law and govern the requirements as to provision of information by online 
traders to consumers. Online traders are required to provide certain information about 
themselves and about how the contracts concluded through electronic means will be 
implemented, including acknowledgement of receipt of the order in a timely manner.  
The DTI guidance on the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002418 states, “the 
requirement for an information society service to be ‘normally provided for remuneration’ does 
not restrict its scope to services giving rise to buying and selling online. It also covers services 
(insofar as they represent an economic activity) that are not directly remunerated by those 
who receive them, such as those offering online information or commercial communications 
(e.g. adverts) or providing tools allowing for search, access and retrieval of data.”419 
The Regulations will apply where, for example, the consumer does not pay for the 
transmission of crypto-currency funds and the miner is rewarded by the creation of new 
bitcoins for the block in which the transaction is contained. Should a dispute arise the 
Regulations also apply the principle of country of origin to the determination of the legal 
proceedings. However, this principle is not extended to the terms of consumer contracts under 
the Regulations. In practical terms, this means that a UK company selling products to UK 
citizens and consumers of other member states must ensure that its terms and conditions 
comply with the laws of the other member states in which the goods and services are sold. 
Thus, exchanges are obliged to ensure that their terms and conditions comply with the laws 
of the countries where the crypto-currencies can be bought and exchanged. Owing to the 
                                                          
415 This was the decision in UK Housing Alliance (North West) Ltd v Francis [2010] EWCA Civ 117. 
416 Consumer Rights (Payment Surcharges) Regulation SI 2012/3110. 
417 2000/31/EC. 
418 A Guide for Business to the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/2013) July 2002 < 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121212135622/http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file14635.pdf> 
accessed 11 July 2015. 
419 A Guide for Business to the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 (SI2002/2013) July 2002 at 
page 9, at 2.13 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121212135622/http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file14635.pdf> 
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anonymity of the users of exchanges it will be difficult to determine the country of origin420 of 
many users. It is outwith the scope of this thesis to examine compliance of the crypto-currency 
terms and conditions with national laws where the crypto-currency services are provided 
outwith the EU. However, it appears unlikely that the sample terms and conditions following 
the examination above, will comply with the national laws of the member states. Should the 
proposed draft European Sales Law421 progress to become a European instrument422 and 
replace the current e-commerce rules, then it is likely that exchanges would take advantage 
of the provisions of the European sales laws which permit that law to be adopted as an 
alternative to the national laws of the member states.  This would remove the need to comply 
potentially with 28 different jurisdictions. 
In terms of the current EU regulations minimum information423 is required which is to be easily, 
directly and permanently accessible on the service providers’ website This includes the name 
and geographical address of the service provider, details, including the e-mail address or other 
address to allow direct and effective communication should a consumer have difficulties with 
the website, a company number,424 any supervisory body or professional body if a regulated 
profession, and a VAT number. The example terms and conditions in the Appendices clearly 
lack some of this key information. These rules are relatively straightforward to comply with and 
non-compliance suggests consumers may not be adequately protected should problems with 
exchanges arise. For example, should a consumer require to sue an exchange the absence 
of geographical address details may frustrate that intention. 
 
4.9: Distance Selling 
                                                          
420 Note earlier discussion regarding worldwide use of crypto-currencies and difficulties ascertaining underlying 
users.   
421 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions a common European Sales Law to Facilitate cross-border 
transactions in a single market (COM/2011/0636 final) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0636> accessed 11 July 2015.  
422 The Law Societies Joint Brussels Office, Brussels Agenda, March 2015  
<http://www.lawscot.org.uk/media/455103/brusselsagenda-march2015.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. 
423 Art 6(1)  of Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 
424 This overlaps with the requirement in the Companies Act 2006 if the service provider is a company. The 
Companies Act 2006 requires that the place of registration should be stated alongside the company number. 
As noted above, this is lacking in several of the crypto-currency exchange terms and conditions and the 
ultimate body is unclear. This is clearly insufficient for the purposes of the Companies Act 2006 and the E-
Commerce Regulations.  





The Consumer Rights Directive425 was partially transposed426 into the UK by the Consumer 
Contracts (Information Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013.427 The 
Directive aimed to consolidate, harmonise and regulate distance selling rules. This section will 
analyse the prior legislation and compare that against the recent amendments under the 
Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges Regulations 2013.  
The Consumer Rights Directive applies to distance contracts - that is those which are 
concluded without the simultaneous physical presence of the trader and the consumer.428 
However financial services transactions are excluded from its operation.429 These are defined 
as any service of a banking, credit, insurance, personal pension, investment or payment 
nature.430 Insofar as crypto-currency transactions involve any element of payment, then they 
are excluded from the protections of the Consumer Rights Directive and its transposition into 
the domestic laws of member states.431 As noted, the recent view of Kokott AG432  that bitcoin 
is neither goods nor services but a payment mechanism and would therefore be excluded from 
the Consumer Rights Directive. On the other hand, the lodging of funds in an online wallet is 
not a banking transaction for the reasons explored433 and therefore does fall within the scope 
of the Directive.  
Instructing an exchange to make a payment from funds previously lodged as bitcoins may 
amount to payment and therefore would be excluded. However, for the reasons explored in 
Chapter 3 (Payment) it is not free from doubt that crypto-currency payments would meet the 
legal tests for payment. If a crypto-currency payment is not legally regarded as payment then 
the payments themselves would not be excluded either.  
The Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000434 applied to contracts 
concluded on or before 12 June 2014. Where an account with an exchange was opened prior 
to that date the 2000 Regulations would continue to apply. From 13 June 2014 onwards the 
                                                          
425 2011/83/EU. 
426 The remaining provisions are implemented in the Consumer Rights (Payment Surcharges) Regulations 2012 
and the Enterprise Act 2002 (Part 8 EU Infringements) Order 2013). 
427 SI 2013/3134. 
428 Consumer Rights Directive art 2(7). 
429 Consumer Rights Directive art 3(3)(d). 
430 Consumer Rights Directive art 2(12). 
431 The measure is a maximum harmonisation instrument art 1 and art 4.  As a result it should be uniformly 
implemented throughout the EU. 
432 Case C-264/14 opinion of Kokott AG issued on 16 July 2015 < 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d2dc30d555012c6119454c778d85909bf
51a8d1d.e34KaxiLc3qMb40Rch0SaxuQbNj0?text=&docid=165919&pageIndex=0&doclang=FR&mode=lst&dir=
&occ=first&part=1&cid=604912> accessed on 3 August 2015.   
433 In Chapter 2 (Money) at 2.1 (Deposit). 
434 SI 2000/2334. 





Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013435 
apply to consumer contracts. As the majority of crypto-currency transactions are B2C the 
implementation of these Regulations to transactions with exchanges must be considered. 
Consumers are provided with a right to cancel the contract within a 14 day time period. 
However, the Consumer Rights Directive436 allows an exception to the right to withdraw where 
the price is dependent on fluctuations in the financial market which cannot be controlled by 
the trader and which may occur within the withdrawal period. Application of this exception 
depends on whether upon transfer from a fiat currency to a crypto-currency the exchange is 
relying on a financial market to predict the value. Each exchange is operating its own OTC 
offering to its customers as there is no universal trading market for crypto-currencies. The 
hosted wallets are closed to the individual exchanges and so the exchange will determine the 
price it will provide in exchange.437 Thus, the right to withdraw arguably exists in relation to 
crypto-currency transactions. This is at odds with the founding principles of crypto-currencies 
that once a transaction is processed through the Blockchain it cannot be reversed. The right 
to cancel however does not make the transaction conditional. The cancellation returns the 
parties to the original position as a separate inverse transaction.438 Accordingly there is no 
breach of the Blockchain protocol. A second transaction is required to reverse the first. If, as 
noted above, crypto-currency payments are not regarded legally as payment then those 
transactions too would be liable to cancellation. Reliance on consumer protection against 
exchanges has not yet been considered by the courts so the foregoing analysis is presently 
entirely theoretical. Nonetheless it is an avenue where consumers may find adequate 
protection and the ability to cancel transactions.439  
 
 
                                                          
435 Implementing the Consumer Rights Directive. 
436 Article 16(b). 
437 The fluctuations in over the counter volumes was apparent over a period of 3 months where Mt Gox 
quoted prices up to 20% higher than its main competitors bitstamp.net and BTC.sx. This led to the opportunity 
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prices on Mt Gox. For further discussion see Joon Ian Wong, Why Mt. Gox, the World’s First Bitcoin Exchange, 
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438 Robertson’s Electrical Ltd v Customs and Excise Commissioners 2006 SC 261 
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injunction against Ryan Kennedy the principal of Moolah Ltd on a common law basis on behalf of those who 
had deposited 750 bitcoins when Moolah was experiencing financial difficulties. John Weru Maina, Selachii LLP 
Consolidates its position as UK’s Leading Bitcoin Law Firm (Cryptonews, USA, 15 March 2015) 
<https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/selachii-llp-consolidates-position-uks-leading-bitcoin-law-firm/> accessed 
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This chapter has provided an examination of the relationship between exchanges and 
consumers. As a necessary preliminary, consideration was given to the application of private 
international law rules to the services of exchanges in relation both to the governing law and 
appropriate forum in which disputes between the parties might be resolved.  The impact of 
those private international law rules would be seen in the governing law which in turn may 
operate to enhance both the level of protections available to consumers as well as the potential 
avenues of redress for them.  
It is highly unlikely the FCA or another regulatory body would be able to satisfy themselves 
that the providers of exchanges terms and conditions currently comply with the High Level 
Principles for Business [PRIN] within the FCA Handbook, in particular the generalised duty to 
treat customers fairly. Should the provision of exchange services become a regulated activity 
under Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 [FSMA] then the terms and conditions would 
require amendments to comply with PRIN. This would require providers to clearly specify the 
services being provided in language readily understandable to users. Furthermore they would 
be unable to rely on terms which distorted the economic balance between the parties which 
would therefore be deemed to be unfair and unenforceable against consumers. 
In the absence of bespoke legislation, the application of the existing directives as presently 
transposed into domestic law, does not appear to offer a suitably comprehensive series of 
protections to consumers. At present the unfair and/or unenforceable terms and conditions 
have the potential to mislead consumers as to their legal rights thus demonstrating market 
imperfections resulting from information asymmetry. Expansion and amendment of the 
regulations and directives would be required to bring the services of exchanges into the remit 
of the legislation. The following chapter aims to consider further regulation of exchanges at 
both national and international level. Thereafter, the thesis will conclude with 













The UK has a comprehensive and mature system of regulation in relation to the provision of 
financial services by recognised financial institutions and others. While that system is 
constantly refined by legislative changes and subordinate rules it has, to date, not addressed 
the issues posed by crypto-currencies. This chapter will examine the points of contact between 
the current regime and crypto-currencies drawing on experiences elsewhere and attempts by 
regulators to equiparate such currencies with known and established principles and categories 
of products. In order to determine what, if any, regulatory regime ought to be applied to crypto-
currencies it is necessary to consider why regulation is implemented and assess if the features 
for regulatory intervention are apparent in crypto-currencies. As the exchange of crypto-
currencies are transactions of a financial nature the chapter will then consider the mature 
regulatory regime applicable to the UK financial services. This chapter will therefore consider 
why regulation is undertaken and thereafter consider the UK model of protection. Chapter 6 
(Recommendations & Conclusions) will then assess any gaps in the regulatory structure and 
explore extension of regulation to crypto-currencies and exchanges.  
 
5.2: Why Regulate? 
The objectives of regulation - what outcome regulation is trying to secure – is distinct from the 
rationale for regulation and the reasons for regulation in practice. This section proposes to 
analyse and balance the objectives, rationale and reasons for regulation of the financial 
services at national and European levels. Owing to the extensive of literature on regulation 
this chapter will focus on the reasons for regulation of the financial services sector. “We 
regulate finance over and above the way we regulate other industries because finance exhibits 
market failures that can have devastating consequences.”440 Regulation of financial 
institutions is expansive and actively enforced owing to the negative ramifications for 
consumers should these financial institutions fail. A lack of confidence in financial institutions 
directly impacts on the propensity of consumers to invest and spend in the economy, thereby 
indirectly affecting connected industries. Aims of regulation441 are to: (i) sustain systemic 
                                                          
440 The Warwick Commission, The University of Warwick, Why Regulate (undated) 
<http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/research/warwickcommission/financialreform/report/chapter_1.pdf> accessed 
11 July 2015. 
441 The Financial Services Authority was subject to a number of statutory duties to secure the regulatory 
objectives under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The regulatory objectives, detailed in s2 
included, market confidence, public awareness, protection of consumers and the reduction in financial crime. 





stability; (ii) maintain the safety and soundness of financial institutions; and (iii) protect 
consumers.442 This section will examine each in relation to financial services. 
 
5.2.1: Systemic stability 
Firstly, as noted in the foregoing chapters, one response of the UK government to the 2008 
economic crisis and the perception of the performance of the FSA in the run up to that crisis 
was the division of the FSA into the FCA and the Prudential Regulation Authority [PRA].443 
The FSA Chief Executive noted the advantage of this approach, “[twin peaks444] will embed 
the forward-looking, judgement-based approach from the old reactive style of regulation. The 
changes will not just be structural but involve behavioural shifts from both supervisors and 
firms.”445 The split model resulted in deposit takers, insurers and major investment firms having 
two groups of supervisors, one focusing on macro prudential regulation (PRA) and one 
focusing on conduct (FCA). All other firms (i.e. those not “dual regulated”) are solely 
supervised by the FCA focusing on regulating conduct. The FCA focus on supervising and 
regulating how financial institutions are conducting the regulated activities which comprise 
their businesses and ensure systemic stability through territory guidance in the FCA Handbook 
from high level principles446 to sector specific guidance.447 These high level principles ensure 
that businesses are sustainable and prevent undue risk taking. The stability flows from the 
FCA Handbook and implementation of the rules by financial institutions. As the FCA has the 
power to censure448 impose financial penalties449, suspend,450 prohibit,451 order redress452, 
bring criminal proceedings453 or take other action to prevent market abuse,454 financial 
                                                          
The succeeding bodies, Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority were created 
under the Financial Services Act 2012. The statutory objectives are detailed in sections 1B – 1D for the 
Financial Conduct Authority and section 2B onwards for the Prudential Regulation Authority.  
442 David Llewellyn, The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation, 1999, FSA Occasional Papers in Financial 
Regulation at p7. 
443 The FSA released publications outlining the approach to be taken by two new bodies in papers dated 15 and 
16 October 2012.  
444 Michael Taylor, Redrawing the regulatory map: A proposal for Reform (1997) JFRC 5(1), 49–57; Michael 
Taylor (1995) Twin Peaks: A Regulatory Structure for the New Century, Centre for the Study of Financial 
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institutions are compelled to comply with the FCA Handbook and principles. In November 
2014 the FCA used its powers to fine Citibank.455 HSBC Bank,456 JPMorgan Chase Bank457 
The Royal Bank of Scotland458 and UBS AG459 collectively £1,114,918,000460 for failures in 
controlling business practices in their G10 spot Foreign Exchange [FX] trading operations. 
More recently, the FCA has imposed a fine of £284,432,000 on Barclay’s Bank for a breach 
of Principle 3 (management and control) by failing to take reasonable care to organise and 
control its affairs responsibly and effectively in relation to FX trading operations.461 The FCA 
considered this market systemically important and failures by regulators to adequately monitor 
these industries should cease. At the time of investigation FX exchanges were not subject to 
any specific regulation. The FCA action demonstrates the ability to impose fines outwith FCA 
regulated activities and the level of fines demonstrates the extent of enforcement using the 
high level Principles for Businesses.462 The fines imposed reflect the desire for transparent 
markets in the UK. If crypto-currencies become authorised then standards of market conduct, 
such as treating customers fairly in PRIN would apply.  
The provision of services by exchanges is not stable. The recent outage463 on bitstamp.net 
affected the entire bitcoin network. Bitstamp’s system problems resulted in quoted prices of 
bitcoin becoming inaccurate, with some products suspended. The CEO of DigitalTangible 
explained that users of bitcoin on her site were shown incorrect prices following the bitstamp 
outage.464 The increasing centralisation of economic power and influence amongst key players 
in the provision of services in which bitstamp is a key exchange, indicates that problems with 
                                                          
455 FCA Final Notice 2014: Citibank N.A. 12 November 2014 <http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/final-
notices/2014/citibank-na> accessed 11 July 2015. 
456 FCA Final Notice 2014: HSBC Bank Plc, 12 November 2014 <http://www.fca.org.uk/your-
fca/documents/final-notices/2014/hsbc-bank-plc> accessed 11 July 2015. 
457 FCA Final Notice 2014: JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. 12 November 2014 <http://www.fca.org.uk/your-
fca/documents/final-notices/2014/jpmorgan-chase-bank> accessed 11 July 2015. 
458 FCA Final Notice 2014: The Royal Bank of Scotland plc, 12 November 2014 <http://www.fca.org.uk/your-
fca/documents/final-notices/2014/royal-bank-of-scotland> accessed 11 July 2015. 
459 FCA Final Notice 2014: UBS AG, 12 November 2014 <http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/final-
notices/2014/ubs-ag> accessed 11 July 2015. 
460 FCA Press Release, FCA fines five banks £1.1 billion for FX failings and announces industry-wide remediation 
programme, November 2014 <http://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-fines-five-banks-for-fx-failings> accessed 11 
July 2015. 
461 FCA Final Notice 2015: Barclays Bank PLC, 20 May 2015 < https://www.fca.org.uk/your-
fca/documents/final-notices/2015/barclays-bank-plc> accessed 11 July 2015. 
462 Legal & General v FSA Financial Services and Markets Tribunal 13 March 2005 first established that the PRIN 
block of the then FSA Handbook was directly enforceable in relation to disciplinary action. Available at 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/legal_general.pdf>  paragraphs 27 and 28, accessed 11 July 2015 
463 As discussed in chapter 1 bitstamp.net suffered a significant security breach on 5 January 2015 and 
temporarily suspended services until 9pm on 9 January 2015. Detailed discussion is in Chapter 1.  
464 Pete Rizzo, Bitcoin ecosystem feels far reaching effects bitstamp outage, (Coindesk, USA, 6 January 2015) 
<http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-ecosystem-feels-far-reaching-effects-bitstamp-outage/> accessed 11 July 
2015. 





these major players could result in systemic failure within the bitcoin industry if not in the 
general financial markets, given the currently small size of the former. The CEO of 
DigitalTangible acknowledged the risks explaining “….what you’re seeing is a lot of systemic 
risk in the bitcoin ecosystem.”465 Following the outage, bitcoin experienced continuing volatility 
in its market price, with a drop of 27% in a matter of hours in mid-January 2015.466 This was 
inextricably linked to the bitstamp outage.467 These ongoing difficulties are demonstrative of 
systemic failings in the crypto-currency network and provide evidence for regulatory 
intervention. However, the systemic issues associated with crypto-currencies and exchanges 
are restricted to the crypto-currency network. The outage and failures have not extended to 
other financial institutions.  
5.2.2: Safety and soundness of financial institutions 
Secondly, the introduction of the PRA, a subsidiary of the Bank of England, was intended to 
provide a supervisory arm independent from the FCA. The PRA provides macro prudential 
regulation to ensure the failure of one institution does not lead to the failure of others because 
of the interconnectedness of the financial markets and financial institutions. The provision of 
independent protection creates a previously absent check on financial institutions and enables 
an independent analysis outwith the FCA. Prudential regulation offers economies of scale in 
monitoring financial institutions as a whole. Often individuals and consumers are not in a 
position to make judgements about the security of their banks, because they lack the specialist 
knowledge or sector specific insight to judge the safety and soundness of financial firms they 
are investing in. For example, in the collapse of Northern Rock consumers were unaware of 
the Northern Rock’s inability to borrow funds on the 90 day LIBOR market until early in the 
financial crisis with the so called “Run on the Rock.” A mass run on deposits, such as 
experienced by Northern Rock, will lead banks to become vulnerable to an imbalance in 
cashflow out while the assets held, largely mortgages are long loans which cannot be readily 
liquidated to match the cash outflows. Any bank, particularly a mortgage bank, is vulnerable 
to a run on capital as they borrow short and lend long e.g. LIBOR 90 day money compared 
                                                          
465 As quoted in Pete Rizzo, Bitcoin ecosystem feels far reaching effects bitstamp outage, (Coindesk, USA, 6 
January 2015) <http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-ecosystem-feels-far-reaching-effects-bitstamp-outage/> 
accessed 11 July 2015. 
466 Yessi Bello Perez, Bitcoin’s Price Drop in the Headlines, (Coindesk, USA, 15 January 2015) 
<http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoins-price-drop-headlines/> accessed 11 July 2015 and Alex Hern, Bitcoin price 
plunge sparks new crash fears, (The Guardian, London, 14 January 2015) 
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467 Alex Hern, Bitcoin price plunge sparks new crash fears, (The Guardian, London, 14 January 2015) 
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with mortgage repayments over 25 years. The introduction of the Basel III Accord 468 aimed to 
improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic 
stress by strengthening banks’ transparency and disclosures. Basel III accordingly reforms469 
targeted both micro prudential regulation, helping the resilience of individual banking 
institutions in periods of stress, and macro prudential measures, designed to tackle potential 
systemic risks thereby reducing the ability of banks to damage the economy through excessive 
risk taking. These reforms bolstered the minimum capital requirements which banks were 
required to maintain to ensure future financial crises did not occur.470 Of course exchanges 
currently fall outwith the regulated sector and are not subject to any capital adequacy 
requirements. In fact they may simply use the funds deposited by their customers as a source 
of capital to fund their own activities and expansion plans. 
Regulation introduces minimum standards, which if actively enforced, promote the safety and 
soundness of financial institutions and remove weaker players from the market which in turn 
increases consumer confidence. As noted by Llewellann, “it is not unknown for producers in 
an industry to welcome regulation if it keeps low-quality producers out of the market.”471 By 
introducing regulation, consumers are provided with confidence in the services available which 
provides greater assurance and further investment. The introduction of regulation in the field 
of crypto-currencies would elevate crypto-currency transactions to provide confidence in the 
services available and remove the association with illegal activities.  
5.2.3: Consumer Protection 
Finally, owing to consumers’ desire for sufficient safeguards, the introduction of regulation 
would offer consumers protection. Consumers reasonably expect protection to be afforded so 
few will be aware of the lack of regulatory protections available should problems with 
exchanges occur. Consumers have already experienced detriment in losses by exchanges 
through alleged hacks or technological difficulties.472 The absence of any mechanisms 
                                                          
468 Basel III is a global, voluntary regulatory framework on bank capital adequacy, stress testing and market 
liquidity risk .Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more 
resilient banks and banking systems, December 2010 (new June 2011) available at 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. 
469 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks 
and banking systems, December 2010 (new June 2011) available at <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf> 
accessed 11 July 2015.  
470 Basel III was introduced in the EU through the capital requirements directives: Directive 2013/36/EU on 
access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment 
firms and Regulation (EU) No 575 / 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment 
firm replaced Directive 2006/49/EC which was designed to implement Basel II.  
471 David Llewellyn, The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation, 1999, FSA Occasional Papers in Financial 
Regulation at p26. 
472 Further examples are detailed in Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies) at 4.5 (Case Studies). 





available to consumers to quantify capital adequacy of exchanges and the associated  risks 
of insolvency, of fraudulent misappropriation of funds or the susceptibility of the exchange to 
a cyber-attack suggests a lack of transparency. While the absence of any safety nets, in the 
shape of compensation schemes or the implicit guarantee of government as lender of last 
resort to exchanges suggests inadequate consumer protection is presently available to those 
who have lodged funds. If these risks cannot be quantified then there is clear evidence of 
information asymmetry.473 Additionally there is no single market in bitcoins, with each 
exchange operating on an OTC basis. Furthermore users are locked into the provision of 
services with that provider as a result of the nature of the online wallets and the underlying 
cryptographic characteristic of the public key/private key infrastructure of crypto-currencies. 
Although there is transparency of price offered by exchanges in relation to the conversion to 
and from crypto-currencies, there is no ready mechanism by which to work out if the price is 
competitive compared with other exchanges. Transparency is key in financial services to 
enable an informed comparison of competitors’ services. This has the potential for actual 
consumer detriment. As noted, one of the key reasons for regulation is to provide adequate 
consumer protection. In the writer’s opinion this evidence of actual and potential consumer 
detriment justifies regulatory intervention.  
5.3: UK Regulatory Model 
5.3.1: Overview 
While the foregoing section provides an overview of the basis for regulation this section will 
now provide an overview of UK regulation and ways in which it protects consumers and 
prevents systemic failure. It will then analyse attempts to fight financial crime, the regulated 
activities and protection offered to consumers – attributes key when considering the work 
undertaken by exchanges. 
FSMA474 repealed the previous statutes regulating financial services providers and the 
services they provided including the Financial Services Act 1986475 and the Banking Act 
1987.476 This signified an alteration to the regulatory culture of financial services in the UK. 
Prior to FSMA, the protections available to investors were largely an inadequate, complex web 
of self-regulation, an institutional approach, which failed to effectively offer investor protection.  
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FSMA was thus, “….broadly welcomed for enhancing investor protection and eliminating the 
complex system of overlapping self-regulatory organisations that previously existed.”477  
To achieve visible and effective investor protection regulation, FSMA478 adopted a functional 
approach in relation to its key statutory objectives of: (i) consumer protection; (ii) integrity of 
UK financial institutions and markets while securing effective competition in the interests of 
consumers.479 The functional approach is perhaps most clearly seen in the general 
prohibition480 from undertaking financial services481 without the necessary authorisation.482 An 
understanding of these statutory objectives and their implementation will be key for exploring 
the potential extension to governance of crypto-currencies and exchanges. FSMA also 
introduced governance by the independent body the FSA to meet the key objectives through 
an impartial regulator.483 The FSA, the repurposed Securities and Investment Board, assumed 
its new role in December 2001 and continued to regulate financial services until 1 April 2013.  
 
As a more considered response to the Banking Crisis in 2008484 the UK coalition 
Government485 introduced the Financial Services Act 2012486 to ensure that “close supervision 
is [provided] because bank failures … have wide-ranging external effects – on depositors, 
                                                          
477 Eilas Ferran and Charles Goodhurt (eds), Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the Twenty First 
Century, (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002) at – Colin Mayer, Regulating Principles and the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 at p25 
478 As amended by the Financial Services Act 2012 c21. The original objectives in FSMA were contained in ss2-6 
and included: market confidence, financial stability, public awareness, the protection of consumers; and the 
reduction of financial crime. Following the introduction of the Financial Services Act 2012 these were modified 
to separate functions between the PRA and the FCA.  
479 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 c8 at section 1B. The original regulatory objectives in the FSMA 
also covered consumer education and the reduction of financial crime. 
480 FMSA s19. 
481 FSMA s22. 
482 FSMA s20. 
483 Michael Taylor, Redrawing the regulatory map: A proposal for Reform (1997) JFRC 5(1), 49–57; Michael 
Taylor (1995) Twin Peaks: A Regulatory Structure for the New Century, Centre for the Study of Financial 
Innovation, London and Michael Taylor (1996) Peak Practice: How to Reform the UK's Regulatory System, 
Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation. 
484 The initial response was the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 and the Banking Act 2009. This was 
latterly replaced by the Financial Services Act 2012.  
485 “It is still early days in the aftermath of the financial crisis. Bankers, depositors, businesses, regulators and 
governments are all adjusting in their own ways. All concerned have a role in rebuilding confidence and a 
robust system. The authorities should move rapidly to establish the right framework for regulation of the 
financial system, including competition policy and the reach of the state safety net. But there should be no rush 
to all-embracing new legislation. Changes to the rules must not only strengthen the banking system but 
reinforce confidence and the competitive position of the British banks and the City. “ as stated by the House of 
Lords, Select Committee on Economic Affairs, 2nd Report of Session 2008 – 2009, Banking Supervision and 
Regulation. Volume 1: Report. 2 June 2009 at p7. 
486 Financial Services Act 2012 c21. The previous administration had enacted the Banking (Special Provisions) 
Act 2008 c2, the Banking Act 2009 c1 and the Financial Services Act 2010 c28. 





taxpayers, other financial institutions, businesses and the economy as a whole ….”487 As 
noted, the 2012 Act488 largely retained the provisions in FSMA but restructured the FSA, 
dividing its powers between two bodies, namely; the FCA and the PRA. The FCA subsumed 
the FSA’s regulatory objectives in relation to micro-prudential regulation, including product 
regulation and conduct of business rules so that markets and financial systems remain sound, 
stable and resilient.489 Following the financial crisis, it was considered vital to have ‘twin peaks’ 
model of supervision and the PRA490 was to be the independent body responsible for the 
macro-prudential regulation and supervision of banks, building societies, credit unions, 
insurers and major investment firms to promote the safety and soundness of these firms given 
the stability these institutions provide to the UK financial system. The key aim was to mitigate 
the risk of systemic failures.491 Regulation by the FCA and PRA is the cornerstone to the 
functional approach introduced in FSMA which, read in conjunction with amending legislation, 
provides comprehensive consumer protections. The following sections will consider the 
application of the current regime to crypto-currencies and the services provided to exchanges. 
Where possible it will consider extension of the regulation to crypto-currencies and exchanges.  
 
5.4: Fighting Financial Crime 
5.4.1: Money Laundering 
The perceived affinity of crypto-currencies with criminal activities has captured the public 
imagination in the UK, Europe and the USA, “….the bit coin [sic] is music to the ears of global 
criminals because it is an illegal ‘currency’ and will be used for a massive amount of money 
laundering….”492 The anonymous, or pseudo anonymous,493 nature of crypto-currencies offers 
opportunities to the criminal fraternity looking to launder the proceeds of crime and facilitate 
criminal activities with tracing the provenance at best difficult. The Financial Action Task Force 
                                                          
487 House of Lords, Select Committee on Economic Affairs, 2nd Report of Session 2008 – 2009, Banking 
Supervision and Regulation. Volume 1: Report. 2 June 2009 at p7. 
488 This act built on the immediate response to the crisis – the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 c2 
489 Financial Services and Markets Act 200 s1B (The FCA’s General Duties). Further information about the aims 
and objectives of the FCA is available online at <http://www.fca.org.uk/about> accessed 11 July 2015 
490 The FCA Handbook is available to view at <http://www.fshandbook.info/FS/> accessed 11 July 2015. Note, 
the Handbook creates binding obligations on firms. For those unfamiliar with the FCA Handbook an overview 
document is available at < http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/handbook/readers-guide.pdf> accessed 
11 July 2015. 
491 <http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/pages/default.aspx> accessed 11 July 2015. 
492 Sally Ramage, Bitcoins - kiss of death to us all in the developed world, Crim. Law. 2014, 220, 1 – 2 at 1. 
493 As discussed in Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies) at 1.3.5 (Money Laundering). 





[FATF]494 issued guidance and Recommendations495 on combatting money laundering in 
general. The FATF recently produced crypto-currency specific anti-money laundering 
guidance which reaffirmed that international co-ordination is required to enhance the 
effectiveness of the international anti-money laundering standards.496 Countries, competent 
authorities and financial institutions497 are expected to identify, assess and understand Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing risks and take appropriate measures to effectively mitigate 
these risks. This guidance extends to traditional and increasingly novel transactions types, 
including the use of crypto-currencies. The FATF Recommendations have significantly 
influenced regulation in the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing at both 
European and national levels. The significance of the FATF Recommendations is affirmed by 
article 7(3) of the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime 1999,498 
                                                          
494 An inter-governmental body established by G7 in 1989. Members include, United Kingdom, USA, China, 
Canada, Japan, France, Hong Kong and Germany amongst others. Objectives include: set standards and 
promote effective implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money 
laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international financial system. 
FATF has developed a series of Recommendations for combatting money laundering and terrorist financing. 
These are recognised as an international standard and have formed the basis for regulatory advancements in 
money laundering. Further information is available at FATF website at <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/pages/aboutus/> accessed 11 July 2015. While FATF is independent it is hosted by the Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD]. 
495 FATF Guidance, International Standards on combating money laundering and the financing of terrorism and 
proliferation, February 2012 <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015 
and FATF Guidance, Virtual Currencies, June 2015 <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-RBA-Virtual-Currencies.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. While 
the FATF Guidance is not binding it is influential and used as a reference tool by the EU legislating in this area.  
496 FATF Guidance, Virtual Currencies, June 2015 <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-RBA-Virtual-Currencies.pdf> accessed 27 June 2015. 
497 Financial institutions means any natural or legal person who conducts as a business one or more of the 
following activities or operations for or on behalf of a customer:  
(1) Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public 
(2) Lending 
(3) Financial leasing 
(4) Money or value transfer services 
(5) Issuing and managing means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, cheques, traveller’s cheques, 
money orders and bankers’ drafts, electronic money).  
(6) Financial guarantees and commitments 
(7) Trading in (a) money market instruments (cheques, bills, certificates of deposit, derivatives etc.); (b) 
foreign exchange; (c) exchange, interest rate and index instruments; (d) transferable securities; (e) 
commodity futures trading.  
(8) Participating in securities issues and the provision of financial services related to such issues 
(9) Individual and collective portfolio management 
(10) Safekeeping and administration of cash or liquid securities on behalf of other persons 
(11) Otherwise investing, administering or managing funds or money on behalf of other persons 
(12) Underwriting and placement of life insurance and other related insurance 
(13) Money and currency changing.  
498 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 55/25 of 15 November 2000 entered into force on 29 September 
2003. Available at 
<https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf> 





the “Palermo Convention,” which provides that, “…in establishing a domestic regulatory and 
supervisory regime under the terms of this article, and without prejudice to any other article of 
this Convention, States Parties are called upon to use as a guideline the relevant initiatives of 
regional, interregional and multilateral organisation against money laundering.”  
Within the EU, the Third Money Laundering Directive499 updated the framework designed to 
protect the integrity and stability of financial institutions against terrorist financing and money 
laundering risks. To incorporate both FATF’s revised Recommendations in February 2012500 
and EU reports identifying significant disparities in member states’ implementation of anti-
money laundering initiatives,501 a new Fourth Money Laundering Directive502 has been 
approved which will replace the Third Money Laundering Directive.   
Presently, the anti-money laundering regime in the UK is governed by the Money Laundering 
Regulations 2007503 which transpose the provisions of the Third Money Laundering 
Directive.504 These in turn incorporate FATF’s then amended 40 Recommendations and 9 
Anti-Terrorist Recommendations.505 The Third Money Laundering Directive sought to 
harmonise anti-money laundering and terrorist financing standards across Europe.506 The 
                                                          
accessed 11 July 2015. The list of signatory states can be found there. While China became bound earlier it 
secured an opt-out for Hong Kong with the British former colony only opting in from 27 September 2006. 
499 Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 2005 
500 The FATF Recommendations, International Standard on combating money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism and proliferation, February 2012 < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. 
501 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Directive 
2005/60/EC on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and 
terrorist financing < http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/financial-
crime/20120411_report_en.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015;  EBA, ESMA and EIOPA’s Report on the legal and 
regulatory provisions and supervisory expectations across EU member states of Simplified Due Diligence 
requirements where the customers are credit and financial institutions under the Third Money Laundering 
Directive [2005/60/EC], April 2012 < http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/jc_2011_097.pdf> accessed 24 
May 2015. 
502 On 20 May 2015 the European Parliament adopted, at second reading, the Council position at first reading 
on the proposed Fourth Money Laundering Directive. The directive will enter into force on the 20th day 
following its publication in the Official Journal i.e. 26th June 2015. Member states will then have two years to 
transpose into national legislation.  
503 SI 2007/2157 replacing the Money Laundering Regulations 2003 SI 2003/3075. 
504 The First Money Laundering Directive (Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the 
use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering) dealt with laundering of proceeds of drug-
related offences through the financial system; The Second Money Laundering Directive (Council Directive 
2001/97/EC of 4 December 2001 amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the 
financial system against money laundering) aimed to cover all serious crime which were then both replaced 
and extended by the Third Money Laundering Directive (Directive 2005/60/EC of 26 October 2005 on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering and terrorist financing).  
505 Following the 9/11 Attack these additional anti-terrorist provisions were inserted. They were revised more 
recently in 2012. 
506 Peter Snowdon and Simon Lovegrove, Money Laundering Regulations 2007, COB 2008, 54 (Mar), 1 – 38 at 
4. 





2007 Regulations are intended to protect the financial system rather than imposing penalties 
for non-compliance – therefore the approach is regulatory507 rather than punitive. The 
Regulations apply only to relevant persons acting in the course of business.508 This extends 
beyond credit institutions and financial institutions to include the business of high value 
dealers,509 casinos,510 and money remittance businesses.511 The inclusion of these categories, 
beyond the traditional scope of credit and financial institutions, demonstrates an increasing 
awareness of the diversity of businesses engaged in high value money items requiring anti-
money laundering provisions. These businesses are not overseen by a regulatory body such 
as the FCA but by HMRC.512 This will be considered below.  
Relevant persons, acting in the course of business, should take all reasonable steps including 
undertaking due diligence measures to avoid committing an offence under the regulations.513 
Customer Due Diligence [CDD] checks form the core obligations of taking “reasonable steps 
and due diligence” and must be undertaken by organisations for each client (unless 
exemptions apply). Put simply, CDD checks require confirmation of: (a) the customer’s identity 
– their name and address; (b) the verification of such through the production of data or 
documents from a reliable source and as an incidental result evidence of habitual residence; 
and (c) the obtaining of information as to the purpose and extent of the business relationship 
which is subject to ongoing industry guidance for sector specific checks providing 
recommendations for compliance with the regulations. Owing to the nature of the services 
provided by exchanges the third category is not applicable as they are creating the business 
relationship. 
The regulations, mirroring the Third Money Laundering Directive, require CDD checks to be 
undertaken in five situations; 1) upon establishment of a business relationship; 2) where the 
customer is undertaking occasional transactions amounting to 15,000 euros (in the UK the 
equivalent is £10,000) or more, regardless of whether the occasional transactions are 
linked514; 3) where there is a suspicion of money laundering or 4) terrorist financing; and 5) 
where the organisation doubts the adequacy of the documentation provided. Additionally, the 
                                                          
507 Alastair Brown, Money Laundering, (Thomson Reuters (Legal) Limited, 2009) at p53. 
508 Regulation 3(1) defines relevant persons as including: credit institutions; financial institutions; auditors; 
independent legal professionals; estate agents; high value dealers and casinos.  
509 Defined in regulation 3(12). High value dealers is a firm or sole trader who by way of business trades in 
goods when he receives, in respect of an transactions, a payment or payments in cash of at least EUR 15,000. 
This definition of high value dealer is derived from Third Money Laundering Directive 2(1)(3)(e). 
510 Defined in regulation 3(14). 
511SI 2007/2157 Schedule 1 para 4 
512 Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) which regulates taxation in the UK. 
513 Regulation 45(4) “A person is not guilty of an offence under this regulation if he took all reasonable steps 
and used all due diligence to avoid committing the offence.” 
514 Definition of “High Value Dealer” in Regulations. 





organisation should have ongoing monitoring as part of their CDD regime on a risk-sensitive 
basis throughout the business relationship and must act quickly should risks be identified. If 
the relevant person cannot comply with the CDD checks no business should be undertaken 
by the organisation on behalf of the relevant person until the organisation is satisfied of 
compliance. Additionally, the organisation should consider, if appropriate and based on the 
relevant person’s failure to comply with CDD, if disclosure to the relevant authority in terms of 
section 330 of Proceeds of Crime Act 2002515 [POCA] is required.516 
The above procedure details the steps for standard CDD. The Regulations also provide for or 
enhanced CDD procedures where a higher risk is perceived517 as there is recognition that, 
“the risk of money laundering and terrorist financing is not the same in every case.”518 Thus, 
simplified519 CDD can be undertaken where the risk is minor e.g. the product being supplied 
is not capable or highly unlikely to be utilised by money launderers. Thus products which offer 
transactional facilities such as bank accounts and credit cards are perceived as risky in 
comparison with a life insurance bond which does not offer such services. By comparison, 
organisations should “take specific and adequate measures to compensate for higher risk” 
business and alter the CDD accordingly. The Regulations also place an obligation on 
organisations to “establish and maintain”520 appropriate systems521 to assist law enforcement 
agencies with investigations. In so doing, these appropriate systems will demonstrate 
regulatory compliance.  
The anti-money laundering rules are applied by businesses of all natures in the regulated 
sector. However, this section will consider application of these requirements to the present 
situation of crypto-currencies and exchanges. The terms and conditions of one Hong Kong 
based exchange provider522 suggest that it undertakes CDD checks at the outset of every 
business relationship523 by requesting scans of documents proving identity and address. It 
does not require production of the originals or the production of those documents to a 
competent authority for authentication purposes. This would not meet contemporary UK or EU 
                                                          
515 c29. POCA replaced the Criminal Justice Act 1998 and 1993. 
516 Further information on POCA is detailed in the following section.  
517 Regulation 14. 
518 Regulation 13. 
519 Regulation 13. 
520 Regulation 20(4) provides, “A credit or financial institution must establish and maintain system which 
enable it to respond fully an rapidly to enquiries from financial investigator accredited under section 3 of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (accreditation and training), persons acting on behalf of the Scottish Ministers in 
their capacity as enforcement authority under that Act, officers of Revenue and Customers or constables as to  
(a) whether it maintains, or has maintained during the previous five years,  business relationship with any 
person; and (b) the nature of that relationship.” 
521 Discussions of the relevant systems is unnecessary for the purposes of this thesis.  
522 <https://anxbtc.com/> accessed 24 May 2015. 
523 The terms and conditions are in Appendix 2C. 





standards.  The Hong Kong exchange implies it is registered under the Money Service 
Operators Licensing System at the Customs and Excise Department, Hong Kong and 
therefore requires confirmation and CDD to comply with the regulations of the Customs and 
Excise Department. It is noted that although the address provided by the Hong Kong exchange 
provider is registered to a Money Service Operator under the Hong Kong Customs and Excise 
Licensing System, the company name does not correspond to the exchange registered at this 
address in the online Customs and Excise Licensing System. This may reflect a cavalier 
approach to regulatory compliance. However, the Hong Kong company is, at least if the 
checks are invoked, introducing CDD checks suggesting a level of compliance with the FATF 
Recommendations.524 The analysis of Silk Road and Liberty Reserve exchange providers525 
demonstrates that not all exchanges implement the FATF Recommendations to actively 
confirm the identity of users of exchanges before undertaking business on their behalf. As will 
be recalled, individuals registered under patently false names, including “Russia hackers”; 
“Hacker Account” and “Joe Bogus.”526 The recent FATF guidance acknowledged that the 
underlying protocols of crypto-currencies do not require or provide identification or verification 
of consumers’ identities.527 If the authorities extend the anti-money laundering measures to 
include the operations of exchanges, registration under such anonymous titles would be 
prohibited. This would assist in identification and monitoring of transactions to assist 
authorities identify suspicious activities.528 Additionally, the implementation of CDD checks by 
exchanges would to an extent eliminate connections with illegality.  
The preamble to the Fourth Money Laundering Directive states that, “the soundness, integrity 
and stability of credit and financial institutions and confidence in the financial system as a 
whole could be seriously jeopardised by the efforts of criminals and their associates either to 
disguise the origin of criminal proceeds or to channel lawful or unlawful money for terrorist 
purposes.”529 In an attempt to launder money or finance terrorists, financiers or money 
launderers can utilise and exploit the freedom of capital movement and freedom to supply 
financial services across the EU. The EU acknowledged European intervention and 
                                                          
524 Hong Kong is one of the countries signed up to the FAFT Recommendations. See further n437. 
525 Further information at Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies) at 1.4.4 (Case Study D: Liberty Reserve (Crypto-
currency & exchange)) and 1.4.3 (Silk Road) and 1.4.6 (Silk Road 2). 
526 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Report, Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and Potential AML/CFT 
Risks, June 2014 <www.fatf-gafi.irg> accessed 11 July 2015. 
527 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Guidance, Virtual Currencies, June 2015 at p11 <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-RBA-Virtual-Currencies.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. 
528 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Guidance, Virtual Currencies, June 2015 at p11 <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-RBA-Virtual-Currencies.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. 
529 The agreed text of the Fourth Money Laundering Directive < 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/cj12/dv/draft_compromisetext_20150112
_/draft_compromisetext_20150112_en.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. 





harmonisation was required to reflect and protect investors against criminals taking advantage 
of these technological advancements.530 Thus, the effectiveness of anti-money laundering 
measures at European level should be increased to combat potential misuse of new 
technologies to conceal the true purpose of transactions.  
At present however exchanges are not subject to the regulations at all. The Regulations apply 
to deposit taking institutions and money remittance businesses but for the reasons discussed 
in Chapter 2 – the definitions in relation to deposit and money transmission are not satisfied 
by dealing in crypto-currencies and therefore exchanges fall outwith the regulatory sphere. 
However, as noted, the FATF have recently published guidance recommending that financial 
institutions should be required to comply with customer identification and verification for 
exchanging crypto-currencies as soon as such products / services are offered.531 
Finally, for completeness, if an individual downloads an online wallet application to their own 
device and is in sole control of depositing funds and transferring them anti-money laundering 
checks are clearly not practical. However, should the application be altered and a third party 
becomes involved in hosting the online wallet then extension of the money laundering 
requirements to this area should be considered. For the purposes of this thesis, anti-money 
laundering checks where the wallet is hosted on the consumer’s own device will not be 
considered further.  
5.4.2: Proceeds of Crime 
The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002532 (“POCA”) provides a series of offences for failing to make 
required reports of suspicion or knowledge of dealings in criminal property. POCA and the 
2007 Money Laundering Regulations are closely related. Principally, under POCA there are a 
number of offences to combat dealings with criminal property. This section proposes to outline 
these offences and examine their potential application to owners or founders of exchanges.  
The substantive money laundering offences are specified in Sections 327, 328 and 329 of 
POCA. Namely, if property is or represents the proceeds of crime it is criminal property533 and 
a person knows or suspects that such property is criminal property then almost any act done 
by that person in relation to the property is an offence under one or more of these sections of 
                                                          
530 The agreed text of the Fourth Money Laundering Directive < 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/cj12/dv/draft_compromisetext_20150112
_/draft_compromisetext_20150112_en.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. 
531 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Guidance, Virtual Currencies, June 2015 at p14 <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-RBA-Virtual-Currencies.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. 
532 c29. POCA replaced certain provisions of the Criminal Justice Acts 1988 and 1993 and extended the scope of 
the legislation while introducing some novel provisions. 
533 POCA 2002 s340. 





POCA. Principally, under section 327 it is an offence to hold funds by concealing, disguising, 
converting, transferring or removing criminal property from the jurisdiction.534 The court 
approved the proposition that “converts” includes “any substitution, actual or constructive, in 
the quality or form of the property,”535 including exchanging for cash or goods.536 Therefore 
the section does not require proof of purpose in order for actions to be included as offences.  
POCA also introduces an offence if an individual enters into or becomes concerned in an 
arrangement which he knows or suspects facilitates or is intended to facilitate (by whatever 
means) the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property by or on behalf of another 
person.537 There have been a number of cases interpreting this and it is accepted that the 
reason or purpose for the actions is not material to implementation.538 Extension of the anti-
money laundering regulation to crypto-currencies as recommended by FATF is therefore 
highly desirable given the use of crypto-currencies and exchanges for illegal purposes.  
Section 329 clearly states that a person is committing an offence where he acquires criminal 
property, uses criminal property or has possession of criminal property. This applies where 
the individual knows or suspects the property to be criminal but does not include bona fide 
possession. Additionally, sections 330, 331 and 332 provide procedural offences and create 
reporting obligations for those in the regulated sector and detail the consequences of failing 
to report in accordance with the obligations. The regulated sector539 includes businesses 
accepting deposits by a person, the activity of operating a bureau de change and transmitting 
money (or any representation of monetary value) by any means. It is possible these definitions 
of bureau de change and money transmitter could be amended to extend coverage to the 
business of crypto-currencies exchanges.540 An offence under these sections requires 
knowledge, suspicion or reasonable grounds for suspicion of an offence.541 This requires 
those in the regulated sector to be trained and aware of national guidance in order to hold 
suspicion or reasonable suspicion in accordance with this section, therefore providing an 
objective basis, albeit training is not a prerequisite of raising action. Failure to comply and 
                                                          
534 POCA 2002 s327(1)(a) – (e). As the UK comprises more than one jurisdiction the removal of funds from a 
Scottish bank account to an English bank account even in the same name would be sufficient to constitute the 
offence. The same is true of a conversion from a fiat currency to a crypto-currency. 
535 R v Burden [2007] EWCA Crim 863. 
536 Alastair Brown, Money Laundering, (Thomson Reuters (Legal) Limited, 2009) at p44. 
537 POCA s328 (Arrangements). 
538 See for example: Squirrell Ltd v National Westminster Bank [2006] 1 WLR 637; R v Macmaster [1999] 1 Cr. 
App. R. 402. 
539 Defined in Schedule 9 of FSMA. 
540 The UK Government has now confirmed it intends to extend these definitions when implementing the 
Fourth Money Laundering Directive into UK Law.  
541 What amounts to reasonable suspicion is explored in R v Da Silva [2006] EWCA Crim 1654 and more 
recently in Shah v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Ltd [2012] EWCH 1283 (QB). 





make a disclosure to either a nominated officer or to the National Crime Agency (“NCA”) can 
result in convictions and the imposition of penalties and imprisonment.  For example, in R v 
Griffiths and Pattison542 the court imposed six months’ imprisonment on solicitors who failed 
to make a disclosure in relation to a conveyancing transaction for undervalue on behalf of a 
friend. Sections 331 and 332 make it an offence for nominated officers to fail to make the 
required reports to NCA. Accordingly there is comprehensive regulation regarding the anti-
money laundering requirements and disclosures to the relevant authorities. A failure to 
disclose is a breach of POCA where the business is regulated, and could result in enforcement 
action by the authorities, the imposition of fines or prison sentences.  
Additionally offences for tipping off543 and failing to provide reasonable assistance to 
undertake investigations544 are included. The FCA have the ability to prosecute, but have not 
prosecuted, offences under this provision of POCA.545  
If exchanges fail to undertake CDD or suspect that the exchange is being used to launder 
proceeds of crime or criminal property, disclosure should be required to the relevant 
authorities. As noted above, following the Silk Road convictions in United States of America,546 
some exchanges are voluntarily introducing CDD provisions to legitimise the activities.547 
Whether this is adequate for the purposes of the Fourth Money Laundering Directive will 
require further in-depth analysis of the terms and conditions, practices and policies of 
exchanges alongside the provisions of the Fourth Money Laundering Directive.548   
5.4.3: Market Abuse Directive 
                                                          
542 [2007] 1 Cr. App, R. (S.) 581 (95) CA. 
543 POCA 333A. 
544 POCA, Part 8. 
545 See R v Neil Rollins [2010] UKSC39. The court held that the FSA (the predecessor to the FCA) had the power 
to prosecute criminal offences under POCA. Rollins argued that the criminal offences should be restricted to 
those specifically referred to in FSMA s401 and 402. However, the court held that the FSA (now the FCA) had 
the power to prosecute money laundering offences under s327 as every person had the right to bring a private 
prosecution. A corporation could bring a prosecution, provided that it was permitted to do by the instrument 
that gave it the power to act. It is not clear that these powers of the FCA extend to the right to prosecute in 
Scotland where this is in the hands of the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service. 
546 Although as previously noted, criminal sanctions cannot be imposed to the same extent in the UK.  
547 This will assist in due diligence by banks when accepting business from exchanges owing to the perceived 
affiliation with illegality.  
548 Chapter 6 (Recommendations & Conclusions) will further examine these areas and provide further 
conclusions.  





As part of the EU Financial Services Action Plan,549 the Market Abuse Directive,550 introduced 
in 2003, aimed to ensure that a single market in securities to control insider trading was further 
harmonised and a regime to control market manipulation introduced. The importance of these 
regulations, and the continuing nature of market abuse allegations, results in this remaining a 
key area of regulation. In terms of the original Market Abuse Directive [MAD] and the UK 
regime the LIBOR551 and FX552 markets fell outwith the scope of the regime. These have both 
been the subject of market manipulation scandals553 which the FCA has addressed by claiming 
breaches of the PRIN block of the Handbook.554 Within the UK, commodity markets such as 
LME555 and ICE Futures,556 formerly the International Petroleum Exchange, were regulated as 
commodity exchanges under FSMA557 which continued notwithstanding the absence of any 
reference to such markets in MAD. This provides a model for regulation of crypto-currency 
exchanges. If crypto-currencies are considered as commodities or commodity-money rather 
than money they might be subject to regulation under FSMA s118 and s118A on this basis. 
Similarly, if purely financial exchanges can be brought within the scope of market abuse 
controls, exchanges operating their own OTC operations might arguably be brought under 
market abuse controls. Many of the features of crypto-currencies and the trading in them have 
the hallmarks of commodity trading. If there is a market made in a crypto-currency it might be 
subject to market abuse.  
Around the world examples can be found of regulators treating bitcoins and altcoins as 
commodities and asserting jurisdiction over players in those markets. The now insolvent US 
                                                          
549 The Financial Action Plan was introduced as part of the Lamfalussy Directive and process. Further 
information on the Financial Action Plan is available at <http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-
policy/actionplan/index_en.htm#maincontentSec1> accessed 11 July 2015 and information regarding the 
Lamfalussy Directives is available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/lamfalussy/transposition/index_en.htm> accessed 11 July 2015. 
550 2003/6/EC. 
551 London Inter Bank Offer Rate. 
552 Foreign exchange. 
553 FCA imposed fines no numerous banks including, Lloyds Banking Group fined £105m for serious LIBOR and 
other benchmark failings, 28 July 2014 <http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/lloyds-bank-of-
scotland.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015; Barclays fined with £290m fine over LIBOR fixing in 2012. This resulted in 
the Government requesting Martin Wheatley, managing director of the FSA and CEO-designate of the FCA to 
undertake an independent review into the setting and usage of LIBOR. The completed report is available at 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/191762/wheatley_review_l
ibor_finalreport_280912.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. The first criminal trial against the first LIBOR defendant 
has commenced in London. Jennifer Rankin, First Libor defendant faces trial in London, (The Guardian, London, 
25 May 2015) < http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/may/25/libor-trial-trader-tom-
hayes?CMP=EMCNEWEML6619I2> accessed 11 July 2015.  
554 See earlier information regarding the PRIN block of the Handbook.  
555 London Metal Exchange <https://www.lme.com/> accessed 11 July 2015.  
556 ICE Futures Market <https://www.theice.com/futures-europe> accessed 11 July 2015. 
557 FSMA Part XVIII 





bitcoin mining company, GAW Miners introduced an altcoin which they termed paycoin.558 In 
order to promote the currency they undertook to buy back the currency at $20. Where the 
market price was less than this, GAW Miners were clearly at risk from large scale arbitrage 
with their “guarantee.”559 This undertaking disappeared after intervention by the US 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission.560 The commissioner considered that bitcoins and 
other altcoins were commodities and the Commission accordingly had a locus to intervene as 
the price guarantees amounted to market manipulation. The US approach offers a possible 
model for intervention in the UK. A further example can be seen by the Realcoin 
announcement in July 2014 of a new crypto-currency backed by the firm’s dollar reserves.561 
It was envisaged that Realcoin would not experience volatility in value owing to the pegging 
against the promoting firm’s dollar reserves. However, offering a crypto-currency, backed by 
its own company with no fluctuation raises questions of market abuse or rigging.562 Owing to 
the lack of regulation such a structure can exist with a lack of independent oversight unless a 
creative and interventionist approach is adopted by regulators such as that noted above by 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. What is true of commodities would be equally 
true of derivative contracts based on those underlying commodities. As a result options, 
futures and contracts for differences based on crypto-currencies create the same range of 
issues.  
At this juncture it should be noted that market manipulation alone is in play in relation to crypto-
currencies and there is no prospect of the other aspect of market abuse - insider dealing, with 
the definition of insider requiring the possession of price sensitive confidential information 
which originated within the organisation contained in the legislation. These factors and the 
potential extension of the legislation, or amendments thereto will be further analysed in the 
next chapter.  
                                                          
558 Stan Higgins, GAW Miners and the Disappearing $20 Paycoin Floor, (Coindesk, USA, 7 January 2015) 
<http://www.coindesk.com/gaw-miners-paycoin-disappearing-20-floor/> accessed 11 July 2015. 
559 Stan Higgins, GAW Miners and the Disappearing $20 Paycoin Floor, (Coindesk, USA, 7 January 2015) 
<http://www.coindesk.com/gaw-miners-paycoin-disappearing-20-floor/> accessed 11 July 2015. 
560 Nermin Hajdarbegovic, Commissioner Claims CFTC Can Intervene in Bitcoin Markets, (Coindesk, USA, 18 
November 2014) < http://www.coindesk.com/commissioner-claims-cftc-can-intervene-bitcoin-markets/> 
accessed 11 July 2015. 
561 Nermin Hajdarbegovic, Brock Pierce Announces Dollar-backed Cryptoc-urrency “Realcoin” (Coindesk, USA, 9 
July 2014) < http://www.coindesk.com/brock-pierce-announces-dollar-backed-cryptocurrency-realcoin/> 
accessed 11 July 2015. 
562 Market stabilisation activities are permitted in limited circumstances where there is a new issue, it is 
disclosed in advance that it may operate, that it operates for no more than 28 days and that there is full 
disclosure to the market after the expiry of the safe harbour provision of the details of the support operation. 





The FCA assumed responsibility for dealing with market abuse in the UK.563 Under FSMA 
market abuse is committed when a person engages in any one or more of the seven 
behaviours564 listed in s118 in relation to qualifying investments.565 Regulation provides a 
secondary offence of taking, or refraining from taking, action which requires or encourages 
another person to engage in behaviour which would be market abuse if the encourager had 
carried out the behaviour.566 Additionally the FCA published the MAR block567 of the 
Handbook568 providing guidance on practices which it considers amount to market abuse.569 
The FCA has the ability to impose penalties and lifetime bans from the financial services 
industry following participation in market abuse. As examined570 the diminishing pool of miners 
controlling crypto-currency development offers the opportunity for market abuse. However 
crypto-currencies are not listed as qualifying investments under FSMA. To do so would require 
amendment to the legislation. Whether the UK could act alone or whether this would require 
to be achieved at EU level is discussed further in this chapter.  
5.5: Regulated Activities 
The foregoing analysis highlighted areas of business of the regulated sector, including those 
accepting deposits and acting as money transmitters. This section will consider these 
regulated activities and consider if the actions of exchanges should, as a matter of policy, 
become regulated activities.   
5.5.1: Deposits 
As identified in the foregoing chapters, the retention of crypto-currencies in exchange hosted 
wallets can be equated with acceptance of deposits by those exchanges. The exchanges 
encourage individuals to retain funds in the hosted wallets for ease of use and regularly refer 
to payments into the hosted accounts as “deposits.”571  
 
                                                          
563 S118 regime goes further than criminal sanctions in 1993 Criminal Justice Act and allows FCA to take 
disciplinary action.  
564 The Government explanatory notes explain that broadly these are behaviours that are based on 
information generally not available to the rest of the market; that the behaviours is likely to give the regular 
market under a false or misleading impression; or that the regular user would be likely to regard the 
behaviours as behaviour that would distort the market.  
565 s118(1)(a). 
566 FSMA s123(1)(b). 
567 Market Abuse section of the handbook. 
568 As required by FSMA - FSMA s119. 
569 < http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/MAR> accessed 11 July 2015. 
570 In Chapter 1 (Crypto-Currencies).  
571 See Appendix 2B: Bitstamp’s Terms of Use.  





Ferran and Goodhurt acknowledge that, “….technological developments open up markets and 
access to information to new investors but they also represent new risks, or perhaps old risks 
in a more intense form.”572 This section aims to consider if crypto-currencies are effectively 
governed by deposit regulation, or rather if, as suggested, old risks are created in a new, more 
intense form outwith the scope of legislation.  
 
The Banking Act 1987 applied a uniform system of regulation to banks and other deposit 
takers (other than building societies) overseen by the Bank of England. This has now been 
subsumed into the scheme first adopted for investment business by the 1986 Act573 by FSMA. 
The functional approach adopted by FSMA, as noted earlier, is best demonstrated in the 
general prohibition that no person may carry on a regulated activity in the UK,574 nor purport 
to do so unless he is either an authorised person; or an exempt person.575 Trading without 
authorisation is a criminal offence576 and any agreements made by a person in the course of 
carrying on a regulated activity, in contravention of the general prohibition are unenforceable 
against the other party.577  However, the consumer may enforce the terms against the person 
carrying on a regulated activity and is entitled to recover compensation for any losses 
sustained. What constitutes a regulated activity is therefore critical to determining the 
applicability of the deposit regime to crypto-currencies. 
Section 22 and Schedule 2 of FSMA detail those activities which amount to a regulated 
activity.  Paragraph 22 of Schedule 2 identifies deposits as a regulated activity, thus “rights 
under any contract under which a sum of money (whether or not denominated in a currency) 
is paid on terms under which it will be repaid, with or without interest or a premium, and either 
on demand or at a time or in circumstances agreed by or on behalf of the person making the 
payment and the person receiving it” amount to a deposit and thus a regulated activity. 
Additionally, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order, as 
                                                          
572 Eilas Ferran and Charles Goodhurt (eds), Regulating Financial Services and Markets in the Twenty First 
Century (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2002) at p4. 
573 Financial Services Act 1986 c60. 
574 This raises the problem of the geographical position of the activities i.e. The locus of where the work is 
undertaken etc.  
575 Section 19 (The General Prohibition) 
(1) No person may carry on a regulated activity in the United Kingdom, or purport to do so, unless he is –  
(a) An authorised person; or 
(b) An exempt person.  
(2) The prohibition is referred to in this Act as the general prohibition. 
576 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 section 23. This includes, on summary conviction imprisonment not 
exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or both. And on conviction on 
indictment, imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or a fine, or both.  
577 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 sections 26, 27 and 29. 





amended578 (“RAO”) contains additional provisions as to the acceptance of deposits. 
Accepting deposits is a regulated activity if – (a) money received by way of deposit is lent to 
another; or (b) any other activity of the person accepting the deposit is financed wholly, or to 
a material extent, out of the capital or interest on money received by way of deposit.579 The 
RAO details what a deposit is i.e. a sum of money which will be repaid, with or without interest 
or premium, and either on demand or at a time or in circumstances agreed by or on behalf of 
the person making the payment and the person receiving it.  
If the activity is deemed a regulated activity then the providers of that regulated activity must 
have received authorisation. Having adopted a broad functional approach to activities the 
persons undertaking those activities must be authorised which adds a more traditional layer 
of institutional regulation. To gain authorisation a business must satisfy the “fit and proper” 
person test in the FIT block of the FCA handbook.580 The FCA tests include detailed 
requirements relating to a legal person’s honesty, integrity and reputation; competence and 
                                                          
578 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001/544 as amended by Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (Carrying on Regulated Activities by Way of Business) (Amendment) Order 
2014/3340; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Green Deal) (Amendment) Order 
2014/1850; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No. 3) Order 
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2014/1448; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2014/366; 
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Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2013/655; Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (PRA-regulated Activities) Order 2013/556; Financial Services and Markets Act 
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(Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2010/86; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated 
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Activities) (Amendment) Order 2009/1342; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) 
(Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2007/3510; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) 
(Amendment) Order 2007/1339; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment 
No. 3) Order 2006/3384; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No.2) 
Order 2006/2383; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 
2006/1969; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No.2) Order 
2005/1518; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Carrying on Regulated Activities by Way of Business) 
(Amendment) Order 2005/922; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) 
Order 2005/593;Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities)(Amendment)(No.2) Order 
2004/2737; Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2004/1610; 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No. 3) Order 2003/2822; 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No. 1) Order 2003/1475; 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2003/1476; 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2002/1776; 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2002/682; Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2001/3544; Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000 (Carrying on Regulated Activities by Way of Business) Order 2001/1177; Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001/544. 
579 Paragraph 5 of Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001/544. 
580 Available at <http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/FIT/1/3> accessed 11 July 2015. 





capability; and financial soundness. The tests apply equally to the controllers of such 
businesses.581 If the FCA handbook was extended to governance of crypto-currencies 
individuals would require to meet the “fit and proper” person test to gain authorisation to be 
permitted to provide an exchange which effectively controls the funds of customers. 
Additionally, the providers of exchanges would be required, if authorised, to comply, at all 
times with the PRIN582 block of the FCA handbook, the high level principles and obligations 
applicable to regulated organisations regardless of the products provided. 
Furthermore, if the legislation was extended to include the accepting of deposits by the 
providers of exchange facilities within the remit of regulated activities those providers would 
require to comply with the Conduct of Business [BCOBS]583 block of the FCA handbook. These 
establish rules and guidance by which the FCA regulates banking conduct of business in line 
with the ethical statements of PRIN.584 Provisions include, ensuring communications are fair, 
clear and not misleading, ensuring customers are provided with relevant information to make 
informed decisions and all customers are treated fairly. Whether these obligations are truly 
novel or merely echo the terms of the Unfair Terms Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999585 
is a moot point however they can be directly enforced in regulatory proceedings by the FCA586 
The previous analysis of exchanges587 suggests that certain individuals presently owning or 
controlling exchanges would be unable to gain authorisation given their previous business 
dealings588 and would not satisfy the tests in FIT589 and SYSC590 and thus the businesses 
would be unable to comply with PRIN591 and BCOBS.592 This implies these individuals would 
not be permitted to carry on a regulated activity in the UK.593 Therefore inclusion in the scope 
of the FCA handbook would require exchanges to apply higher standards to receipt and 
                                                          
581 These are set out in the SYSC block of the FCA Handbook available at 
<http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/SYSC> accessed on 11 July 2015. 
582 Available at <http://www.fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/PRIN> accessed 11 July 2015. 
583 Available at <http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/BCOBS> accessed 11 July 2015. 
584 The recent fines imposed by the FCA on banks for LIBOR rigging was based on PRIN 3 and 5 as LIBOR was 
not a regulated market under FMSA: <http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/final-notices/lloyds-bank-of-
scotland.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015 see also FCA Press Release, Lloyds Banking Group fined £105m for serious 
LIBOR and other benchmark failings, 28 July 2014 < http://www.fca.org.uk/news/lloyds-banking-group-fined-
105m-libor-benchmark-failings> accessed 11 July 2015. 
585 SI/1994/3159. 
586 FSA v Legal and General <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/legal_general.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015. 
587 See Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies) at 4.1 (Case Studies). 
588 For further information, see discussion in Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies) regarding alleged hacking and 
alleged insolvency of crypto-currency exchanges of Moolah, MtGox and Mintpal. 
589 FIT Sourcebook available at <https://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/FIT> accessed 4 July 2015.  
590 SYSC Sourcebook available at <https://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/SYSC> accessed 4 July 2015.  
591 PRIN Sourcebook available at <https://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/PRIN> accessed 4July 2015.  
592 BCOBS Sourcebook available at <https://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/D136> accessed 4 July 2015. 
593 It is important to consider the earlier discussions on jurisdiction and assessing the relevant jurisdiction / 
where activities are undertaken. This clearly presents some issues in the cyber world. 





monitoring of the online deposits. Additionally, it should be noted that neither FSMA nor the 
RAO contain a definition of money – thus consideration and application of the legislation in 
relation to money falls on the common law legal and economic analysis in Chapter 2 (Money). 
It was concluded that, in their present form and level of acceptance, crypto-currencies cannot 
be considered money. This will be key when considering amendments to legislation in Chapter 
6. While modifications to the RAO and FSMA provide an opportunity to bring crypto-currencies 
within the scope of deposit regulation, there a number of questions outstanding as to the form 
such amendments would take and how crypto-currencies can effectively be categorised. 
These questions and potential regulation will be examined in the recommendations and 
conclusions in Chapter 6. 
For completeness, an individual or company accepting deposits at an exchange cannot be 
considered an exempt person under the legislation and this category is of no relevance to 
acceptance of crypto-currencies nor consideration as deposits. As such it will not be 
considered further.594  
By making the acceptance of funds by exchanges a regulated activity as noted above an 
authorisation regime follows. As a consequence of authorisation businesses are required to 
subscribe to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme and to pay annual levies to support 
the costs of running the appropriate sub-scheme in relation to deposits discussed below at 
5.5.2.1. Furthermore businesses must submit themselves to the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
Financial Ombudsman Service discussed below at 5.5.2.2 and honour their awards. These 
are minimum requirements. In certain types of business the FCA has chosen to provide further 
regulation of conduct of the authorised activities by promulgating Sourcebooks of detailed 
rules which authorised persons must follow. At this stage of development of crypto-currency 
transactions it is probably too early to provide detailed rules designed to improve business 
practices. The FCA must have an evidence base on which to make such decisions and at the 
present level of adoption and use of crypto-currencies there is not yet the appropriate 
evidence.  
 
5.5.2: Deposit Guarantee Schemes  
As evidenced in the preceding paragraphs, the services provided by exchanges fall outwith 
the remit of regulated activities and therefore exchanges are not required to be authorised as 
                                                          
594 An exempt person (in relation to a regulated activity) is a person who is exempt from the general 
prohibition as a result of: being an appointed representative; the exemption for recognised investment 
exchanges and clearing houses; or the exemption of EEA market operators exercising a passport right (FSMA 
200, s312A (2)). 





deposit taking institutions. Nonetheless the protection under the EU Deposit Directive595 
should be considered. The Directive required that member states introduced one or more 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes596 to reimburse a limited value of deposits to depositors where 
a bank fails. The key aim is to strengthen and align protections597 available to investors across 
the now 28 member states598 to provide greater consumer protection and financial stability. 
One aim is to prevent panic withdrawals, such as was evidenced by the withdrawals from 
Northern Rock599 - “the first run on a British Bank in over 140 years.”600 As previously 
examined601 the Government nationalised Northern Rock602 to protect investors and reassert 
stability in the industry. Subsequent legislation603 and a division of the responsibility for 
monitoring of the financial services industry between the FCA and the PRA was undertaken 
while enhancing the protections available to investors through the introduction of the three 
special resolution regimes introduced by the Banking Act 2009. This along with the deposit 
guarantee scheme was aimed to restore confidence in a newly restabilised banking sector.  
5.5.2.1: Financial Services Compensation Scheme604 (“FSCS”) 
The FSCS ensures the UK’s compliance with inter alia the EU Deposit Directive, albeit the 
powers afforded by FSMA, as amended, extend beyond the scope of the Directive. The FSCS 
                                                          
595 EU Deposit Directive 94/19/EC as amended by Directive 2009/14/EC and subsequently replaced by 
2014/49/EC which has yet to be transposed into domestic law. 
596 Until 1/12/2001. 
597 While the original 1994 Directive was a minimum harmonisation measure the 2009 amending Directive was 
a maximum harmonisation measure, as is the 2014 formulation. These latter instruments require transposition 
exactly unless the terms of the directive provide otherwise. 
598 The original directive provided for €20,000 as a minimum harmonisation measure with the prospect of a 
self insured amount to a maximum harmonisation measure with a uniform €100,000 across the EU with no self 
insured amount. 
599  BBC Author, The rush at Northern Rock continues, (BBC, London, 15 September 2007) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6996136.stm> accessed 24 May 2015; Public Accounts Committee – 
Eighteenth Report, HM Treasury: The creation and sale of Northern Rock plc, 5 November 2012 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmpubacc/552/55202.htm> at “summary” 
accessed 11 July 2015; Commons Select Committee, Committee publishes findings on the creation and sale of 
Northern Rock plc, 16 November 2012 <http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-
z/commons-select/public-accounts-committee/news/creation-and-sale-of-northern-rock-plc/> accessed 11 
July 2015; Public Accounts Committee – Eighteenth Report, HM Treasury: The creation and sale of Northern 
Rock plc, 5 November 2012 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmpubacc/552/55202.htm> at “conclusions” 
accessed 11 July 2015. 
600 Roman Tomasic, Corporate rescue, governance and risk-taking in Northern Rock: Part 1 Comp.Law.2008, 
29(10), 297 – 303 at 297. 
601 See Chapter 1 (crypto-currencies) at 1.3.3 (Lack of Central Regulation).  
602 Bruno Nikolic, Rise and fall of regulatory state in financial markets, JIBLR 2013, 28(1), 1 – 8 at 1. 
603 Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 which included sunset provisions which were then replaced by the 
permanent Banking Act 2009 which included the new three special resolutions procedures. Latterly, the 
Financial Services Act 2012 c21. 
604 As introduced by Part XV (The Financial Services Compensation Scheme) s212 of Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000. 





amalgamated605  the previous schemes to provide a single portal for compensation claims for 
depositors and investors.606The scheme aims to provide protection to individual investors, 
depositors and policyholders who would not generally be in a position to make an informed 
assessment of the risks to their funds should the firm fail. This protection only extends to 
consumer and not professional clients.607 Fisher et al explained that as “the collapse of a 
financial institution holding substantial sums of investors’ money is an event which can have 
major repercussions, including, of course, serious hardship for individual investors and a 
damaging loss of confidence in the financial services industry generally.”608 For the purposes 
of the scheme a deposit is considered “money placed in a bank or similar [deposit taking] 
institution to earn interest or for safe-keeping”609 and a default is “where a firm is unable, or 
likely to be unable to pay claims against it, generally because it has stopped trading, is 
insolvent or has insufficient assets to meet claims against it.” 610 
                                                          
605 Previous schemes were divided by field and included, for insurance, the policyholder protection scheme 
contained in the Policyholders Protection Act 1975;  deposit protection by the Banking Act 1979 and for 
building societies in the Building Societies Act 1986; investor compensation scheme by Financial Services Act 
1986. In relation to unsatisfied negligence claims for investment advice the investors compensation scheme 
offered protection. When residential mortgages and mortgage advice became a regulated activity on 30th 
October 2004 a new sub-scheme was added. This process continued with the regulation of general insurance 
intermediation and advice on 15th January 2005 when the Insurance Mediation Directive was implemented in 
the UK by amendment of the RAO. 
606 Individuals are protected for deposits up to £85,000 per person per firm (or exchange) for defaults 
occurring after 31 December 2010.  From the end of 2015 this will reduce to £75,000 per person per firm as a 
result of the appreciation of the Pound Sterling against the Euro where the limit in the Directive is expressed as 
€100,000 or equivalent in local currency. There were considerable difficulties with institutions which had used 
their passporting rights to open branches or offer internet banking accounts in the UK at the time of the crisis, 
particularly the Icelandic banks. Compensation ought to have been paid by the Icelandic compensation scheme 
as EEA member but it was insolvent. Compensation was in fact paid by UK Government lending money to FSCS 
and claiming it had lent that money to Iceland to meet its obligations. EFTA Surveillance Authority sued Iceland 
for failing to ensure payment of the minimum amount of compensation to Icesave depositors in the 
Netherlands and the UK within the time limits, in (EFTA Surveillance Authority v Iceland : EFTA court case 
E16/11) but the national emergency provision in EEA Agreement was applied by that court to exclude liability. 
This however is still ongoing E-8/15 - Financial Services Compensation Scheme Limited v The Depositors' and 
Investors' Guarantee Fund (TIF) and is to be heard in EFTA Court on 8 July 2015.  This highlights the difficulties 
in receiving cross border compensation. This undoubtedly has implications for individuals using the services of 
exchanges following the alleged hacks, as detailed in Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies) and Chapter 4 (Consumer 
Protections).  
607 As defined in the FCA Handbook as “a client that is either a per se professional client or an elective 
professional client (see COBS 3.5.1 R) [Note: article 4(1)(12) of MiFID] available online at 
<http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/Glossary/P> accessed 24 May 2015. 
608 Jonathon Fisher et al, The Law of Investor Protection, 2nd Edition (Sweet & Maxwell 2003), at p345. 
609 As detailed on the Financial Services Compensation Scheme website available at <http://www.fscs.org.uk/> 
accessed 11 July 2015. 
610 As detailed on the Financial Services Compensation Scheme website available at <http://www.fscs.org.uk/> 
accessed 11 July 2015. 





At present, users of exchanges are offered no protection by FSCS or any other body should 
an exchange fail.611 This is inevitable as the loss flows from an area that is not a regulated 
activity. A user’s funds will effectively be at risk of loss should an exchange suffer a default or 
technological glitches and become unable to repay depositors’ deposits.  
For the avoidance of doubt, if an individual downloads a wallet application to their computer, 
tablet or laptop, no third party is storing their crypto-currencies as a deposit and therefore 
should the individual suffer malfunction, failure or loss of their computer equipment or other 
inability to access the private key preventing accessing the crypto-currency or the failure of 
the exchange no compensation will be afforded. Such loss is, and it is recommended should, 
remain outwith the scope of FSCS. 
5.5.2.2: Financial Ombudsman Service [FOS] 
FOS was established for resolution of disputes by an independent body.612 Financial 
institutions are given an opportunity to resolve any complaints within 8 weeks, thereafter if the 
customer is still not satisfied the complaint can be raised with FOS. This independent body 
will look to resolve disputes between the customer and financial institution from an 
independent, neutral perspective.    
FOS investigate complaints613 in accordance with the FCA handbook and industry guidance 
e.g. FCA thematic reviews and legislation.614 The statutory scope of FOS has recently been 
broadened to reflect the introduction of regulation in the areas of e-money, payment 
                                                          
611 Mark Oakes, Head of Communications explained that “FSCS protects up to £85,000 of depositors’ money in 
savings and current accounts with UK authorised bank, building societies and credit unions. However, virtual 
currencies are not regulated by the UK regulators, so FSCS does not provide protection in the event of any 
losses suffered by consumers.” <http://www.fscs.org.uk/industry/news/2014/january/fscs-cautions-
consumers-of-virtual-currency/> accessed 11 July 2015. 
612 As introduced by Part XVI (The Ombudsman Service) s225 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as 
amended by Financial Services Act 2012. It replaced eight predecessor bodies, some of which were voluntary 
such as the Insurance Ombudsman Bureau and other existed to fulfil a statutory require for a consumer 
redress scheme such as the Banking Ombudsman and the Building Societies Ombudsman. The FOS is the UK 
node of the FIN-NET network of consumer ADR schemes for financial services disputes established under 
Commission Recommendation 98/257/EC. 
613 “…its statutory Grundnorm is to resolve disputes by reference to what is fair and reasonable in all 
circumstances of the case; in doing so it is enjoined to draw on legal rules, regulatory guidance and codes of 
practice; and of its own volition utilises a subjection notion of maladministration” as quoted in P. Morris The 
Financial Ombudsman Service and the Hunt Review: continuing evolution in dispute resolution 2008 J.B.L. 785 
at 787. 
614 In relation to consumers interactions with authorised persons in relation to regulated activity within its 
compulsory jurisdiction (s228) and in relation to other matters where the authorised person has consented to 
its voluntary jurisdiction. (s227). 





services615 and consumer credit claims.616 As noted, neither FSMA617 nor the RAO contain a 
generic definition of money so the conclusions drawn in Chapter 2 (Money) will be key when 
considering any extension to the RAO for regulation of crypto-currencies and exchanges.  
5.6: Electronic Money 
Following the conclusions in Chapter 2618 that crypto-currencies cannot, at present be 
construed as money, this section will examine the potential application of the Electronic Money 
Directive619 and Regulations620 in the governance of crypto-currencies and exchanges.  
The EU Deposit Directive621 states that “electronic money and funds received in exchange for 
electronic money should not, in accordance with Directive 2009/110/EC622 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, be treated as a deposit and should not therefore fall within the 
scope of this Directive.”623 An examination of “electronic money” is required to consider if 
crypto-currencies, albeit not money, fall within the definition of electronic money and the 
providers of exchanges should be considered “authorised electronic money institutions.” If 
exchange providers could be considered as “authorised electronic money institutions” 
regulation of crypto-currencies and exchanges would fall within the ambit of the Electronic 
Money Directive rather than governance under the EU Deposit Directive.  
The Electronic Money Directive defines electronic money as, “electronically, including 
magnetically, stored monetary value as represented by a claim on the issuer which is issued 
on receipt of funds for the purpose of making payment transactions as defined in point 5 of 
article 4 of Directive 2007/64/EC,624 and which is accepted by a natural and legal person other 
than the electronic money issuer.” Reference to “payment transactions” is therefore required 
to understand its application – “payment transaction means an act, initiated by the payer or by 
the payee, of placing, transferring or withdrawing funds, irrespective of any underlying 
obligations between the payer and the payee.” Taken together these directives explain the 
                                                          
615 As detailed in Chapter 3 (Payment) at 3.7 (Payment Regulation).  
616 Further information available at <http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ombudsman-
news/74/74-ombudsman-focus.htm> accessed 11 July 2015. 
617 FSMA contains a definition of Electronic Money, as defined in the Electronic Money Regulations 2011. 
618 Chapter 2 (Money) at 2.5 (Conclusions).  
619 2009/110/EC. 
620 SI 2011/99. 
621 EU Deposit Directive 94/19/EC as amended by Directive 2009/14/EC as replaced by 2014/49/EC. 
622 Directive 2009/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on the taking 
up, pursuit and prudential supervision of the business of electronic money institutions amends Directive 
2005/60/EC and 2006/48/EC and repealing Directive 2000/46/EC (O) L 267. 
623 EU Deposit Directive 94/19/EC as amended by Directive 2009/14/EC as replaced by 2014/49/EC at (29) 
available online at <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.173.01.0149.01.ENG> accessed 11 July 2015. 
624 Payment Services Directive. 





definition of electronic money should cover electronic money whether it is held on a payment 
device, in the electronic money holder’s possession or stored remotely at a server and 
managed by the electronic money holder through a specific account for electronic money. A 
key criterion is the acceptance other than by the electronic money issuer – thus closed crypto-
currencies (identified in Chapter 1) 625 would immediately be excluded. The EBA stated that 
“…..although some of these criteria are also met by virtual currencies, there is one important 
difference. In electronic money schemes the link between the electronic money and the 
traditional money format is preserved and has a legal foundation, as the stored funds are 
expressed in the same unit of account.”626 The EBA concluded that the conversion of a unit of 
account to a virtual one in a crypto-currency scheme is a fundamental issue. As crypto-
currency schemes rely on their own demand and supply mechanisms there is no unit of 
account to compare the data. Additionally, the EBA state that the demand and supply 
mechanism invoked by the crypto-currencies means the link and conversion rate to fiat 
currencies is broken.  
Consideration should turn to whether exchanges can be considered authorised electronic 
money institutions and therefore fall under further legislation. The Perimeter Guidance Manual 
[PERG] of the FCA handbook provides guidance on the definition of “authorised electronic 
money institution,” namely PERG 3A.1 explains the Electronic Money Regulations create an 
authorisation and registration regime for issuers of electronic money that are not full credit 
institutions, credit unions or municipal banks. To be an authorised electronic money institution 
the detailed conditions in Regulation 6 of the Electronic Money Regulations627 must be met. 
                                                          
625 At Chapter 1 (1.1 The Concept). 
626 European Central Bank, Virtual Currency Schemes October 2012, 
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf> accessed 4 July 2015.  
627 6. Conditions for authorisation 
(1) The Authority may refuse to grant an application for authorisation only if any of the conditions set out in 
paragraphs (2) to (8) is not met. 
(2) The application must comply with the requirements of, and any requirements imposed under, regulation 5. 
(3) The applicant must immediately before the time of authorisation hold the amount of initial capital required 
in accordance with Part 1 of Schedule 2 
(4) The applicant must be either— 
(a) a body corporate constituted under the law of a part of the United Kingdom having— 
(i) its head office; and 
(ii) if it has a registered office, that office,  
in the United Kingdom; or 
(b) a body corporate which has a branch that is located in the United Kingdom and whose head office is 
situated in a territory that is outside the EEA. 
(5) The applicant must satisfy the Authority that, taking into account the need to ensure the sound and 
prudent conduct of the affairs of the institution, it has— 
(a) robust governance arrangements for its electronic money issuance and payment service business, including 
a clear organisational structure with well-defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility; 
(b) effective procedures to identify, manage, monitor and report any risks to which it might be exposed; and 





PERG 3A.2 (General Issues) confirms that if an organisation issues electronic money in the 
UK and does not fall within an exclusion or exemption they must be an authorised electronic 
money institution, a small electronic money institution, or an EEA authorised electronic money 
institution. The EBA do not consider exchanges to be electronic money institutions. However, 
in the future if exchanges were considered authorised money institutions if carrying on 
business in the UK they would require to satisfy various conditions, including being a body 
corporate with head office in the UK,628 ensuring compliance with the registration requirements 
detailed in the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 or its successor and satisfying the tests 
that the persons responsible for the management of the electronic money and payment 
services are of good repute and possess appropriate knowledge. This includes the 
requirement that any persons having a qualifying holding in the payment institution are fit and 
proper persons. The FIT block of the Handbook and requirements are discussed above. As 
noted,629 it appears unlikely the owners and creators of many exchanges would at present be 
                                                          
(c) adequate internal control mechanisms, including sound administrative, risk management and accounting 
procedures, which are comprehensive and proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of electronic 
money to be issued and payment services to be provided by the institution. 
(6) The applicant must satisfy the Authority that— 
(a) having regard to the need to ensure the sound and prudent conduct of the affairs of an authorised 
electronic money institution, any persons having a qualifying holding in the institution are fit and proper 
persons; 
(b) the directors and persons responsible for the management of its electronic money and payment services 
business are of good repute and possess appropriate knowledge and experience to issue electronic money and 
provide payment services; 
(c) it has a business plan (including for the first three years, a forecast budget calculation) under which 
appropriate and proportionate systems, resources and procedures will be employed by the institution to 
operate soundly; 
(d) it has taken adequate measures for the purpose of safeguarding electronic money holders' funds in 
accordance with regulation 20. 
(7) The applicant must comply with a requirement of the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 to be included 
in a register maintained under those Regulations where such a requirement applies to the applicant. 
(8) If the applicant has close links with another person (“CL”) the applicant must satisfy the Authority— 
(a) that those links are not likely to prevent the Authority's effective supervision of the applicant; and 
(b) if it appears to the Authority that CL is subject to the laws, regulations or administrative provisions of a 
territory which is not an EEA state (“the foreign provisions”), that neither the foreign provisions, nor any 
deficiency in their enforcement, would prevent the Authority's effective supervision of the applicant. 
(9) For the purposes of paragraph (8), an applicant has close links with CL if— 
(a) CL is a parent undertaking of the applicant; 
(b) CL is a subsidiary undertaking of the applicant; 
(c) CL is a parent undertaking of a subsidiary undertaking of the applicant; 
(d) CL is a subsidiary undertaking of a parent undertaking of the applicant; 
(e) CL owns or controls 20% or more of the voting rights or capital of the applicant; or 
(f) the applicant owns or controls 20% or more of the voting rights or capital of CL. 
628 Alternatively, there is provision under the Banking Consolidation Directive (2006/48/EC) to establish under 
a home state regulation and passport in with home state authorisation to establish a branch while complying 
with the host state regulations. The right to sell is based on home state regulation. 
629 See Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies) at 1.4 (Case Studies).  





in a position to meet the FIT criteria nor the SYSC.630 The conviction against the principal of 
Silk Road has already been examined.631  
Consideration of the American federal offence of “wire fraud” and Payment Services Directive 
I and II, when adopted, would be sensible when legislating in relation to crypto-currencies and 
will be considered further in the following chapter. As previously identified several exchanges 
are incorporated abroad and significant structural amendments would be required to fall into 
the scope of the Electronic Money Regulations.  
5.7: Collective Investment 
While crypto-currencies are not deposits for the reasons discussed, this is only one category 
of regulated activity within FSMA and the RAO. Crypto-currencies do not naturally fit into other 
categories of investment. It appears providers of exchanges are not offering nor promoting 
storage in hosted wallets as an investment vehicle – even if, as the previous analysis 
concluded this is the intention of many individuals.632 Nonetheless the provisions of FMSA 
regarding Collective Investment Schemes are of potential application. Operating a Collective 
Investment Scheme is a regulated activity.633 Any arrangements with respect to property of 
any description, including money, the purpose or effect of which is to enable persons taking 
part in the arrangements (whether by becoming owners of the property or any part of it or 
otherwise) to participate in or receive profits or income arising from the acquisition, holding, 
management or disposal of the property or sums paid out of such profits or income falls within 
the scope of the regulation of collective investment scheme. This section has the ability to 
capture crypto-currency operations regardless of whether crypto-currencies are defined as 
money or commodities or investment or some other category of property.  
Persons who participate in Collective Investment Schemes must not have day-to-day control 
over the management of the property, whether or not they have the right to be consulted or to 
give directions as to investment, in addition to the pooled nature of the contributions.634 The 
characteristics of funds held in “hosted wallets” with exchanges allows individuals to 
automatically access and control the fund flow in their respective “online wallets.” It is plain 
that the providers of exchanges are not providing the opportunities associated with Collective 
Investment Schemes and storage in “hosted wallets” could not be considered as Collective 
                                                          
630 Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls. 
631 In Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies) at 1.4 (Case Studies).  
632 Further information is detailed in Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies). 
633 FSMA s235 
634 FSMA s235(2) 





Investment vehicles.635 Thus, no further analysis of Collective Investment Schemes is 
required.   
5.8: Conclusions 
As demonstrated by the above analysis, at present crypto-currencies and exchanges fall 
outwith the regulatory landscape. Opportunities to develop and expand the regulatory 
framework for the inclusion of crypto-currencies and the services provided by exchanges is 
plausible. This chapter has touched upon some amendments, but the following chapter will 
examine these possible extensions alongside bespoke regulation to provide a functional 
approach to regulation of crypto-currencies.  
Concerns are abundant regarding the lack of standards required by exchanges to ensure 
market stability and fairness. In addition, there has already been evidence of widespread 
consumer detriment owing to the losses flowing from alleged hacks and losses by the 
exchanges. Consumers have limited recourse against exchanges for such losses and owing 
to the lack of current regulation fall outwith the protections of FOS and FSCS. Owing to the 
constant evolution of the market and the improving technology there is a risk that detailed 
legislation will soon become outdated and could stifle innovation. Therefore introduction of 
principle based regulation at a tertiary level, in a similar vein to the regulation for platform 
service providers, would be appropriate to combat the lack of guidance. This will be discussed 
further in the next chapter. 
  
                                                          
635 An interesting case regarding collective investment vehicles is: Financial Conduct Authority v Capital 
Alternatives Ltd and others [2014] EWHC 144 (Ch). Capital Alternatives were promoters and operators of four 
land investment schemes which bought subleases with investors capital on the basis the investors would 
receive a share of the profit. The FCA brought a claim for declaration that the schemes were collective 
investment schemes under s235 of FSMA 2000. Capital Alternatives argued that the terms of the investment 
scheme provided that the property within the scheme consisted of individual pots so individual investors were 
provided individual returns and this was not a collective investment scheme. The court held that the 
management of the properties was “on a whole” and accordingly the schemes were collective investment 
schemes. A further case considering a collective investment scheme is: Andrew Brown and others v 
InnovatorOne Plc and others [2012] EWHC 1321. 





Chapter 6: Recommendations and Conclusions 
 
6.1: The story so far 
The nature of crypto-currencies has been examined in Chapters 2 (Money) and 3 (Payment).  
Whether analysed from a legal or economic stance it is clear that, at present, crypto-currencies 
cannot be regarded as money636 primarily owing to the lack of universal acceptance637 and 
ongoing volatility in value.638 As explored above, the most widely accepted and debated 
crypto-currency is bitcoin. The number of daily transactions, as recorded in the Blockchain, is 
a measure of the breadth of its acceptance. As noted in Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies)639 the 
rolling seven day average is around 100,000 transactions worldwide. This demonstrates a 
continuing level of acceptance amongst the crypto-currency community at a level considerably 
greater than other crypto-currencies, but these figures confirm the level of acceptance is not, 
at present, universal.  
Regardless of acceptance issues, crypto-currencies exhibit some of the characteristics of 
money and the European Banking Authority [EBA] recently acknowledged that crypto-
currencies “….could potentially fulfil one or more of the functions of money.”640 If this novel 
product continues to become more widely accepted with usage expanding beyond the limited 
network then crypto-currencies may come to fulfil the definitional elements of money.  
Intrinsically linked with money is payment. As explored above641 the value of bitcoin since 
inception has been extremely volatile and confirms that contracting for payment by bitcoin, or 
another crypto-currency, is a play as to its future value – not dissimilar to commodity 
transactions. At present, crypto-currencies cannot be regarded as a means of payment, 
unless, under the terms of a contract the creditor has agreed to accept payment by crypto-
currency. Owing to this volatility in value, contractual payment by crypto-currency is regarded 
as an investment play and likely to be regarded as commodity-exchange rather than fulfilment 
of a payment obligation by fiat currency.642 The proposition that payment by crypto-currency 
constitutes commodity trading was furthered by the founder of litecoin when he recently 
                                                          
636 Chapter 2 (Money) at 2.5 (Conclusions). 
637 Chapter 2 (Money) at 2.3.1 (Medium of Exchange) and 2.4.4 (Medium of Exchange). 
638 Chapter 2 (Money) at 2.3.3 (Store of Value) and 2.4.5 (Store of Value).  
639 At Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies) 1.4 (Case Studies).  
640 European Banking Authority, Opinion on “Virtual Currencies”  (2014) 
<http://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-2014-
08+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf> at p12, accessed 11 July 2015. 
641 At Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies) 1.4 (Case Studies). 
642 See Kokott AG opinion discussed at 3.1 (Requirements). 
 





confirmed that crypto-currencies can be traded speculatively,643 not only with direct trading but 
also through derivative contracts.644 This analysis confirms the definitional uncertainty and 
thereby the requirement for regulatory guidance for this advancing product.  
Rival crypto-currencies have recently suffered a similar fate. The values exchanged under 
altcoin transactions remain low. Jackson Palmer, the founder of dogecoin has left645 leaving 
the venture without focus. Development of litecoin has similarly been given a low priority by 
its founder.646  
The exploration in the foregoing chapters confirms that crypto-currency networks are not 
collective investment schemes.647 While certain activities in the crypto-currency infrastructure 
may be organised as collective investment schemes, an example is the emergence of mining 
pools648 with central management, pooled resources to crack the algorithms and division of 
the rewards, the crypto-currency network and purchase of crypto-currencies does not 
constitute a collective investment scheme. Further consideration of the regulation surrounding 
collective investment schemes alongside the economics and mechanics of mining pools is 
however outwith the scope of this thesis.  
6.1.1: Definitional Regulation  
Chapter 5 (Regulation) confirms that if conventional regulatory definitions of money and 
payment are applied, crypto-currencies fall outwith the regulated perimeter. Two further 
features are obvious from the literature. Firstly, where an exchange holding crypto-currencies 
to the account of their customers649 fails for any reason then the consumers with funds held 
are not entitled to repayment and invariably will suffer detriment.650 As crypto-currencies fall 
outwith the regulated sphere there are no protections for consumers should exchanges suffer 
losses. Secondly, the crypto-currency network has and continues to be used for nefarious 
purposes. To reduce the risk of exchanges being used as conduits for illegality they should 
come under the Customer Due Diligence [CDD] requirements of the Anti-Money Laundering 
[AML] regime651 – there are examples of the application of CCD to casinos, dealers in high 
                                                          
643 Daniel Cawrey, Video: Charlie Lee on Scams, Plans and Being “Satoshi Lite” (Coindesk, USA, 11 February 
2015) <http://www.coindesk.com/video-charlie-lee-scams-plans-satoshi-lite/> accessed 11 July 2015. 
644 Consideration in Chapter 5 (Regulation) at 5.4.3 (Market Abuse Directive).  
645 Pete Rizzo, Dogecoin Founder Exits Crypto Community Citing “Toxic” Culture, (Coindesk, USA, 24 April 2015) 
<http://www.coindesk.com/dogecoin-founder-bitcoin-toxic/> accessed 11 July 2015. 
646 Daniel Cawrey, Video: Charlie Lee on Scams, Plans and Being “Satoshi Lite” (Coindesk, USA, 11 February 
2015) <http://www.coindesk.com/video-charlie-lee-scams-plans-satoshi-lite/> accessed 11 July 2015.  
647 Chapter 5 (Regulation) at 5.7 (Collective Investment).  
648 Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies) at 1.2 (Operation).  
649 In online hosted wallets.  
650 Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies) at 1.4 (Case Studies).  
651 Chapter 5 (Regulation) at 5.4.1 (Money Laundering). 





value items and money transmission services without the necessity of their being subject to 
the full regulatory regime. Application of minimum AML requirements would legitimise use of 
crypto-currencies and will be considered further below.    
The potential for consumer detriment through losses in the novel area of crypto-currencies, 
where concepts may not be familiar to consumers (or regulators), provides a case for imposing 
a regulatory regime upon exchanges. The relevant regulation is a matter for judgement on the 
part of regulators and has thus far produced differing approaches reflecting risk appetite and 
the level of adoption of crypto-currencies in the relevant countries. Previous regulatory failures 
to identify new markets and products in financial services652 provide an impetus for prompt 
intervention to proactively support development of crypto-currencies and the UK financial 
market. Yet regulation must not stifle innovation or the growth of crypto-currencies and 
exchanges. Taking this balance into account, governments and regulators have commenced 
assessing whether, and how, crypto-currencies and the crypto-currency network should be 
regulated.653 For example, Australian tax authorities recently determined that bitcoin and 
crypto-currency transactions are subject to taxation for goods rather than money.654 Australian 
regulators however concluded that there was insufficient adoption of crypto-currencies to 
justify regulatory intervention.655 This non-interventionist approach can be contrasted with the 
introduction in the Isle of Man of legislation to provide a governing framework for the 
anticipated “take off”656 of crypto-currencies.657 In the UK in August 2014, the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer658 launched plans to make the UK a global centre of financial innovation. One 
aspect of the plan was pro-innovation regulatory measures to unlock the potential of new 
technology. This was reflected by the launch of a Government consultation on the potential of 
digital currencies and associated technologies in November 2014.659 Over 120 responses660 
                                                          
652 For example, failures to regulate LIBOR and FX trading markets as discussed in Chapter 5 (Regulation) at 
5.2.2: Safety and Soundness. 
653 Payments Council and British Bankers Association, Response to HM Treasury Call for Information, 3 
December 2014 at p2 
654 The Australian Tax Office explained that “bitcoin is not a legally recognised universal means of exchange 
and form of payment by the laws of Australia or the laws of any other country. Therefore, it is not ‘currency 
(whether of Australia or of any other country)’” as quoted in Alex Hern, Bitcoin hit with tax blow in Australia, 
(The Guardian, London, 19 December 2014) < http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/dec/19/bitcoin-
hit-tax-blow-australia> accessed 11 July 2015. 
655 See opinion of Kokott AG discussed at 3.1 (Requirements).  
656 Zoe Kelinman, Bitcoin Island: cleaning up the crypto-currency, (BBC, London, 24 April 2015) < 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-32394170> accessed 11 July 2015. 
657 As further discussed below.  
658 At the time George Osborne.  
659 HM Treasury, Digital Currencies: Call for Information < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/digital-currencies-call-for-information> accessed 11 July 2015. 
660HM Treasury, Digital Currencies: Response to the Call for Information 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/digital-currencies-call-for-information> accessed 11 July 
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were received and are summarised in the Government’s response, published in March 
2015.661 This chapter will continue to build on the foregoing analysis and identify potential 
domestic regulation to legitimise use, exchange and deposit of crypto-currencies and touch 
points with regulation focusing on the key themes of consumer protection and commodity 
regulation.  
6.1.2: Approach 
If it is decided to apply regulation then two broad approaches might be adopted (a) adapt 
existing definitions – which may have unforeseen consequences in relation to business 
models of existing providers or (b) provide a sui generis regime of bespoke regulation. This 
chapter will now consider both approaches and provide recommendations to sustain 
development of the Blockchain technology, not into a disruptive force, but a vital component 
in the furtherance of the UK as a financial hub.662  
This thesis has provided an analysis of the development of crypto-currencies and the 
surrounding infrastructure. It has not been the intention to provide a complete technological 
analysis but it is hoped this work will be a stimulus for further discussion and debate on the 
practicalities and adoption of crypto-currencies. The identification of potential regulation will 
form a basis for further works to explore the practical implementation of the recommendations 
to secure adequate protection for consumers. This need not involve all of the elements 
discussed below which offer a menu approach from which the most appropriate tools could 
be selected. Some of these tools however may be dependant on the adoption of certain others. 
6.2: Money Laundering 
As discussed663 illegality and laundering of criminal funds have become synonymous with the 
use and exchange of crypto-currencies. This connection undermines key policy objectives for 
regulation of the financial sector664 - ensuring financial institutions do not participate wittingly 
or otherwise in organised crime which affects the safety and soundness of the financial 
                                                          
661 HM Treasury, Digital Currencies: Response to the Call for Information 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/digital-currencies-call-for-information> accessed 11 July 
2015. 
662 James Quinn, George Osbourne embraces Bitcoin as London aims to be centre of global financial technology 
revolution, (The Telegraph, London, 6 August 2014) < 
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663 Chapter 1 (Crypto-Currencies) at 1.4 (Case Studies).   
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relation to its key statutory objectives of: (i) consumer protection; (ii) integrity of UK financial institutions and 
markets while securing effective competition in the interests of consumers. Financial Services and Markets Act 
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sector.665 The Government wishes to support the development of legitimate businesses and 
thereby create a hostile environment for illegal digital currency businesses.666 This might be 
compared with early digital music piracy where disruptive players who operated illegally were 
removed from the market.667 Existing technology companies developed internet based music 
sharing legitimately in accordance with regulation. This altered business base by Apple 
iTunes668 and Spotify669 has resulted in a change in the way music is purchased and they have 
become key market players. A similar opportunity therefore exists to regulate crypto-currency 
use and dissuade illegal entities from entering, or continuing, in the market through adequate 
regulation and sanctions.670 One such avenue is through the introduction of mandatory anti-
money laundering requirements by exchanges - an approach recommended by many 
respondents to the Government’s Call for Information,671 including the United Kingdom Digital 
Currency Association [UKDCA].  
 
Appropriate money laundering regulation is a near term goal to legitimise use which will 
remove players who are prepared to allow themselves to be associated with illegality.672 This 
may improve consumer confidence leading to wider adoption and as noted, dissuade illegal 
entities from being involved. A corollary of minimum Customer Due Diligence [CDD] is that the 
anonymity of users of crypto-currencies - one of the attractive features of the network to users 
- will be further compromised. The introduction of CDD and AML requirements have the 
opportunity to elevate crypto-currencies in public opinion and ensure adequate levels of 
security are adopted. The UK Government’s analysis of the responses to the call for 
                                                          
665 The BCCI Banking scandal is of particular importance. BCCI went bust owing more than £10bn to its 
creditors after having operated a complex internal system shifting assets from company to company to 
increase borrowing limits.  The Bank of England were subject to claims by depositors after failing to take action 
against BCCI, which it knew was badly run. Further information is available in Sam Jaffa, Great Financial 
Scandals: The schemers and scams behind the greatest financial disasters (Robson Books Ltd, London, 1998) 
p235 – 263.  
666 HM Treasury, Digital currencies: response to the call for information, March 2015 at 1.4 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/414040/digital_currencies_
response_to_call_for_information_final_changes.pdf> accessed 11 July 2015.  
667 For example Napster which enabled users to share music files on their hard drives over a common free 
server. This had no regard for copyright laws and was ordered to close following legal action in San Francisco. 
Further information is BBC Author, Napster shut down, (BBC, London, 27 July 2000) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/852283.stm> accessed 11 July 2015. A further example was 
Limewire which operated a similar business model with a shared public platform for accessing other users hard 
drives.  
668 ITunes information available at <https://www.apple.com/uk/itunes/> accessed 11 July 2015. 
669 Spotify information available at < https://www.spotify.com/uk/> accessed 11 July 2015. 
670 This can be contrasted with the recent regulation in relation to Payday Loans as explored at Chapter 1 
(Crypto-currencies) at 1.3.4 (Prohibition).  
671 United Kingdom Digital Currency Association, The UK Digital Currency Association’s response to HM 
Treasury’s Digital Currencies: Call for Information, 3 December 2014. 
672 Chapter 1 (Crypto-currencies) at 1.4 (Case Studies). 





information confirms the intention to apply anti-money laundering regulation to digital currency 
exchanges in the UK to support continuing development of crypto-currencies and prevent 
criminal use.673 An immediate opportunity is the extension of the reach and scope of the Money 
Laundering Regulations to exchanges by statutory instrument after consultation.674 Extension 
would introduce CDD checks to confirm the customer’s identity and obtain, in advance, 
information as to the purpose and extent of the business relationship. This would be subject 
to ongoing industry guidance and sector specific recommendations for implementation. 
Checks would require to be undertaken upon the establishment of a business relationship i.e. 
when a consumer opens an online wallet with an exchange and would immediately offer 
legitimacy to transactions. Amendment by this route will require to give consideration when 
transposing the Fourth Money Laundering Directive. The legislative base of the Fourth Money 
Laundering Directive is Article 114 TFEU – the approximation of law of member states to 
facilitate the establishment and functioning of the EU. Therefore mutual cooperation with the 
Fourth Money Laundering Directive is required rather than maximum harmonisation. This 
permits the UK to choose to over-implement and thereby introduce money laundering 
requirements for exchanges – a matter on which the Fourth Money Laundering Directive is 
silent - in transposing the Fourth Money Laundering Directive. The anti-money laundering 
provisions currently in place for high value dealers and casinos, already covered by the Third 
Money Laundering Directive, offers an immediate model for the extension to exchanges. The 
oversight would be undertaken by HMRC in this model. This would not require the extension 
of the regulated perimeter nor oversight by FCA and is the least intrusive form of control of 
exchanges which may be considered consistent with the creation of a supportive environment 
for financial innovation.  
 
Alternatively, the Isle of Man offer a model under its Proceeds of Crime regulation. The Isle of 
Man Government has amended the Proceeds of Crime Act 2008675 to extend application to 
bitcoin companies, including exchanges, operating from the Isle of Man. The Proceeds of 
Crime Act now extends to “the business of issuing, transmitting, transferring, providing safe 
custody or storage of, administering, managing, ending, buying, selling, exchanging or 
otherwise trading or intermediating convertible virtual currencies, including crypto-currencies 
                                                          
673<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/414040/digital_currenci
es_response_to_call_for_information_final_changes.pdf> at section 1.5. 
674 Conversely the Italian Central Bank recently determined that exchanges are not required to enforce anti-
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Woong, Italian Central Bank: No AML Requirement for Bitcoin Exchanges, (Coindesk, USA, 5 February 2015) < 
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or similar concepts where the concept is accepted by persons as a means of payment for 
goods or services, a unit of account, a store of value or a commodity.” This forms an alternative 
model for the UK to adopt but the definition of criminal property in the UK POCA is already 
broad enough to encompass crypto-currencies. However the reporting and tipping off offences 
in POCA would require exchanges to be brought formally within the regulated sector.  The Isle 
of Man also intend to amend the Designated Businesses (Registration and Oversight) Bill 
2014676 to extend the scope of the Isle of Man Financial Services Commission [FSC] to 
oversee and regulate crypto-currency and exchange businesses operating from the Isle of 
Man This extension attempts to disassociate crypto-currencies and illegality and provide a 
legitimate base from the Isle of Man. Critics have questioned the associated costs of 
establishing businesses in the Isle of Man677 inferring establishment in less stringent 
jurisdictions would be preferable. This is a form of regulatory arbitrage whereby there is a race 
to the bottom i.e. a race to the country with the least regulations and restrictions for exchange 
providers. The provisions have only recently been approved, thus the effects on the crypto-
currency industry operating from the Isle of Man cannot yet be quantified. However, once 
these amendments have been implemented and the impact assessed, the UK Government 
could consider replicating the amendments through domestic statutory instruments to extend 
the scope of POCA and FCA regulation.  
 
6.3: Commodities and regulated markets 
 
The Market Abuse regime in s118 and s118A FSMA, as amended, might be extended, 
notwithstanding the new UK Market Abuse Regime Regulation678 and the Market Abuse 
Regulation and Market Abuse Directive 2 [MAD2],679 to exchanges converting fiat currencies 
to crypto-currencies and vice versa.  As part of the EU Financial Services Action Plan,680 the 
Market Abuse Regulation provides for the civil and regulatory regime to be uniform throughout 
the EU. This can be differentiated from Market Abuse Directive 1 [MAD1] because of the 
differing base implementation.  The UK had, prior to the promulgation of MAD1 included 
                                                          
676 The Designated Business (Registration and Oversight) Bill 2014 received its third reading in the House of 
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677 Emily Spaven, Isle of Man Introduces Regulation for Bitcoin Businesses, (Coindesk, USA, 26 March 2015) < 
http://www.coindesk.com/isle-of-man-introduces-regulation-for-bitcoin-businesses/> accessed 11 July 2015. 
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certain commodity markets within the scope of the provisions.681 Those super equivalent 
provisions were retained when s118 was amended to transpose MAD1.682 The UK model is 
therefore more expansive than the European requirements on Market Abuse.  
 
As noted, certain US authorities have treated bitcoins as commodities for regulatory purposes, 
particularly in relation to derivative contracts based on bitcoins.683 There is therefore 
experience of other regulators seeking to apply commodities’ regulation to crypto-currencies. 
This would prevent potential market manipulation in attracting consumers by offers of 
guaranteed conversion rates to and from crypto-currencies. Regulation under the commodity 
umbrella would also protect consumers from abusive practices such as pre-positioning when 
consumers place orders and the exchanges buys or sells ahead of that order to its 
advantage.684  
 
Crypto-currencies exhibit characteristics of each of money, payment services and 
commodities but satisfy the current definitions of none. This is a complex area and will require 
careful definitional guidance by the Government – should crypto-currencies be considered 
money and regulation accordingly amended or should regulation of crypto-currencies be on 
similar terms to commodity markets such as the London Metal Exchange? The holding of a 
euro or dollar denominated account is not uncommon in the UK. Exchanges rates between 
sterling to euro and sterling to dollar fluctuate. Derivative contracts, options, futures and 
contracts for differences exist in relation to these exchange rate risks. There is no suggestion 
that dollar or euro are commodities in the UK. The derivative contracts of options, futures and 
contracts for differences in relation to any currency are already regulated.685 If crypto-
currencies are treated as a currency as they satisfy a revised definition of money then these 
derivative contracts of options, futures and contracts for differences would also be regulated. 
This would provide an avenue to bring crypto-currencies within regulation without the need to 
apply commodity regulation to the use of crypto-currencies.   
 
                                                          
681 Chapter 5 (Regulation) at 5.4.3 (Market Abuse).  
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It is therefore submitted that regulators resist the temptation to simply regard crypto-currencies 
as commodities and consider a hybrid approach to regulation. This would adopt a suitable 
mechanism of protection for consumers.  
 
6.4: Consumer detriment 
 
6.4.1: Extension of RAO / FIT Sourcebook 
 
The foregoing chapters highlight extensive consumer detriment in the use and exchange of 
crypto-currencies through a lack of information asymmetry as to the financial security of the 
exchange itself.686 There have been a number of recent examples of exchanges closing 
because they are unprofitable or because their business model becomes unsustainable. 
Furthermore the number of alleged hacks on exchanges, at least some of which are almost 
certainly cases of embezzlement of funds, have resulted in consumers losing the bitcoins 
lodged and the value which they represent. This provides another justification for regulatory 
intervention. An immediate response is to extend the definitions of deposit or investment in 
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order, as amended 
(“RAO”). Exclusion of crypto-currencies from money687 currently prohibits protection under the 
RAO. The exact terms of such extension will require considered analysis to determine the 
appropriate level of extension required and be balanced with the above recommendations 
regarding regulation of crypto-currencies as a hybrid. The principal stumbling block to that is 
of course the failure of crypto-currencies to qualify as money.688 However if they were to be 
defined as investment of a type such as one conforming to the MiFID Directive criteria then 
the client money rules contained in the PRIN block of the FCA Handbook and amplified in the 
CASS block would apply.689 This requires the complete segregation of clients’ monies690 and 
would require an exchange to retain the full value of funds deposited in crypto-currency to the 
account of the respective depositors. 691 This offers a completely different and much more 
onerous business model from deposit taking for exchanges. That might the type of regulatory 
intervention that would effectively prohibit the industry operating.692 
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Extension of the RAO to incorporate crypto-currencies would bring exchanges into the scheme 
of FSMA, including the FCA Handbook. Options for extension include by amending the 
definition of deposit or creating a new category of crypto-currency transactions within the RAO. 
The new category would provide some sui generis regulation which does not conflict with 
existing categories in the RAO given that crypto-currencies exhibit categories of both money 
and commodities. This avenue provides an opportunity to provide bespoke guidance within 
the requirements to amend any existing definitions within the RAO. This approach would 
provide a nurturing approach for the further development of crypto-currencies thereby aligning 
with the Government’s aim of establishing the UK as a financial hub for developing 
technologies.   
 
Extension of the RAO would result in the FIT sourcebook of the FCA Handbook being 
applicable to those exercising controlling functions at exchanges – and potentially crypto-
currencies depending on ascertainment of the characteristics of the crypto-currency in 
question. This could potentially remove incidences such as the embezzlement at Mt Gox.693 
Thus suggesting that fitness to own and manage the business, as well as the maintenance of 
sufficient capital and the capacity to monitor operations were not apparent. The requirement 
to comply with the FIT principles seeks to ensure individuals are honest and trustworthy prior 
to establishment of an exchange. This could be retrospectively applied to founders of existing 
exchanges. Exchanges would also be required to comply with the PRIN block of the FCA 
sourcebook. These high level principles impose standards on the exchanges and would 
elevate the level of consumer protection available. The success of the implementation of the 
FCA Handbook may indicate that an extension of the authorised regime under FSMA might 
be appropriate in the future. 
 
6.4.2: CRYPT Sourcebook 
 
Extension of existing sourcebooks provide immediate protection to consumer. However, this 
is not considered sufficient. An additional route of protection is proposed by way of a new 
conduct of business sourcebook – CRYPT – as a specialist sourcebook. This bespoke 
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sourcebook would regulate crypto-currencies and exchanges as specialised business sectors. 
Similar to the Collective Investment Schemes [COLL] Sourcebook694 this could specify 
investor relations, money laundering requirements, qualification as an exchange and 
operating duties and responsibilities. The FCA sourcebooks permit regular updating as 
technology and use develops. Such tertiary rules and guidance provide an immediate and 
flexible approach rather than through prescriptive regulation and a succession of statutory 
instruments. This avenue also provides an opportunity to engage exchanges and consumers 
to understand the problems regularly encountered and the protections suitable for rectification.  
 
6.4.3: Certification Marks 
Finally, the UKDCA recommend that a set of standards are developed (via a Certification 
Mark) to encourage participants to operate and innovate industry-defined best practices. Such 
certification marks would be similar to ISO marks695 to reassure the public about the quality of 
the services. Use of certification marks would ensure there is a consistent standard in the 
crypto-currencies and exchanges providing services696 and provide alignment rather than 
each exchange operating on an OTC basis. The Government confirmed in its response to the 
Call for Information that it will work with British Standards Institution and the digital currency 
industry to develop standard certification marks to ensure levels of consumer protection.697  
An entire infrastructure will require to be developed to secure implementation and 
differentiation of those services achieving the Certification Mark from those falling short of the 
required standards.698 This suggestion has gravitas in offering a standard to consumers, 
however implementation is no “quick fix” and this would require large scale adoption by 
exchanges to be effective. This recommendation will therefore require considerable buy-in 
from crypto-currency stakeholders before effectiveness can be ascertained. At present it is 
unclear if crypto-currency stakeholders would be prepared to undertake additional work and 
incur the associated costs. Given the number of problems encountered in this young industry 
it is difficult to believe that it has the capacity to behave ethically and adopt quality standards. 
Additionally the Certification Mark would require to be compulsory to elevate above the 
voluntary BSI kite mark. This has been further demonstrated by the comments following 
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organisation and the world’s largest developer of voluntary international standards. Further information 
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announcement by the Isle of Man Government of extension of regulation to crypto-currency 
exchanges.699 The UK Government previously attempted to introduce CAT700 standards for 
ISAs. These voluntary marks were not an endorsement of the product and proved unpopular 
with providers and customers. Ultimately the Government removed CAT standards in favour 
of stakeholder products.701 In theory the introduction of standards is an option to elevate the 
use of exchanges, however, large scale adoption will depend on the appetite by exchanges 
and other crypto-currency participants.  
6.5: Scale and sustainability 
 
There is, as yet, no evidence of extension of failures in the crypto-currency network to other 
areas of the banking sector. Thus, there is no evidence of systemic failures in the broader 
financial system. As prudential regulation protects against systemic failures there is no need 
to regulate prudentially crypto-currencies and the network. There are a number of issues with 
scale. Blockchain is currently processing around $2m a day of bitcoin transaction which is 
insignificant given the economy of USA.702 In doing so bitcoin transactions are little more than 
a sideshow compared with American payment processors’ volume of transactions. It is simply 
not feasible to suggest that this is scalable technology to use for everyday transactions and 
disrupt payment services providers such as VISA or Mastercard in relation to consumer 
transactions. Nor can crypto-currencies offer credit facilities nor direct debits. While crypto-
currencies will increase in popularity, given the hurdles they are required to overcome, they 
will remain a niche product amongst those who believe, trust and invest in the network for the 
foreseeable future.   
 
Additionally, given the amount of energy required to successfully mine703 it is not inconceivable 
there could be a situation similar to GAW miners where the miners become insolvent leaving 
a considerable electricity bill.704 This could potentially have consequences given the number 
of larger players in the market. As the technology required to successfully mine increases in 
                                                          
699 Emily Spaven, Isle of Man Introduces Regulation for Bitcoin Businesses, (Coindesk, USA, 26 March 2015) 
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complexity the profit margins will decrease and affect the scalability of crypto-currencies.  
 
6.6: Final thoughts 
To have confidence in the crypto-currency system it is necessary to have confidence in the 
system and payment services provider regulation. It is submitted that Anti Money Laundering 
[AML] is the very minimum requirement.  The introduction of Certification marks, CRYPT 
sourcebook, inclusion as a regulated activity and association authorisation alongside  
consideration of scalability are all secondary once AML and legitimacy of crypto-currencies is 
confirmed.  
The Government recognise this is an area of continuing growth and it will be crucial to assess 
the longevity of crypto-currencies as a means of exchange. As such the Government has 
announced a new research initiative to bring together Research Councils, Alan Turing Institute 
and Digital Catapult with industry to address research opportunities and challenges for digital 
currency technology.705 It is probable that the underlying technology, the Blockchain, will 
outlive the crypto-currencies themselves. Banks are now involved in deploying the technology 
in internal products. This is comparable to the music industry where established companies 
built on the initial steps by innovators in the market.  
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2015, at 4.7. 




















Appendix 1A: Top 12 Crypto-Currencies (December 2014) 
# Name Market Cap Price Available Supply 
1  Bitcoin $ 4,443,852,054 $ 326.11  13,626,850 BTC  
2  Ripple $ 702,090,818 $ 0.022735  30,881,360,458 XRP * 
3  Litecoin $ 102,175,799 $ 2.93  34,868,954 LTC  
4  BitShares $ 39,804,213 $ 0.015935  2,497,973,773 BTS * 
5  MaidSafeCoin $ 20,760,435 $ 0.045874  452,552,412 MAID * 
6  Dogecoin $ 20,089,997 $ 0.000207  96,922,022,508 DOGE  
7  Stellar $ 18,568,418 $ 0.005228  3,551,439,650 STR * 
8  Nxt $ 16,209,553 $ 0.016210  999,997,096 NXT * 
9  Peercoin $ 12,634,026 $ 0.575611  21,948,896 PPC  
10  Counterparty $ 10,487,084 $ 3.96  2,646,690 XCP * 
11  Darkcoin $ 9,800,971 $ 1.98  4,960,533 DRK  
12  Namecoin $ 8,533,700 $ 0.811273  10,518,900 NMC  





* Not mineable706 
Appendix 1B: Top 12 Crypto-Currencies (May 2015) 
                                                          
706 Reproduced from coinmarketcap. Information correct at 20 December 2014 < http://coinmarketcap.com/> 
accessed 20 December 2014. 





# Name Market Cap Price Available Supply 
1  Bitcoin $ 3,357,166,146 $ 236.91  14,170,400 BTC  
2  Ripple $ 208,140,758 $ 0.006523  31,908,551,587 XRP * 
3  Litecoin $ 56,781,003 $ 1.45  39,094,604 LTC  
4  Dash $ 15,900,822 $ 2.96  5,373,170 DASH  
5  Stellar $ 12,552,972 $ 0.002597  4,834,444,006 STR * 
6  Dogecoin $ 11,545,006 $ 0.000116  99,434,192,083 DOGE  
7  Nxt $ 9,251,123 $ 0.009251  999,997,096 NXT * 
8  BitShares $ 9,088,328 $ 0.003622  2,509,520,303 BTS * 
9  MaidSafeCoin $ 8,629,088 $ 0.019068  452,552,412 MAID * 
10  BanxShares $ 7,520,918 $ 1.45  5,202,663 BANX * 
11  Peercoin $ 5,697,933 $ 0.255220  22,325,574 PPC  
12  Bytecoin $ 4,522,131 $ 0.000026  172,886,143,001 BCN  
 
* Not mineable      
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accessed 17 May 2015 
707 





Appendix 2A: BTC.sx Terms and Conditions 
Terms, Conditions, and Privacy Policy of Bitcoin Trading708 
Use of this BTC.sx website ("Website") and the service offered on the Website ("Service") are 
governed by the terms contained on this Terms of Service page ("Terms"). By accessing, viewing 
or downloading information from the Website and using the Service provided by BTC.sx you 
acknowledge that you have read, understand, and unconditionally agree to be bound by these 
Terms. BTC.sx may at any time, without notice, amend the Terms. You agree to continue to be 
bound by any amended terms and conditions and that BTC.sx has no obligation to notify you of 
such amendments. You acknowledge that it is your responsibility to check these Terms 
periodically for changes and that your continued use of the Website and Services offered by 
BTC.sx following the posting of any changes to the Terms indicates your acceptance of any such 
changes. 
The Website and the copyright in all text, graphics, images, software and any other materials on 
the Website is owned by BTC.sx including all trademarks and other intellectual property rights in 
respect of materials and Service on the Website. Materials on this Website may only be used for 
personal use and non-commercial purposes. 
You may display on a computer screen or print extracts from the Website for the above -stated 
purpose only provided that you retain any copyright and other proprietary notices or any BTC.sx 
trademarks or logos, as shown on the initial printout or download without alteration, addition or 
deletion. Except as expressly stated herein, you may not without BTC.sx's prior written 
permission alter, modify, reproduce, distribute or use in any other commercial context any 
materials from the Website. 
You acknowledge that 'BTC.sx' and the BTC.sx logo are trademarks of BTC.sx. You may 
reproduce such trademarks without alteration on material downloaded from this Website to the 
extent authorised above, but you may not otherwise use, copy, adapt or erase them.  
You shall not in any circumstances obtain any rights over or in respect of the Website (other than 
rights to use the Website pursuant to these Terms and any other terms and conditions governing 
a particular service or section of the Website) or hold yourself out as  having any such rights over 
or in respect of the Website. 
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"Agreement" means the Terms and Conditions of Use herein.  
"BTC.sx" means BTC.sx as a trading name of COINS.SX LTD, registration number: 
8849225, a company registered in England and Wales. All references, materials 
(including intellectual properties and patents) of BTC.sx are wholly owned and managed 
by COINS.SX LTD. 
"Data" means any data input by you or with your authority into the Website.  
"Intellectual Property Rights" means any registered or unregistered design rights, 
patents, copyright, database rights, data protection rights, trade marks, service marks, 
moral rights, know-how and any other intellectual or industrial property rights, anywhere 
in the world. 
"Member" means any current registered user of BTC.sx. 
"Service" means all services made available (as may be changed or updated from time 
to time by BTC.sx) via the Website. 
"Website" means any of the images, written material, databases, software or other 
material available on any website owned or operated by BTC.sx. 
1. Access Conditions 
1.1 You will ensure that all usernames and passwords required to access the Website are kept 
secure and confidential. You will immediately notify BTC.sx of any unauthorised use of your 
passwords or any other breach of security and BTC.sx will reset your password.  
1.2 When accessing and using the Service, You must: 
(a) not attempt to undermine the security or integrity of BTC.sx's computing systems or networks 
or, where the Services are hosted by a third party, that third party's computing systems and 
networks; 
(b) not use, or misuse, the Services in any way which may impair the functionality of the Services 
or Website, or other systems used to deliver the Services or impair the ability of any other use r 
to use the Services or Website; 
(c) not attempt to gain unauthorised access to the computer system on which the Website is 
hosted or to any materials other than those to which you have been given express permission to 
access; 
(d) not transmit or input into the Website any files that may damage any other person's computing 
devices or software; content that may be offensive; or material or Data in violation of any law 





(including Data or other material protected by copyright or trade secrets which you do not  have 
the right to use); 
(e) not attempt to modify, copy, adapt, reproduce, disassemble, decompile or reverse engineer 
any computer programs used to deliver the Services or to operate the Website except as is strictly 
necessary to use either of them for normal operation. 
(f) You will ensure that all usernames and passwords required to access the Website are kept 
secure and confidential. You will immediately notify BTC.sx of any unauthorised use of your 
passwords or any other breach of security and BTC.sx wi ll reset your password; 
1.3 Use of the Service may be subject to limitations, including but not limited to transaction 
volumes and the number of calls permitted to be made against BTC.sx's application programming 
interface. Any such limitations will be advised. 
1.4 For the purpose of account security, BTC.sx reserves the right to request additional 
information at any time to support the verification of user identities.  
1.5 By registering as a Member, a Member represents and warrants:  
(a) they have accepted the Terms; and 
(b) they are at least 18 years of age and have the capacity to accept the Terms.  
2. Intellectual Property Rights 
2.1 All intellectual property rights relating to all the material used on the Website including, but 
not limited to, design, structure, layouts, graphical images and underlying source code belongs 
to BTC.sx. All rights are reserved. 
2.2 You acknowledge that, except as otherwise agreed between the parties in writing, all 
intellectual property rights of BTC.sx and the Website shall remain with BTC.sx. 
2.3 By submitting content to any public area of the Website, including blogs, message boards, 
and forums, you grant BTC.sx a royalty-free, perpetual, irrevocable, non-exclusive right and 
licence to use, reproduce, modify, adapt, publish,  translate, create derivative works from, 
distribute, communicate to the public, perform and display the content (in whole or in part) 
worldwide and to incorporate it in other works in any form, media, or technology now known or 
later developed, for the full term of any rights that may exist in such content. You also permit any 
subscriber to access, display, view, store and reproduce such content for personal use.  
2.4 By submitting any content to the Website you warrant that you are entitled to and have all  
necessary intellectual property rights over that content.  
3. Privacy Policy 
3.1 Please scroll down to see our Privacy Policy, which forms part of these terms.  
4. Data Protection 





4.1 BTC.sx may place information concerning you on a database of internal use only. BTC.sx will 
not disclose your details to any third party unless required by law, unless specifically instructed 
to the contrary by you. 
5. Third Party Websites 
5.1 BTC.sx links to third party websites that are not affiliated or associated with BTC.s x (although 
BTC.sx branding, advertisements or links may appear on these websites) and BTC.sx may send 
e-mail messages to you containing advertisements or promotions including links to third parties. 
BTC.sx makes no representation as to the quality, suitability, functionality or legality of the 
material on third party websites that are linked to, or to any goods and services available from 
such websites. The material is only provided for your interest and convenience. BTC.sx does not 
monitor or investigate such third party websites and BTC.sx accepts no responsibility or liability 
for any loss arising from the content or accuracy of this material and any opinion expressed in 
the material should not be taken as an endorsement, recommendation or opinion of BTC.sx. 
5.2 Under no circumstances are you to create a hyperlink to any of the pages on the Website, 
unless BTC.sx provides you with its prior consent to do so. If you do create a link to any of the 
pages on the Website, you acknowledge that you are responsib le for all direct or indirect 
consequences of the link, and you indemnify BTC.sx for all loss, liability, costs or expense arising 
from or in connection with the link. 
6. Warranties and Representations 
6.1 You acknowledge that: 
a) You are authorised to access and use the Website; 
b) If you are using the Website on behalf of or for the benefit of any organisation then it is 
assumed that you have the right to do so. The organisation will be liable for your actions including 
any breach of these Terms; 
c) Your use of the Website and the Service is at your own risk. You agree that BTC.sx is not 
liable for any damage or harm arising out of your use of the Website and Service;  
d) The information provided on the Website is for general information purposes only and i s given 
in good faith. However, the information is selective and BTC.sx may not verify all information, 
which may not be complete or accurate for your purposes and should not be relied upon without 
further enquiry. The information should not be construed as a recommendation to trade or engage 
the Service provided by BTC.sx in a particular manner; and 
e) BTC.sx does not warrant that the use of the Website will be uninterrupted or error free. Among 
other things, the operation and availability of the systems used for accessing the Website, 
including public telephone services, computer networks and the Internet, can be unpredictable 
and may from time to time interfere with or prevent access to the Website. BTC.sx is not in any 





way responsible for any such interference that prevents your access or use of the Website and 
the Service. 
6.2 BTC.sx gives no warranty about the Website. Without limiting the foregoing, BTC.sx does not 
warrant that the Website will meet your requirements or that it will be suitable for you r purposes. 
To avoid doubt, all implied conditions or warranties are excluded insofar as is permitted by law 
including, without limitation, warranties of merchantability, fitness for purpose, title and non -
infringement. 
6.3 You warrant and represent that you are acquiring the right to access and use the Website 
and agreeing to these Terms for the purposes of a business and that, to the maximum extent 
permitted by law, any statutory consumer guarantees or legislation intended to protect non -
business consumers in any jurisdiction does not apply to the supply of the Website or these 
Terms. 
7. Service Performance 
7.1 BTC.sx denies all liability for the timely operation of the Website when used within an Internet 
environment, where you or a third party is providing the computer equipment upon which the 
product is depend upon for any part of its functionality.  
7.2 By using this service you confirm your understanding that the timely operation of the Internet 
and the World Wide Web is governed by constraints beyond the control of BTC.sx. You accept 
that BTC.sx is not liable for any perceived slow operation of the Website.  
7.3 By using this service you accept that all trade executions placed by btc.sx are final and 
irreversible. Using the service you accept that trades are placed out to market on an at best price 
basis. 
7.4 By using this service you accept that BTC.sx reserves the right to liquidate any trades at any 
time regardless of the profit or loss position. 
8. Indemnification 
8.1 You agree to indemnify and hold harmless BTC.sx, its contractors, and its licensors, and their 
respective directors, officers, employees and agents from and against any and all claims and 
expenses, including attorneys' fees, arising out of your use of the Website, including but not  
limited to out of your violation this Agreement. 
9. Limitation of Liability 
9.1 In no event will BTC.sx, or its suppliers or licensors, be liable with respect to any subject 
matter of this agreement under any contract, negligence, strict liability or othe r legal or equitable 
theory for: (i) any special, incidental or consequential damages; (ii) the cost of procurement or 
substitute products or services; (iii) for interruption of use or loss or corruption of data; or (iv) for 
any amounts that exceed the fees paid by you to BTC.sx under this agreement during the twelve 





(12) month period prior to the cause of action. BTC.sx shall have no liability for any failure or 
delay due to matters beyond their reasonable control. The foregoing shall not apply to the exte nt 
prohibited by applicable law. 
10. Funding Charges 
10.1 Trades placed with BTC.sx are subject to daily funding charges. The most up-to-date 
charges are shown here, however, these charges are subject to change without notice.  
11. Calculations 
11.1 All calculations performed by the BTC.sx trading engine and as verified by BTC.sx are final. 
Our methodology is outlined here. As noted in clause 6.1, BTC.sx does not warrant that the use 
of the Website will be uninterrupted or error free. 
12. Termination & Remedies for Breach of these Terms by You 
a) BTC.sx reserves the right to seek all remedies available at law and in equity for violations of 
these Terms, including without limitation, the right to restrict, suspend or terminate your account 
or deny you access to the Website without notice; and 
b) BTC.sx shall be entitled to disclose your user identity and personal details if required or 
requested by a court of law, governmental agency or any other law enforcement authority in such 
circumstances as BTC.sx in its sole discretion considers reasonably necessary or appropriate.  
13. Absence of Waiver 
13.1 Any failure or delay by BTC.sx to enforce any of the Terms or to exercise any right under 
the Terms will not be construed as a waiver to any extent of our rights.  
14. Force Majeure 
14.1 Neither party is liable for delay in meeting its obligations due to any cause outside its 
reasonable control including acts of god, riot, war, malicious acts of damage, fires, electricity 
supply failure, Government authority.  
15. Survival 
15.1 Should any provision of these Terms be held to be void, invalid, unenforceable or illegal by 
a court, the validity and enforceability of the other provisions shall not be affected. If any provision 
is determined to be unenforceable, you agree to an amendment by BTC.sx of such provision to 
provide for enforcement of the provisions intent, to the extent permitted by applicable law.  
16. Governing Law 
The Terms are governed by and construed in accordance with English law. You agree to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts. 
BTC.sx Privacy Policy 





We respect your privacy and are committed to protecting it through means outlined within this 
policy. 
The policy sets out the different areas where user privacy is concerned and outlines the 
obligations & requirements of the users and the website. 
Furthermore the way this website processes, stores and protects user data and information will 
also be detailed within this policy. 
BTC.sx is organised primarily to provide registered users with bitcoin services. The services 
offered include the transfer of digital tokens known as bitcoins.  
The Website 
This website and its owners take a proactive approach to user privacy and ensure the necessary 
steps are taken to protect the privacy of its users. This website complies with UK and EU laws 
and requirements for user privacy. Storage 
The data that we collect from you may be transferred to, and stored at, a destination outside the 
UK and EU. 
Use of Cookies 
BTC.sx may use cookies to better the users experience while visiting. Where applicable this 
website will use a cookie control system allowing the user to allow or disallow the use of cookies 
on their computer / device. This complies with recent legislation requirements for websites to 
obtain explicit consent from users before leaving behind or reading files such as cookies on a 
users computer / device. 
Cookies are small files saved to the user's computer hard drive that track, save and store 
information about the users interactions and usage of the website. Th is allows the website, 
through it's server to provide the users with a tailored experience within this website.  
Users are advised that if they wish to deny the use and saving of cookies from this website on to 
their computers hard drive they should take necessary steps within their web browsers security 
settings to block all cookies from this website. This website uses tracking software to monitor it's 
visitors to better understand how they use it. This software is provided by Google Analytics which 
may use cookies to track visitor usage. You can read Google's privacy policy here for further 
information http://www.google.com/privacy.html. 
Contact & Communication 
Users contacting BTC.sx do so at their own discretion and provide any such personal details 
requested at their own risk. Your personal information is kept private and stored securely until a 
time it is no longer required or has no use, as detailed in the UK Data Protection Act 1998.  





We use any information submitted to provide you with further information about the products and 
services we offer or to assist you in answering any questions or queries you may have submitted. 
This includes using your details to inform you of important announcements. This i s by no means 
a comprehensive list of your user rights in regard to receiving email -marketing material. Your 
details are not passed on to any third parties. 
Cryptographic hashes 
Users sending bitcoins to this website through the use of cryptographic hashes  and keys take full 
responsibility for the risks involved. By using services offered by BTC.sx you will automatically 
accept liability of any loss, damages or implications incurred through the use of this website. 
BTC.sx and its owners will not be held liable for any loss of bitcoin. 
Users who do not agree can request the return of their bitcoin through the use a withdrawal once 
logged in. 
Security 
No cryptographic private keys or bitcoin private keys are held on BTC.sx servers. Bitcoins sent 
to cryptographic public keys displayed on this website are immediately forwarded to offline vaults.  
External Links 
Although this website only looks to include quality, safe and relevant external links users should 
always adopt a policy of caution before clicking any external web links mentioned throughout this 
website. 
We cannot guarantee or verify the contents of any externally linked website despite their best 
efforts. Users should therefore note they click on external links at their own risk and this website 
and it's owners cannot be held liable for any damages or implications caused by visiting any 
external links. 
Correct Personal Information 
In accordance to The Data Protection Act 1998 (UK), users have the right to access any Personal 
Information held. Upon request, we will inform you of the Personal Information relating to your 
account, the use and relevant disclosure. Subject to a maximum fee no greater than GBP10 or 
agreed equivalent, we will send you a copy of all Personal Information retained.  
Where possible, the website will enable users to update inaccurate or incorrect information. 
Additionally update requests can be made by emailing the site's owners at  support@btc.sx. 
Changes to this Policy 
We may revise this Privacy Policy from time to time. If we make a change to this policy that, in 
our sole discretion, is material, we will take steps to notify all users by a notice on the site. By 





continuing to access or use the Services after those changes become effective, you agree to be 
bound by the revised Privacy Policy. 
Contact Us 
If you have any concerns regarding our Privacy Policy, please contact us for more information.  
E-Mail support@btc.sx 
Effective: October 23, 2014 
  





Appendix 2B: Bitstamp Terms of Use709 
 
TERMS OF USE 
ACCEPTANCE OF TERMS OF USE 
By using this website (“Site”), registering for a Bitstamp Account (“Account”), or using any of our other 
Bitstamp Services, you ("you, your, or yourself") are agreeing to accept and comply with the terms and 
conditions of use stated below ("Terms of Use"). You should read the entire Terms of Use carefully 
before you use this Site or any of the Bitstamp Services. 
As used in this Terms of Use, “Bitstamp" refers to the company Bitstamp Limited, including, without 
limitation, its owners, directors, investors, employees or other related parties. Depending upon the 
context, "Bitstamp" may also refer to the services, products, website, content or other materials 
(collectively, "Bitstamp Services") provided by Bitstamp. 
The Service operated by Bitstamp allows buyers ("Buyers") and sellers ("Sellers"), to buy and sell the 
Internet currency known as "Bitcoins" (see http://bitcoin.org). 
The Service operated by Bitstamp also allows all registered users of the Service ("Members") to: 
 Transfer Bitcoins to other Members or other users of Bitcoin outside the Bitstamp site. 
 Use Bitcoins for purchasing goods. 
 Buy the Internet currency known as XRP. 
 Access and use the Ripple system. 
Depending on your country of residence, you may not be able to use all the functions of the Site. It is 
your responsibility to follow those rules and laws in your country of residence and/or country from which 
you access this Site and Services. As long as you agree to and comply with these Terms of Use, 
Bitstamp grants to you a personal, non-exclusive, non-transferable, non-sublicensable and limited right 
to enter and use the Site and the Service. 
 
IF YOU DO NOT ACCEPT THE TERMS OF USE AND CONDITIONS OUTLINED IN THIS 
AGREEMENT, DO NOT ACCESS THIS SITE AND DO NOT USE THIS SERVICE. 
By opening an Account, you expressly represent and warrant: 
 1. You have accepted these Terms; and 
 2. You are at least 18 years of age and have the full capacity to accept these Terms and enter into 
a transaction involving Bitcoins. 
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The trading of goods and products, real or virtual, as well as virtual currencies involves significant risk. 
Prices can and do fluctuate on any given day. Due to such price fluctuations, you may increase or lose 
value in your assets at any given moment. Any currency - virtual or not - may be subject to large swings 
in value and may even become worthless. There is an inherent risk that losses will occur as a result of 
buying, selling or trading anything on a market. 
Bitcoin trading also has special risks not generally shared with official currencies or goods or 
commodities in a market. Unlike most currencies, which are backed by governments or other legal 
entities, or by commodities such as gold or silver, Bitcoin is a unique kind of "fiat" currency, backed by 
technology and trust. There is no central bank that can take corrective measure to protect the value of 
Bitcoins in a crisis or issue more currency. 
Instead, Bitcoin is an as-yet autonomous and largely unregulated worldwide system of currency firms 
and individuals. Traders put their trust in a digital, decentralised and partially anonymous system that 
relies on peer-to-peer networking and cryptography to maintain its integrity. 
Bitcoin trading is probably susceptible to irrational (or rational) bubbles or loss of confidence, which 
could collapse demand relative to supply. For example, confidence might collapse in Bitcoin because 
of unexpected changes imposed by the software developers or others, a government crackdown, the 
creation of superior competing alternative currencies, or a deflationary or inflationary spiral. Confidence 
might also collapse because of technical problems: if the anonymity of the system is compromised, if 
money is lost or stolen, or if hackers or governments are able to prevent any transactions from settling. 
There may be additional risks that we have not foreseen or identified in our Terms of Use. 
You should carefully assess whether your financial situation and tolerance for risk is suitable for buying, 
selling or trading Bitcoins. 
We use our banking providers in order to receive client moneys and making payments. Our banking 
providers DO NOT transfer Bitcoins, exchange Bitcoins, or provide any services in connection with 
Bitcoins. 
 
LIMITED RIGHT OF USE 
Unless otherwise specified, all Materials on this Site are the property of Bitstamp and are protected by 
copyright, trademark and other applicable laws. You may view, print and/or download a copy of the 
Materials from this Site on any single computer solely for your personal, informational, non-commercial 
use, provided you keep intact all copyright and other proprietary notices. 
The trademarks, service marks and logos of Bitstamp and others used in this Site ("Trademarks") are 
the property of Bitstamp and their respective owners. The software, text, images, graphics, data, prices, 
trades, charts, graphs, video and audio used on this Site belong to Bitstamp. The Trademarks and 
Material should not be copied, reproduced, modified, republished, uploaded, posted, transmitted, 
scraped, collected or distributed in any form or by any means, whether manual or automated. The use 
of any such Materials on any other Site or networked computer environment for any other purpose is 





strictly prohibited; any such unauthorised use may violate copyright, trademark and other applicable 
laws and could result in criminal or civil penalties. 
 
MAINTAINING YOUR ACCOUNT: OUR RULES 
This Site is for your personal and non-commercial use only. We are vigilant in maintaining the security 
of our Site and the Service. By registering with us, you agree to provide Bitstamp with current, accurate, 
and complete information about yourself as prompted by the registration process, and to keep such 
information updated. You further agree that you will not use any Account other than your own, or access 
the Account of any other Member at any time, or assist others in obtaining unauthorised access. 
The creation or use of Accounts without obtaining the prior express permission from Bitstamp will result 
in the immediate suspension of all said Accounts, as well as all pending purchase/sale offers. Any 
attempt to do so or to assist others (Members or otherwise), or the distribution of instructions, software 
or tools for that purpose, will result in the Accounts of such Members being terminated. Termination is 
not the exclusive remedy for such a violation, and Bitstamp may elect to take further action against you. 
You also are responsible for maintaining the confidentiality of your Account information, including your 
password, safeguarding your own Bitcoin, and for all activity including Transactions that are posted to 
your Account. If there is suspicious activity related to your Account, we may, but are not obligated, to 
request additional information from you, including authenticating documents, and to freeze any 
transactions pending our review. You are obligated to comply with these security requests, or accept 
termination of your Account. You are required to notify Bitstamp immediately of any unauthorised use 
of your Account or password, or any other breach of security by email addressed 
to support@bitstamp.net. Any Member who violates these rules may be terminated, and thereafter held 
liable for losses incurred by Bitstamp or any user of the Site. 
Bitstamp similarly reserves the right to freeze Ripple accounts in accordance with the new policy 
announced by Ripple Labs set to take effect September 15, 2014. As explained by Ripple Labs: 
The freeze protocol extension gives gateways the ability to 1) globally freeze all their issued funds, or 
2) freeze funds issued to a particular user. Frozen funds may only be sent back to the gateway who 
issued them. The global freeze feature allows a gateway to freeze all balances issued by it. The gateway 
may still issue payments. Accounts holding frozen balances may return the funds to the gateway. This 
feature is useful for migrating users from one account to another and to safeguard users in the event of 
a compromise of the gateway account. The individual freeze is intended primarily for complying with 
regulatory requirements which may vary from one jurisdiction to another. It also allows gateways to 
freeze individual accounts issuances in order to investigate suspicious activity. These features allow 
gateways to better operate in compliance of laws and regulations. 
Finally, you agree that you will not use the Service to perform criminal activity of any sort, including but 
not limited to, money laundering, illegal gambling operations, terrorist financing, or malicious hacking. 
The minimum allowable trade is $5. 
 





TERMINATION AND ESCROW OF UNVERIFIED ACCOUNTS 
You may terminate this agreement with Bitstamp, and close your Account at any time, following 
settlement of any pending transactions. 
You also agree that Bitstamp may, by giving notice, in its sole discretion terminate your access to the 
Site and to your Account, including without limitation, our right to: limit, suspend or terminate the service 
and Members' Accounts, prohibit access to the Site and its content, services and tools, delay or remove 
hosted content, and take technical and legal steps to keep Members off the Site if we think that they 
are creating problems or possible legal liabilities, infringing the intellectual property rights of third parties, 
or acting inconsistently with the letter or spirit of these Terms. Additionally, we may, in appropriate 
circumstances and at our discretion, suspend or terminate Accounts of Members for any reason, 
including without limitation: (1) attempts to gain unauthorised access to the Site or another Member's 
account or providing assistance to others' attempting to do so, (2) overcoming software security features 
limiting use of or protecting any content, (3) usage of the Service to perform illegal activities such as 
money laundering, illegal gambling operations, financing terrorism, or other criminal activities, (4) 
violations of these Terms of Use, (5) failure to pay or fraudulent payment for Transactions, (6) 
unexpected operational difficulties, or (7) upon the request of law enforcement or other government 
agencies, if deemed to be legitimate and compelling by Bitstamp, acting in its sole discretion. 
We expressly reserve the right to cancel and/or terminate Accounts that have not been verified by the 
Client despite our good faith efforts to contact you seeking such verification (“Unverified Accounts”). All 
Unverified Accounts which have been inactive for a period of 6 months or more are further subject to 
transfer to a third-party escrow (the "Unverified Escrow”), and will no longer be maintained or be the 
legal responsibility of Bitstamp Ltd. The administrator/trustee of the Unverified Escrow shall make any 
and all additional reasonable efforts required by law to determine and contact each Unverified Account 
owner and, after suitable effort and time, will donate any residual Bitcoin or cash in these unclaimed 
Unverified Accounts to a nonprofit group or groups involved in the Bitcoin ecosystem. 
The suspension of an Account shall not affect the payment of the commissions due for past 
Transactions. Upon termination, Members shall communicate a valid bank account to allow for the 
transfer of any currencies credited to their account. Said bank account shall be held by the Member. 
Bitcoins may be transferred to a valid bank account only after conversion into a currency. Bitstamp shall 
transfer the currencies as soon as possible following the Member's request in the time frames specified 
by Bitstamp. 
Bitstamp will send to you the credit balance of your Account, however in circumstances a number of 
intermediaries may be involved in an international payment and these or the beneficiary bank may 
deduct charges. We will use reasonable efforts to ensure that such charges are disclosed to you prior 
to sending your payment, however where they cannot be avoided, you acknowledge that these charges 
cannot always be calculated in advance, and that you agree to be responsible for such charges. 
Upon Account closing, any amount less than $5 in value will not be returned. 
 





AVAILABILITY OF SERVICES 
All services are provided without warranty of any kind, either express or implied. We do not represent 
that this Site will be available 100% of the time to meet your needs. We will strive to provide you with 
the Service as soon as possible but there are no guarantees that access will not be interrupted, or that 
there will be no delays, failures, errors, omissions or loss of transmitted information. 
We will use reasonable endeavours to ensure that the Site can normally be accessed by you in 
accordance with these Terms of Use. We may suspend use of the Site for maintenance and will make 
reasonable efforts to give you notice. You acknowledge that this may not be possible in an emergency. 
 
APIS AND WIDGETS 
We may provide access to certain parties to access specific data and information through our API 
(Application Programming Interface) or through widgets. We also may provide widgets for your use to 
put our data on your Site. You are free to use these in their original unmodified and un-altered state. 
EXTERNAL WEBSITES 
Bitstamp makes no representations whatsoever about any outside or third party website which you may 
access through the Site. Occasionally, the Bitstamp website may provide references or links to other 
websites ("External Websites"). We do not control these External Websites third party sites or any of 
the content contained therein. You agree that we are in no way responsible or liable for External 
Websites referenced or linked from the Bitstamp website, including, but not limited to, website content, 
policies, failures, promotions, products, opinions, advice, statements, prices, activities and 
advertisements, services or actions and/or any damages, losses, failures or problems caused by, 
related to, or arising from those sites. You shall bear all risks associated with the use of such content. 
External Websites have separate and independent terms of use and related policies. We request that 
you review the policies, rules, terms, and regulations of each site that you visit. It is up to you to take 
precautions to ensure that whatever you select for your use is free of such items as viruses, worms, 
Trojan horses and other items of a destructive nature. 
 
FINANCIAL ADVICE 
For the avoidance of doubt we do not provide any investment advice in connection with the Services 
contemplated by these Terms of Use. We may provide information on the price, range, volatility of 
Bitcoins and events that have affected the price of Bitcoins but this is not considered investment advice 
and should not be construed as such. Any decision to purchase or sell Bitcoins is your decision and we 
will not be liable for any loss suffered. 
 






Our business model, and our Service, consists of facilitating the buying, selling and trading of Bitcoins 
and their use to purchase goods in an unregulated, international open payment system. The Services 
we provide are currently unregulated within the UK. 
 
EMAIL 
Email messages sent over the Internet are not secure and Bitstamp is not responsible for any damages 
incurred by the result of sending email messages over the Internet. We suggest sending email in 
encrypted formats; you are welcome to send PGP encrypted emails to us. The instructions and keys to 
do so are available upon request. 
 
DISCLOSURES TO LEGAL AUTHORITIES AND AUTHORIZED FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
We may share your Personal Information with law enforcement, data protection authorities, government 
officials, and other authorities when: 
 Required by law; 
 Compelled by subpoena, court order, or other legal procedure; 
 We believe that the disclosure is necessary to prevent physical harm or financial loss; 
 Disclosure is necessary to report suspected illegal activity; or 
 Disclosure is necessary to investigate violations of our Terms of Use or Privacy Policy. 
With respect to US residents, we also may share your information with other financial institutions as 
authorized under Section 314(b) of the US Patriot Act, and with tax authorities, including the US Internal 
Revenue Service, pursuant to the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act ("FATCA"), to the extent that 
this statute may be determined to apply to Bitstamp Ltd. "Personal Information" refers to information 
that identifies an individual, such as name, address, e-mail address, trading information, and banking 
details. “Personal Information” does not include anonymised and/or aggregated data that does not 
identify a specific user. 
 
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS OF PERSONAL INFORMATION 
We store and process your Personal Information in data centres around the world, wherever Bitstamp 
facilities or service providers are located. As such, we may transfer your Personal Information outside 
of the European Economic Area (“EEA”). Such transfers are undertaken in accordance with our legal 
and regulatory obligations. 
 






The Terms of Use shall be governed and construed in accordance with English Law. The parties agree 
to irrevocably submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English Courts. 
 
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY 
To the extent permitted by law, Bitstamp will not be held liable for any damages, loss of profit, loss of 
revenue, loss of business, loss of opportunity, loss of data, indirect or consequential loss unless the 
loss suffered arising from negligence or wilful deceit or fraud. Nothing in these terms excludes or limits 
the liability of either party for fraud, death or personal injury caused by its negligence, breach of terms 
implied by operation of law, or any other liability which may not by law be limited or excluded. 
Subject to the foregoing, Bitstamp's aggregate liability in respect of claims based on events arising out 
of or in connection with any single Member's use of the Site and/or Service, whether in contract or tort 
(including negligence) or otherwise, shall in no circumstances exceed the greater of either (a) the total 
amount held on Account for the Member making a claim less any amount of Commission that may be 
due and payable in respect of such Account; or (b) 125% of the amount of the Transaction(s) that are 




To the full extent permitted by applicable law, you hereby agree to indemnify Bitstamp, and its partners 
against any action, liability, cost, claim, loss, damage, proceeding or expense suffered or incurred if 
direct or not directly arising from your use of Bitstamp's Sites, your use of the Service, or from your 
violation of these Terms of Use. 
 
MISCELLANEOUS 
If we are unable to perform the Services outlined in the Terms of Use due to factors beyond our control 
including but not limited to an event of Force Majeure, change of law or change in sanctions policy we 
will not have any liability to you with respect to the Services provided under this agreement and for a 
time period coincident with the event. 
 
MODIFICATION OF TERMS 





Bitstamp reserves the right to change, add or remove portions of these Terms, at any time, in an 
exercise of its sole discretion. You will be notified of any changes in advance through your Account. 
Upon such notification, it is your responsibility to review the amended Terms. Your continued use of the 
Site following the posting of a notice of changes to the Terms signifies that you accept and agree to the 
changes, and that all subsequent transactions by you will be subject to the amended Terms. 
 
DEFINITIONS 
Account. The contractual arrangement wherein a Bitstamp Member has accepted our Terms of Use 
and Privacy Policy, and received approval to use the Bitstamp Services, including the purchase and 
sale of Bitcoins and to perform associated Transactions. 
Bitcoins. The Peer-to-Peer internet currency further described at http://bitcoin.org. 
Buyer(s). Member(s) that are submitting an offer to buy Bitcoins through the Service. 
Commission. Refers to the fee which is payable to Bitstamp on each Transaction, such as a Bitcoin 
Purchase Transaction. 
Member(s). Refers to Buyers and Sellers as well as any holder of an Account. 
Personal Information. Information that identifies an individual, such as name, address, e-mail address, 
trading information, and banking details. “Personal Information” does not include anonymised and/or 
aggregated data that does not identify a specific user. 
Price. The "price per coin" for which Members are willing to purchase or sell Bitcoins, using the Service 
in a Bitcoin Purchase Transaction. The Price may be expressed in any of the currencies deposited by 
Members in their Account and supported by the Service. See our Site for a full list of currencies. 
Seller(s). Member(s) that are submitting an offer to sell Bitcoins through the Service. 
Service(s). The technological platform, functional rules and market managed by Bitstamp Ltd. to permit 
Sellers and Buyers to perform purchase and sale transactions of Bitcoins. 
Transaction. Includes the following: 
 The agreement between the Buyer and the Seller to exchange Bitcoins through the Service for 
currencies at a commonly agreed rate ("Bitcoin Purchase Transaction"); 
 The conversion of currencies into Bitcoins deposited by Members on their Account ("Conversion 
Transaction"); 
 The transfer of Bitcoins among Members ("Bitcoin Transfer Transaction"); 
 The transfer of currencies among Members ("Currency Transfer Transaction"); and 
 The purchase of ancillary products ("Purchase Transactions"). 
Bitstamp may not offer all of these types of transactions at this time or in all places. 
Transaction Price. The total price paid by the Buyer in respect of each Transaction performed through 
the Service. 
 






If you have any questions relating to these Terms of Use, your rights and obligations arising 









Appendix 2C: ANXBTC710 
In using this website you are deemed to have read and agreed to the following terms of use: 
These Terms and Conditions (the 'Terms') set out the conditions under which ANXBTC.COM, a 
company incorporated under the laws of Hong Kong (hereinafter, 'ANXBTC.COM') offer you use of the 
ANXBTC.COM Website at https://ANX-PRO.COM (the 'Site' or 'Website') and access to the 
ANXBTC.COM Platform (the 'Platform'). Please read these Terms carefully and do not use the Site or 
the Platform unless you accept them. 
Furthermore, the following terminology applies to these Terms and Conditions and any or all 
Agreements: 'Client', 'Registered Member', 'You' and 'Your' refers to you, the person accessing this 
website and accepting the Company's terms and conditions. 'The Company', 'Ourselves', 'We' and 'Us', 
refers to ANXBTC.COM. 'Party', 'Parties', or 'Us', refers to both the Client and ourselves, or either the 
Client or ourselves. All terms refer to the offer, acceptance and consideration of payment or fees 
necessary to undertake the services provided by ANXBTC.COM and its' associated Platform. 
ANXBTC.COM and its associated Platform facilitates a service whereas registered members can 
exchange fiat currency for virtual currency. 
By registering on and using any of the functions provided by the ANXBTC.COM Site or Platform, you 
are deemed to have read, understood and accepted all of the following terms & conditions. In addition, 
by opening an account to use the ANXBTC.COM Platform: 
 you have accepted these Terms; and 
 you are confirming that you are at least 18 years of age and have the full capacity to accept 
these Terms and enter into a transaction as a result of using the ANXBTC.COM Platform 
 you agree only to trade with legally obtained funds that belong to you 
 you agree to take full responsibility for your trading or non-trading actions and any gains or 
losses sustained as a result of using the ANXBTC.COM platform 
 you confirm the details provided upon registration are true and accurate 
 you agree to abide by any relevant laws in your jurisdiction, including reporting any trading 
profits for taxation purposes. 
Changes to Terms 
ANX reserves the right, at its sole discretion, to change, add or remove portions of these Terms, at any 
time. Such notification will be made via the Website. It is your responsibility to review the amended 
Terms. Your continued use of the Website and Platform following the posting of changes will mean that 
you accept and agree to the changes and you agree that all subsequent transactions by you will be 
subject to these Terms. 
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ANX reserves the right to close inactive accounts that have exhibited no events or transaction activity 
for a period greater than 6 months. Customers of whom accounts will be closed as a result of this 
condition will be contacted by ANX using the customers registered email address 14 days prior to 
account closure. After the account is closed, customers will have 30 days to make arrangements for 
any funds held in the account or notify ANX by email that they wish to keep the account open. ANX will 
not be liable for any funds that were held within the account after 30 days from account closure. 
KYC (Know-Your-Customer) and AML (Anti Money Laundering) Policies 
ANX remains committed in providing a safe, globally-compliant and reputable service to its clients. As 
a company, we pride ourselves on the integrity and transparency of our business. For this reason, ANX 
relies on comprehensive and thorough KYC (Know-Your-Customer) and AML (Anti Money Laundering) 
policies. 
ANX is legally registered and its infrastructure is physically located in Hong Kong. ANX insists on a 
comprehensive and thorough KYC (Know-Your-Customer) and AML (Anti Money Laundering) 
compliance framework. This includes the monitoring of suspicious transactions and obligatory reporting 
to local regulators and other compliance bodies. 
Our AML and KYC policies differ depending on the country of origin of which our clients are located and 
furthermore recorded against through the ANX registration process. The specific AML and KYC policies 
as per regional jurisdiction are located below. Our robust compliance framework ensures that regulatory 
requirements are being adhered to at both a local and global level, instilling a level of trust and ensuring 
ANX will continue to operate indefinitely. 
ANX reserves the right to refuse registration to persons from or in jurisdictions that do not meet 
international AML standards or could be considered as a Politically Exposed Person. 
ANX reserves the right to carry out customer due diligence to verify its users and their transactions. 
Enhanced customer due diligence will be carried out periodically as part of our ongoing risk review and 
assessment. In addition to this, any attempt to abuse ANX or its platform will result in an immediate 
account suspension and reported to the respective authorities. 
The ANX AML and KYC policies are as follows: 
 Transactions conducted via the ANX platform will be subject to AML transaction monitoring. 
 Identity and proof of address documents and transaction records will be maintained for at least 
six years and will be submitted to regulators as required without prior notification to registered 
users. 
 ANX may at any time without liability and without disclosing any reason, suspend the operation 
of your account. ANX shall notify you after exercising its rights under this clause. 
 Registered members of whom transactions involve fiat currency will be required to verify their 
identity and adhere to the ANX KYC policy. This includes the submission of both government 
ID and proof of address. Valid ID includes a passport, national card, or drivers license. Valid 





proof of address includes utility and rates bills not older than 3 months. Other forms of ID and 
Address verification will not be accepted. Your account will be unregistered until account 
verification has been completed. 
 Suspicious transactions will result in a Suspicious Activity Report being submitted to the Joint 
Financial Intelligence Unit ('JFIU'). 
 It is your responsibility to determine what, if any, taxes apply to the payments you make or 
receive, and it is your responsibility to collect, report an remit the correct tax to the appropriate 
tax authority, regardless of jurisdiction. ANX is not responsible for determining whether taxes 
apply to your transaction, or for collecting, reporting or remitting any taxes arising from any 
transaction, to you or any taxation, governing or third authority. 
 Trading Bitcoins, virtual currencies and virtual commodities carries a high level of risk, and may 
not be suitable for everyone. Before deciding to buy or sell these instruments you should 
carefully consider your investment objectives, level of experience, and risk appetite. The 
possibility exists that you could sustain a loss of some of all of your investment and therefore 
you should not invest money that you cannot afford to lose. You should be aware of all the risks 
associated with virtual commodities, and seek advice from an independent financial adviser 
should you have any doubts. Furthermore, there may be risks that are not disclosed in our 
Terms of use. You should use extreme consideration and be conscious of assessing your 
financial situation and tolerance for risk before engaging in activities involving the trading of 
virtual commodities. 
 Any opinions, news, research, analyses, prices, or other information contained on this website 
is provided as general market commentary, and does not constitute investment advice. ANX 
will not accept liability for any loss or damage, including without limitation to, any loss of profit, 
which may arise directly or indirectly fro use of or reliance on such information. 
 There are risks associated with utilizing an Internet-based deal execution trading system 
including, but not limited to, the failure of hardware, software, and Internet connection. As ANX 
does not control the reliability or availability of the Internet, ANX cannot be responsible for 
communication failures, distortions or delays when trading via the Internet. 
 The content on this website is subject to change at any time without notice, ANX has taken 
reasonable measures to ensure the accuracy of the information on the website, however, does 
not guarantee its accuracy, and will not accept liability for any loss or damage which may arise 
directly or indirectly from the content or your inability to access the website, for any delay in or 
failure of the transmission or the receipt of any instruction or notifications sent through website. 
 In case of discrepancy between the English version and the Chinese versions in respect of all 
or any part of the contents in the website, the English version shall prevail. 
  





Appendix 3 (Price Fluctuations)  
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FCA Final Decision Notices 
 FCA Final Notice 2014: Lloyds Banking Group July 2014 
 FCA Final Notice 2014: Citibank N.A. 12 November 2014 
 FCA Final Notice 2014: JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A..12 November 2014 
 FCA Final Notice 2014: UBS AG 12 November 2014 
 FCA Final Notice 2014: HSBC Bank Plc, 12 November 2014 
 FCA Final Notice 2014: The Royal Bank of Scotland plc 12 November 2014 
 
